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Abstract 
 
This thesis seeks to develop animal theology in dialogue with Leonardo Boff, 
specifically in relation to his liberation, ecological, and contextual theologies. 
Through an examination of his major works relating to creation—notably, Jesus 
Christ Liberator: A Critical Christology of Our Time (1972), Saint Francis: A Model 
for Human Liberation (1981), Ecology and Liberation: A New Paradigm (1993), and 
Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor (1995)—this thesis unravels the anthropocentric and 
instrumentalist thinking that characterises Roman Catholic thought about animals. In 
Jesus Christ Liberator, the work of Christ is considered only in relation to humanity, 
which in practical terms means that human beings—their life, worth, and destiny—are 
God’s primary, if not exclusive, concern. In Saint Francis, despite the obvious moral 
example provided, Boff almost wholly ignores Francis’s significance for other 
creatures, and his ecological theology tantalisingly remains insufficiently attentive to 
the animal issue. 
 Yet Boff’s ecological theology represents a significant shift, and at least 
notionally, he accepts the rights of other creatures. So paradoxically, his ecological 
theology is a catalyst for greater concern for creation, including animals. Boff may 
have influenced the thinking of Pope Francis, especially in the pope’s Laudato Si’ 
(2015), and has certainly engendered greater theological thinking on the environment. 
Finally, this thesis proposes a non-anthropocentric reconstruction of the Trinity as 
Gentleness, Solidarity, and Fraternity, reinforced by Boff’s work in Trinity and 
Society (1986) and Holy Trinity, Perfect Community (1988). A Trinitarian theology of 
animal liberation is suggested based on, inter alia, the notion of communion as being 
“for” creation and the idea of Triune sight. The Trinity is proposed as a model for 
human–animal relations. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
On the outskirts of São Leopoldo, I see an emaciated, tired horse searching for food in 
a rubbish heap. Behind the horse, I see homes made out of corrugated cardboard and a 
small, thin child playing in the rubbish. I am on my way to a theological congress at 
EST Faculdades in São Leopoldo, in the south of Brazil. The image of the horse and 
the child on the rubbish heap haunts me as I travel through Brazil, as it brings together 
the central themes of my thesis—poverty, ecology, and animals—in the largest 
Catholic country in the world. 
 This thesis seeks to develop animal theology in dialogue with the Brazilian 
theologian Leonardo Boff. His work encompasses liberation, ecological, and 
contextual theologies, and it is in these principal areas that I hope to develop my 
animal theology. Boff’s theology reflects the theological neglect of animals in the 
Roman Catholic tradition. Yet paradoxically, his thought, especially his ecotheology, 
may be a catalyst for greater concern for creation, including animals. I look in detail 
at four of his most significant works over three decades, works that best represent the 
development of his thought in these areas.  
This introduction begins with a discussion of what animal theology is based 
on foundational insights of animal theology, which provides a guide to the key themes 
of the thesis and also reviews current literature. The last section of this chapter 
comprises my methodology and an outline of the chapters. It poses three guiding 
methodological questions which frame the thesis. It also contains a guide to the 
interviews conducted in Brazil in order to provide an overview of interview method, 
the interviewees, and their expertise. It ends by explaining the contents of the 
appendices. 
 
1.1. What is animal theology? 
Before I turn to my discussion of what animal theology is, some definitions may be 
useful. In discussions of creation theology, some terms are often used 
interchangeably—for instance, “animals” and “creatures.” Many theorists now adopt 
the language of “nonhuman animals” instead of “animals” because it signifies the fact 
that biologically humans are animals. This term is often used in an attempt to bridge 
the linguistic divide that can be used to separate humans from animals. While 
acknowledging the importance of language in constructing how we understand 
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human–animal relationships, this work will retain the word “animal.” For the sake of 
brevity, throughout this work “animal” will be understood as nonhuman animal, and 
“human” as human animal. For the purposes of this work, the term “animal(s)” is 
used to mean nonhuman animals in whom sentiency can be reasonably supposed—
that is, all mammals, reptiles, amphibians, birds, and fish. Sentience may be defined 
as the ability to experience pleasure and pain, including mental suffering involving 
fear, shock, terror, anticipation, anxiety, stress, foreboding, or distress.1 The 
theological implications of sentience will be discussed below in relation to insight (e). 
Although insects are animals, they are not included within this definition because 
sentiency has yet to be established in their case. “Creature(s)” is a broader term that is 
used to indicate beings within creation, which would include all animals, sentient or 
not. Creation here is understood as including all created beings, whether animals or 
plants, as well as other parts of the natural world, such as rivers, mountains, minerals, 
and so on. 
To understand what is developed in this thesis, we must first grasp what 
animal theology is. Animal theology is a term coined by Andrew Linzey2 in 1994 in 
his now classic work Animal Theology.3 The grounds for selecting and focusing on 
Linzey’s work are threefold. First, Linzey has pioneered the field. Mark Rowlands 
maintains that: “Andrew Linzey is virtually synonymous with the discipline of animal 
theology: a discipline that he has legitimate claim to have single-handedly 
invented.”4 Second, Linzey is the only theologian to be recognised by the awarding of 
a Lambeth Doctorate of Divinity by Archbishop George Carey for his “unique and 
massive pioneering work at a scholarly level in the area of the theology of creation 
with particular reference to the rights and welfare of God’s sentient creatures.”5 
Third, Linzey’s corpus is much larger than generally appreciated. Apart from over 
100 articles, his books, both authored and edited, on animals are: Animal Rights: A 
Christian Assessment (1976), Christianity and the Rights of Animals (1987), Animals 
and Christianity: A Book of Readings (1988), Song of Creation (1988), Compassion 
                                                 
1 For a discussion of these issues, see Rollin, The Unheeded Cry. 
2 Although I am familiar with all of Linzey’s work, this thesis draws largely upon his animal theology 
corpus in particular—namely, Christianity and the Rights of Animals; Animal Theology; Animal 
Gospel; Creatures of the Same God; and Why Animal Suffering Matters. 
3 Linzey, Animal Theology. 
4 Rowlands quoted from his endorsement of Linzey, Why Animal Suffering Matters. 
5 Statement by Archbishop George Carey at the conferring of the Doctorate of Divinity, Lambeth 
Palace, 2001, https://www.oxfordanimalethics.com/who-we-are/director/. 
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for Animals: Readings and Prayers (1988), Political Theory and Animal Rights 
(1990), Animal Theology (1994), After Noah: Animals and the Liberation of Theology 
(1997), Animals on the Agenda: Questions About Animals for Theology and Ethics 
(1998),  Animal Gospel: Christian Faith as if Animal Mattered (1999), Animal Rites: 
Liturgies of Animal Care (1999), Animal Rights: A Historical Anthology (2005), 
Creatures of the Same God: Explorations in Animal Theology (2007), Why Animal 
Suffering Matters: Philosophy, Theology, and Practical Ethics (2007), The Link 
Between Animal Abuse and Human Violence (2009), Other Nations: Animals in 
Modern Literature (2010), The Global Guide to Animal Protection (2013), Animal 
Ethics for Veterinarians (2017), The Ethical Case Against Animal Experiments 
(2018), The Palgrave Handbook of Practical Animal Ethics (2018), The Routledge 
Handbook of Religion and Animal Ethics (2018), and Ethical Vegetarianism and 
Veganism (2018). He is therefore the theologian who has published more on the status 
of animals than any other. Bishop John Austin Baker claims him as “the greatest 
living writer on theology and animals.”6 
In his introduction to Animal Theology Linzey states, “I hold that Christian 
theology provides some of the key categories of thought which enable a full satisfying 
ethical conception of the place of non-human creatures in our world.”7 Linzey does 
not offer a strict definition of the term, and so let me attempt to offer one. Animal 
theology is an attempt to view the Christian tradition through an animal-friendly lens, 
while retaining a critical approach to the tradition with regards to its concern for 
animals. Animal theology is involved, like feminist theology, in a process of looking 
again at the Christian tradition to reclaim and rebuild insights and voices concerning 
our relationship with animals. Although animals are now under discussion in various 
academic fields, animal theology is distinct from, for example, discussions in 
philosophy, which might include animal rights language,8 or discussions in law, 
which include conceptions of property or personhood.9 Animal theology begins from 
theological concepts, and although it may garner some insights from other animal 
                                                 
6 Baker quote taken from https://www.oxfordanimalethics.com/2007/06/launch-of-creatures-of-the-
same-god/. 
7 Linzey, Animal Theology, viii. 
8 The philosophical literature on animal rights is considerable, but for the classic statement of the 
deontological case, see Regan, The Case for Animal Rights; and for the classic statement of preference 
utilitarianism, see Singer, Animal Liberation. 
9 The legal literature on animals also is growing, but for a discussion of animals as property, see 
Francione, Animals, Property, and the Law; or for an example of the discussion of animals as legal 
persons, see Wise, Rattling the Cage. 
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fields, it is grounded in its own set of theological considerations. It begins from the 
perspective that although critical of the Christian tradition, contained therein are many 
resources for a better understanding our relationship with animals. Since Linzey 
pioneered the subfield there has been increasing literature on the subject of animal 
theology.10 
In discussing the themes of animal theology, I will draw not just upon the 
work Animal Theology but on all of Linzey’s corpus, to draw out what I consider to 
be the foundational insights of animal theology. Although his perspective has 
developed over time, a clear statement of Linzey’s position is given in his “Credo” in 
Animal Gospel. It is the clearest, succinct articulation of what animal theology 
encompasses. It is worth reproducing here in full: 
 
I affirm the One Creator God from whom all existence flows. I celebrate the  
common origin of all life in God. I undertake to cherish and love all creatures  
whose life belongs to God and exists for God’s glory. 
 I affirm the life of Jesus as the true pattern of service to the weak. I  
promise my solidarity with all suffering creatures. I join hands with Jesus in  
his ministry to the least of all, knowing that it is the vocation of the strong to  
be gentle. 
 I see in the face of the Crucified the faces of all innocent, suffering  
creatures. I hear their cries for a new creation. I thank God for the grace to feel  
their suffering and give voice to their pain. 
 I affirm the Word made flesh as the new covenant between God and all  
sentient creatures. I seek to live out that covenant in acts of moral generosity,  
kindness and gentleness to all those creatures that God has gathered together  
into unity. 
 I affirm the life-giving Spirit, source of all that is wonderful, who  
animates every creature. I pledge myself to honor life because of the Lord of  
life. 
                                                 
10 Linzey has inspired and or facilitated a new generation of books on animal theology, including: The 
works on animal theology are now numerous, but see for example, Webb, On God and Dogs; 
McLaughlin, Christian Theology and the Status of Animals; Jones, The School of Compassion; Barsam, 
Reverence for Life; Smith, Animals in Tillich's Philosophical Theology; Sampson, Animal Ethics and 
the Nonconformist Conscience; Gilmour, Animals in the Writings of C. S. Lewis; and Nellist, Eastern 
Orthodox Christianity and Animal Suffering. In addition, Linzey is co-editor of the Palgrave Macmillan 
Animal Ethics Series which has commissioned over 35 volumes. 
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 I affirm the hope of the world to come for all God’s creatures. I believe  
in the Cross as the symbol of liberation for every creature suffering from  
bondage. I will daily trust in the redeeming power of God to transform the  
universe. 
 I pray that the community of Christ may be blessed with a new vision  
of God’s creation. I will turn away from my hardness of heart and seek to  
become a living sign of the Gospel for which all creatures long. 
 I rejoice in animals as fellow-creatures: loved by the Father, redeemed  
by the Son, and enlivened by the Holy Spirit. 
 May God the Holy Trinity give me strength to live out my  
commitment this day.11 
 
Linzey’s Credo is the starting point for considering the foundational insights of 
animal theology. What follows a discussion of these insights in which Linzey’s 
position is summarised before looking at some of the alternatives and responses to his 
ideas. This discussion usefully provides a review of the major themes within animal 
theology. I hope to illustrate the ways in which the debates surrounding these insights 
have developed in order to give a sense of how they relate to the debates within 
Boff’s work. These foundational insights should serve to indicate the themes I hope to 
develop in this thesis as well as serving as a review of the current literature. The 
foundational insights of animal theology are:  
 
a) The Triune God delights in differentiated being and so should we;  
b) God’s own right as Creator establishes the rights of all sentient creatures;  
c) In Christ God embraces the flesh of all sentient creatures;  
d) In Christ God rejects the fallenness of the world and wills to create a new  
heaven and earth;  
e) The cross of Christ is the symbol of liberation of every creature suffering  
from bondage. God in Christ is the face of suffering of the world;  
f) God’s generosity in Christ necessitates the response of moral generosity.  
Lordship should be expressed as service; and  
g) The life giving Spirit, source of all that is wonderful, animates every  
                                                 
11 Linzey, Animal Gospel, 7-8. 
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creature. Approximating the Kingdom is empowered by the spirit.  
 
Let me take each one in turn. 
 
a. The Triune God delights in differentiated being and so should we 
This deceptively simple point is at the heart of animal theology. It is the idea that God 
is concerned with more than simply human beings. God loves and delights in all 
creation. Celebrating creation is central to Linzey’s work, epitomised in After Noah 
by Linzey and Dan Cohn-Sherbok, “there is a direct relationship between our inability 
to celebrate animals and our dismal record of exploitation. We should not be surprised 
that we exploit our fellow creatures if we do not know how to celebrate, rejoice, and 
give thanks for the beautiful world God has made.”12 The proper attitude towards 
creation and other creatures is one of celebration, delight and awe because “the world 
of living creatures exists because God loves them, and sustains them, and rejoices in 
them.”13 This is an insight at the heart of Saint Francis’ ministry, as will be discussed 
in chapter four.14 The wonder of creation is captured in the words of his follower 
Saint Bonaventure: “open your eyes, alert the ears of your spirit, open your lips and 
apply your heart so that in all creatures you may see, hear, praise, love and worship, 
glorify and honour your God.”15 In celebrating other creatures, we are celebrating the 
world God has made. 
Despite acknowledging God as Creator, the Christian tradition has tended to 
see the rest of creation as mere theatre or background to God’s real concern, namely 
humanity. Humanity is the locus of God’s concern for the world as evidenced by the 
imago dei and the incarnation. The Catholic tradition, especially the work of Thomas 
Aquinas, focuses on God’s work in the world in relation to humanity to the exclusion 
of the rest of creation. This is explored in detail in chapter two of this thesis (40-47).  
A discussion of the particularity of Christ in the incarnation can be found in relation 
to Boff’s work in chapter three (54-58). Delighting in the creation that God has made 
does not mean that humanity does not hold a special place in creation. Linzey holds a 
strong view of human uniqueness, that is humans as the servant species (which will be 
                                                 
12 Linzey and Cohn-Sherbok, After Noah, 12. 
13 Linzey and Cohn-Sherbok, After Noah, 12. 
14 For more on Linzey’s perspective on Saint Francis and animals see, Linzey and Barsam, “Saint 
Francis of Assisi.” 
15 Extract from Bonaventure, “The Soul’s Journey into God,” reproduced in Linzey and Regan, 
Compassion for Animals, 9. 
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discussed in insight (f)). However, delighting in God’s creation does entail a rejection 
of moral anthropocentrism, which is the view that humans are God’s sole or primary 
concern, that human wants and concerns are alone morally significant. Encompassed 
in the rejection of moral anthropocentrism is the rejection of the idea that human 
interests should always outweigh the interests of animals.16  
 Celia Deane-Drummond provides one response to the charge that theology is 
too focused on humanity to fully appreciate the importance of the rest of creation. 
Deane-Drummond takes an evolutionary biological approach to Roman Catholic 
theology to defend the idea that the imago dei applies not only to humans but also to a 
lesser degree to animals. Through a discussion of moral agency and the divine image, 
she suggests that “non-human animals can be thought of as in some sense sharing in 
moral agency, whether in a latent sense or through specific behaviour in their own 
moral worlds.”17 From this she suggests that animals may share in the divine image, 
such that they may be considered “image-bearing” beings.18 In other words, she 
argues for animals as having in a limited sense, moral agency, which ties them to the 
divine image. In so doing she expands the category of the divine image to include 
animals within it and thus adjusting and reducing the emphasis on the theological 
significance of humanity.  
 This attempt to locate the divine image within created beings, rather than 
humans alone, stresses the interconnectedness of creation and reduces the 
anthropocentric focus. However, the conception of animals as moral agents is 
problematic and highly debated amongst philosophers.19 Although Deane-Drummond 
is only arguing for moral agency in a limited sense, even doing this leaves open a 
range of problematic questions. For example, if animals are moral and they eat each 
other, why can’t we eat animals? Since murder and violence are common in the 
animal kingdom, it leaves open moral questions of how we should behave if we are 
all moral agents. Further, if they are moral agents, albeit in a limited way, does that 
then require the meting out of some corresponding form of justice? In short, 
attributing the image and moral agency to the rest of creation, while reducing the 
anthropocentric lens, can pose more questions than it resolves. At its worst it may 
                                                 
16 For a fuller discussion of anthropocentrism, see Linzey and Linzey, “Anthropocentrism.” 
17 Deane-Drummond, “Are Animals Moral?,” in Deane-Drummond and Clough, Creaturely Theology, 
209. 
18 Deane-Drummond, “Are Animals Moral?,” 210. 
19 For more different perspectives on this debate, see Bekoff and Pierce, Wild Justice; Clark, The 
Nature of the Beast; and Rowlands, Can Animal Be Moral?. 
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even be construed as a call to return to the morality of nature, namely predation: eat 
and be eaten. The question of predation in nature will be explored again in relation to 
insight (d). Theologically Deane-Drummonds position blunts the imago dei. In trying 
to stress the interconnectedness of creation, she reduces the unique role that humans 
are called to take up in relation to creation. 
 A different theological vision of the imago dei is offered by Ryan Patrick 
McLaughlin. Building on Linzey’s work, he undertakes a detailed analysis of the 
divine image based on the biblical witness. He concludes that, “God endows 
humanity with the divine image for the sake of keeping the divine order of the 
cosmos.”20 That is the giving of the image is linked with the task of caring for 
creation. The purpose of the image is our responsibility for creation. 
This work attempts to problematise Boff’s anthropocentric focus. The critique 
that Boff’s theology is too focused on humanity to see the importance of other 
creatures is a reoccurring theme throughout this thesis, but is especially discussed in 
relation to his liberation theology in chapter three (54-65) and his Franciscan theology 
in chapter four (75-83). I develop further a Trinitarian approach to animal theology in 
chapter seven (162-177). 
 
b. God’s own right as Creator establishes the rights of all sentient creatures 
In Linzey’s first work Animal Rights: A Christian Assessment, he argued for an 
extension of the idea of rights to animals based on a philosophical conception of 
rights.21 However, as he acknowledges in his later work Christianity and the Rights of 
Animals, the response to his Animal Rights made him realise that a fully theological 
account of animal rights was required.22 In developing a theological basis for animal 
rights, he takes Dietrich Bonhoeffer as his starting point. Bonhoeffer writes that, 
“There is no right before God [but] … The rights of natural life are in the midst of the 
fallen world the reflected splendour of the glory of God’s creation.”23 Rights language 
only properly belongs to God and is reflected in creation as part of God’s glory. In 
Christianity and the Rights of Animals and Animal Theology, this idea was developed 
into “Theos- rights”: God’s own right as Creator established the rights of all sentient 
                                                 
20 McLaughlin, Christian Theology and the Status of Animals, 96. 
21 For philosophical discussions of why animals do not have rights see, Frey, Interests and Rights;  
Frey, Rights Killing and Suffering; and Leahy, Against Liberation. 
22 For a conservative Christian critique of Animal Rights see, Griffiths, The Human Use of Animals. 
23 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 127; discussed in Linzey, Christianity and the Rights of Animals, 70-2. 
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creatures.24 “When we speak of animal rights we conceptualize what is owed to 
animals as a matter of justice by the virtue of their Creator’s right.”25 Theos-rights, as 
Linzey terms them, are God’s right to have her creation respected and are based on 
four claims. First, “Creation exists for its Creator.”26 That is, creation belongs to God 
and not humanity. Second, God is for and on the side of his27 creation. God is not 
indifferent to creation rather “God the Creator is tied to what divine nature has created 
in creation.”28 God is interested in and loves her divine creation. Third, God’s “for-
ness” towards creation is a “continual affirmation” rather than a once and for all 
action in which sentient beings are “indwelt by the Spirit.”29 The Spirit moves within 
creation, especially sentient life, luring it towards the peaceable kingdom. Fourth, if 
God is for creation, so should humanity be. “It may well be the special task of humans 
within creation to do what other creatures cannot do, at least in a consciously 
deliberate way, namely honour, respect and rejoice in the creation in which God 
rejoices.”30 Rights language then is used here in a specifically theological sense. 
Linzey acknowledges the limitations of rights language but maintains that it can 
“convey to us that the claims of animals are God-based claims of justice.”31 From this 
insight it follows that animals are not here for human use. They are individual sentient 
beings with intrinsic value of their own. Animal theology rejects a purely 
instrumentalist conception of animals—the view that they are here for our use, a 
means to human ends. Instrumentalism will be discussed in relation to the Catholic 
tradition in chapter two (40-47). 
 Theos rights is perhaps the most debated idea within Linzey’s corpus.32 
Responses to Linzey’s idea fall predominately into one of two categories. The first is 
to say that rights language is not appropriate language in a theological context.33 Two 
different examples of this come from Stephen Webb and Stanley Hauerwas and John 
                                                 
24 For a full exploration of “theos-rights,” see “The Theos-Rights of Animals” in Linzey, Christianity 
and the Rights of Animals, 68–98. Linzey of course is not the first theologian to suggest that animals 
have rights. See for example, Lawler, “On the Rights of Animals.” 
25 Linzey, Animal Theology, 27. 
26 Linzey, Animal Theology, 24. 
27 Throughout this thesis I refer to the divine as “he” and “she” interchangeably, to indicate the non-
gendered nature of God. 
28 Linzey, Animal Theology, 24. 
29 Linzey, Animal Theology, 25. 
30 Linzey, Animal Theology, 25. 
31 Linzey, Animal Theology, 27. 
32 See for example, Marshall, “Does Creation have Rights?;” and Barclay, “Animal Rights: A 
Critique.” 
33 See for example, Barclay, “Animal Rights: A Critique,” 49-61; and Linzey’s response, “Animal 
Rights: A Reply to Barclay.” 
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Berkman. Webb argues that the theological language of grace and giving is more 
appropriate than the language of rights because “no matter how strategically 
important rights language is for the animal liberation movement, it is still preceded by 
and grounded in acts of charity. Giving is the more fundamental gesture.”34 Hauerwas 
and Berkman go further still and reject the idea of rights for both human and animals. 
They argue that “Christians have far richer resources by which to address the question 
of how we should relate to other animals. Any appeal to rights pales in relation to the 
peace and love of Christ to which the Christian is called.”35 Linzey pre-empts this 
criticism when he acknowledges, “in fighting for the positive good of animals and 
humans, Christians will need to utilize a varied vocabulary. All that is claimed here is 
that rights language should be part of the necessary armoury.”36 
 The second response tends to critique Linzey from a philosophical 
perspective. To take one example, Clare Palmer interprets Theos-rights as a form of 
the philosophical argument for rights on the basis of certain capabilities. The 
argument goes that in order for beings to have rights, those rights are located in a 
similar quality or capacity that those beings share.37 In Linzey’s case it is the capacity 
to be indwelt by the Spirit that humans and animals share. Basing rights on 
similarities or similar capacities, she argues, is problematic. “The emphasis on ethical 
‘alikeness’ means that differences such as species membership, domestication, 
historical context, and location are not morally relevant. No particular individual 
characteristics or histories can enter into any ethical decision.”38 Palmer, however, 
seems to have missed the central argument of Linzey’s position – it is not the 
capacities of the individual beings that gives them moral rights. It is God the Creator 
who has rights, and by extension only do other beings share in those rights. In short, 
Palmer has misunderstood the theological basis of the argument and failed to 
appreciate the development of Linzey’s thought from a philosophical to a theological 
argument. 
 The conception of rights in relation to Boff’s work is considered more fully in 
chapter five (112-119). 
                                                 
34 Webb, On God and Dogs, 42. 
35 Hauerwas and Berkman, “A Trinitarian Theology of the ‘Chief End’ of ‘All Flesh’,” 67. 
36 Linzey, Christianity and the Rights of Animals, 95. 
37 The “capabilities approach” in animal rights is associated with the work of Martha Nussbaum. See 
Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice; and Nussbaum, “The Capabilities Approach and Animal 
Entitlements,” in Beauchamp and Frey, The Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics.  
38 Palmer, “Animals in Christian Ethics,” 168; original emphasis. 
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c. In Christ God embraces the flesh of all sentient creatures 
In the prologue of John’s Gospel it says first “in him was life” (1:4) and “the Word 
became flesh” (1: 14).39 These are two related but distinct ideas. The first is that all 
life is comes from the Word. Linzey draws upon Edward Irving to explain the 
significance of this phrase: “Life we hold … [to be] the purchase of Christ’s sacrifice 
made from the foundation of the world … Whether you regard the life of any 
individual or the life of the race of men, or the life of animals … it is all a fruit, a 
common fruit of redemption, a benefit of the death of Christ.”40 The life encompassed 
by the Word is all life in creation. The second is that in the incarnation God took on 
flesh. Linzey interprets this to mean, not just human flesh, but all creaturely flesh. 
Flesh is an important distinction here, as it is what separates all animals, both human 
and non human, from the rest of creation. Flesh is also the basis of sentience and 
suffering. Only those beings who have flesh have the ability to suffer. In saying that 
Christ took on the flesh of sentient creatures, a claim is being made about the 
suffering of all sentient creatures. As Jürgen Moltmann writes, “God has made the 
suffering of the world his own in the Cross of his Son.”41 Suffering is what is 
redeemed by Christ on the cross, suffering that includes animal suffering. One thinker 
who posits a moral equivalence between the suffering of innocence animals and the 
suffering of the innocent Christ, is John Henry Newman. He writes, “Think then, my 
brethren, of your feelings at cruelty practiced upon brute animals, and you will gain 
one sort of feeling which the history of Christ’s Cross and Passion ought to excite 
within you.”42 God in Christ affirms his love affair with all flesh. 
 Christian theology has traditionally tended to diminish the importance of 
nonhuman suffering.43 To cite one example, Joseph Rickaby in his textbook on moral 
philosophy writes we have “no duties of charity, nor duties of any kind, to the lower 
animals, as neither to sticks and stones” and further that “in all that conduces to the 
sustenance of man may we give pain to brutes … Nor are we bound to any anxious 
                                                 
39 For a discussion see, Keener, Gospel of John, 385 and 406. 
40 Irving, Collected Writings, 295-6; discussed in Linzey, Christianity and the Rights of Animals, 30-
32. 
41 Moltmann, The Crucified God, 277; see a discussion in Linzey, Why Animal Suffering Matters, 164-
5. 
42 Newman, “The Crucifixion,” 138; discussed in Linzey, Why Animal Suffering Matters, 37-40. 
43 See for example, Geach, Providence and Evil. Geach argues that “God cannot share with his 
creatures” the “virtue of sympathy with physical suffering” (76-80). See Linzey’s response to Geach in 
Linzey, Christianity and the Rights of Animals, 58-62. 
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care to make this pain as little as may be.”44 In the light of this tradition, concern for 
animal suffering and pain may be considered at best a challenge.45 Indeed even 
amongst thinkers who do not deny animal suffering there is a tendency to diminish its 
significance. A. Richard Kingston argues that “British theodicy, although not formally 
denying animal suffering, has virtually done so by reducing its intensity to almost 
zero.”46 This is not just a trend in historic theological thought. At a recent conference 
in Rome, I responded to two examples of this. The first from South African 
theologian Ernst M. Conradie who not only saw no difference between eating a carrot 
and a rabbit, he argued that animals could be intrinsically valued and eaten at the 
same time.47 Even if one thinks Conradie’s position extreme, Christopher Southgate 
at the same conference gave a whole paper on concern for animal extinction, without 
mentioning that extinction is a process in which animals suffer and die.48 Even 
ecological theologians focused on climate change concerns have a tendency to not see 
animal suffering as a moral concern. 
 Many subsequent thinkers have taken up the idea of flesh as a central idea 
within animal theology. For example, David Cunningham builds on Linzey’s notion 
of flesh. 49 Cunningham suggests that “an account of the theological significance of 
flesh provides a … starting-point for reflection on the relationships among elements 
of the created order, precisely because it blurs the boundaries among various species 
and thereby emphasises their interdependence.”50 Flesh has become a key category 
for discussing human-animal relations because what we share in flesh is sentience. 
 Similarly in his On Animals, David Clough acknowledges the assumption of 
flesh in the incarnation as God’s taking on of creatureliness: “The doctrine of the 
incarnation does not therefore establish a theological boundary between humans and 
other animals; instead, it is best understood as God stepping over the boundary 
between creator and creation and taking on creatureliness.”51 Clough does not in this 
instance, however, make the connection between flesh and suffering, and thereby 
                                                 
44 Rickaby, Moral Philosophy, 249-50. 
45 Rickaby only reflects the traditional view that animals are here for human use. See for example, 
Palazzini, Dictionary of Moral Theology. Indeed natural theologian Charles Raven doubted that 
animals can experience suffering (Raven, The Creator Spirit). 
46 Kingston, “Theodicy and Animal Welfare,” in Linzey and Regan, Animals and Christianity, 77. 
47 Conradie, “Could Eating other Creatures be a Way of Recognising their Intrinsic Value?”  
48 Southgate, “Reflections on Migration of Species in Response to Climate Change.” 
49 Cunningham, “The Way of All Flesh,” in Deane-Drummond and Clough, Creaturely Theology, 113. 
50 Cunningham, “The Way of All Flesh,” 117. 
51 Clough, On Animals, 103. 
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misses an important theological interpretation of the redemption of suffering in 
Christ. However, it is included here as an example of how others have reflected on the 
idea of “flesh.” 
 The significance of flesh will be discussed in chapter three in relation to 
Boff’s liberation theology (56-57), and animal suffering will be discussed in light of 
his ecological theology in chapter five (119-122). There is an exploration of the 
Catholic tradition on animal suffering in chapters two (40-47) and six (128-135).  
 
d. In Christ God rejects the fallenness of the world and wills to create a new heaven 
and earth 
In Christ, God redeems the world, not just humanity. This simple insight alerts us to 
the idea that creation, including animals, need redemption. Implicit in holding that 
creation needs redemption is an acceptance that creation is fallen and imperfect and in 
need of redemption. For Linzey, the falleness of the world is most clear in the 
suffering of animals. “Animals, we can properly suppose, have something to be 
redeemed from, namely the bondage to decay and the groans and sighs to which they 
are currently subject.”52 However, to accept the falleness of the world is not to argue 
that creation does not also reveal the divine: “the very nature of creation is always 
ambiguous; it points both ways; it affirms and denies God at one and the same 
time.”53 Creation is ambiguous, that is it both discloses and at the same time does not 
disclose God, the Creator. The significance of this is that “It follows that there can be 
no straightforward moral or theological appeal to the way nature is.”54 Creation is not 
then a moral textbook, from which we can read off a series of commands. Like all 
creation, the natural world, both reveals and hides her Creator.   
 Many eco-theologians, including Boff, are keen to distance themselves from 
the idea of the fall of nature.55 This distancing is seen as important because ideas of 
the corruption of nature have been seen as buttressing the use and abuse of creation. 
Thomas Berry argues that “We need to move from a spirituality of alienation from the 
natural world to a spirituality of intimacy with the natural world.”56 It is our alienation 
                                                 
52 Linzey, Animal Rites, 108. 
53 Linzey, Animal Theology, 81; my emphases. 
54 Linzey, Animal Theology, 81. 
55 For a classic rejection of the fall of nature see, Fox, Original Blessing. In his rejection of the fall of 
nature, Fox accepts predation as God-given. 
56 Berry, “Christianity’s Role in the Earth Project,” in Hessel and Radford Ruether, Christianity and 
Ecology, 128. 
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from the natural world that has justified our abuse of it. Regaining a sense of our 
interconnection with the natural world and the wonder and beauty of it is seen as 
essential to treating the world better. This sense has led theologians such as Sallie 
McFague to conceive of the world as God’s body as an affirmation of the created 
world.57  
 An alternative to the ambiguity of creation is to affirm as James Nash does 
that there are moral norms to be found in nature. He argues that “Ecologically 
sensitized and otherwise reformed, the natural law approach can provide or point to 
an adequate framework for social and ecological ethics.”58 He argues for the 
augmentation of natural law theory with a “sense of ecosystemic compatibility.”59 In 
short, for Nash “following nature makes moral sense.”60 However, following nature 
which is characterised by predation, entropy and decay leaves us with difficult moral 
questions. For example, is killing God’s will? Is the law of the jungle the same as 
natural law?61 There are even some eco-theologians, such as Richard Cartwright 
Austin who see “the beauty of predation.”62 The question of predation is a difficult 
one and will be discussed at length in chapter five (98-100). The ambiguity of 
creation in relation to ethics will be discussed in more detail in chapter five (107-112).  
 
e. The cross of Christ is the symbol of liberation of every creature suffering from 
bondage. God in Christ is the face of suffering of the world 
In Christ, God rejects the falleness of the world and takes all suffering upon himself 
on the cross. “If it is believed, in fidelity to the gospel story, that God truly enters into 
creaturely suffering, then there can be no good reason for excluding God’s suffering 
presence from the realm of the non-human creation as well.”63 In short, God does not 
will the suffering of animals or humans. The suffering God in Christ redeems all 
suffering. 
Traditional conceptions of atonement understand human bondage to be 
liberated by the redemptive act of the cross. Animal theology understands the 
                                                 
57 McFague, The Body of God. 
58 Nash, “Seeking Moral Norms in Nature,” in Hessel and Radford Ruether, Christianity and Ecology, 
228. 
59 Nash, “Seeking Moral Norms in Nature,” 246. 
60 Nash, “Seeking Moral Norms in Nature,” 246. 
61 A full discussion of natural law and its relationship to creation is beyond the scope of this thesis, but 
for further discussion see, Northcott, The Environment and Christian Ethics, 199-256;  
62 Austin, Beauty of the Lord, 197. 
63 Linzey, Animal Theology, 52. 
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liberation that occurs to be one that encompasses the whole world, but especially 
other suffering creatures. Discussions of the idea of redemption in Boff’s work will be 
considered in chapter three. 
 The idea that salvation in Christ extends beyond human beings is not a new 
idea. Indeed it is present in the biblical witness – “all things” in Christ.64 However, 
the idea that animal suffering is not God’s will is one that has received strong 
opposition in some Christian circles. For some hunting, trapping and killing animals 
is a form of glorifying God.65 For example, W. E. Nunnally argues that “every aspect 
of bow hunting can become his or her own act of worship … [since] the Scriptures 
sanction and even encourage the activity of hunting.”66 These arguments reject the 
idea that God wishes us to reduce suffering in the world, instead seeing the act of 
killing as participating in God’s creation. A common response to the idea that Jesus 
does not will animal suffering is to cite the story of Jesus and the pigs, in which Jesus 
appears to cast the demons into the pigs and the pigs drown (Matt. 8:28-34). As 
Stephen M. Vantassel argues “Christ had complete control of the situation and yet did 
not work to reduce animal suffering.”67 The argument goes: if Jesus does not care 
about animal suffering, we do not need to. 
Our conception of God’s relationship to creation and whether or not nature is 
in some sense “fallen” is discussed at length in chapter five (107-112). 
 
f. God’s generosity in Christ necessitates the response of moral generosity. Lordship 
should be expressed as service  
What we see in the life and death of Christ is the outpouring of divine generosity. 
Christ expresses God’s lordship and power over the world through service and 
                                                 
64 See Col. 1:19–20: “For in him all the fullness of God was pleased to dwell, and through him God 
was pleased to reconcile to himself all things, whether on earth or in heaven, by making peace through 
the blood of his cross” (my emphases). For a discussion, see Wright, Colossians and Philemon, 17–22. 
See also Eph. 1:8–10: “With all wisdom and insight he has made known to us the mystery of his will, 
according to his good pleasure that he set forth in Christ, as a plan for the fullness of time, to gather up 
all things in him, things in heaven and things on earth” (my emphases). For a discussion, see Hoehner, 
Ephesians, 153–246. 
65 For a Christian defence of hunting for sport see, Ammon, The Christian Hunter’s Survival Guide. 
For Linzey’s response to Ammon see chapter 7 “Hunting as the Anti-Gospel of Predation,” in Linzey, 
Animal Theology, 114-124. Linzey is not the first theologian to oppose sport hunting on the grounds 
that Christians should seek to liberate animals from their fallen state, see for example, Carpenter, 
“Christian Faith and the Moral Aspects of Hunting,” in Moore, Against Hunting. 
66 Nunnally, “Bow Hunting as an Act of Worship,” in Hill and White, God, Nimrod, and the World, 
404-5. 
67 Vantassel, “Dominion over Animals,” in Hill and White, God, Nimrod, and the World, 344. 
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sacrifice. This is the basis of what Linzey terms the “paradigm of generosity.”68 From 
Christological assumptions, he argues that God is on the side of the poor, the weak, 
and the marginalised. The example of Jesus should produce in us the response of 
moral generosity. “The pattern of obligation disclosed by Christ makes no appeal to 
equality. The obligation is always and everywhere on the ‘higher’ to sacrifice for the 
‘lower’; for the strong, powerful and rich to give to those who are vulnerable, poor or 
powerless.” 69 Those who cannot speak for themselves lay a special moral claim upon 
us, especially children and animals. That adult humans have such power over animals 
is at the heart of our responsibility for them: that power should be expressed as 
service. “It is the sheer vulnerability and powerlessness of animals, and 
correspondingly our absolute power over them which strengthens and compels the 
response of moral generosity.”70 This idea may be termed, “the moral priority of the 
weak.”71 Christian theology invites us to go further, and see that the weakest amongst 
us are deserving of more, not less, moral concern. 
 The moral priority of the weak is at the heart of Linzey’s animal theology and 
has also received a large amount of criticism. Whether the category of the weak and 
or the poor should be applied to animals has been criticised in terms of competing 
moral concerns. Neil Messer argues that Linzey’s conception of moral priority could 
“lead humans to sacrifice their own interests and well-being rather than exploit 
animals.”72 He uses examples of vegetarianism and animal experimentation to suggest 
that the moral priority of the weak could involve reducing harm to animals at the 
expense of their own wellbeing. Messer’s examples involve scenarios in which 
humans have to move away from their own self-interest for the good of animals. 
While one might argues that some level of sacrifice on the part of humanity may be 
necessary for other species to thrive, his examples do seem to pose an either/or 
problem in which moral calculations can only be made in favour of either humans or 
animals. As I have discussed elsewhere, the moral calculations in regard to animal 
experimentation are rarely humans or animals, but rather humans and animals.73 In 
other words, it is not necessary to pose scenarios where one must choose between 
                                                 
68 See especially “The Generosity Paradigm,” in Linzey, Animal Theology, 30–33. 
69 Linzey, Animal Theology, 32. 
70 Linzey, Animal Theology, 32. 
71 See “The Moral Priority of the Weak,” in Linzey, Animal Theology, 26–44. 
72 Messer, “Humans, Animals, Evolution and Ends,” in Deane Drummond and Clough, Creaturely 
Theology, 226. 
73 See Linzey and Linzey, The Ethical Case Against Animal Experiments, 51-53. 
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animal wellbeing and human wellbeing as they are often more intertwined than is 
supposed. Messer’s ideas will be discussed further in relation to vegetarianism in 
relation to insight (g). But in relation to the critique that humans may have to give up 
their own interests for the sake of other beings. That is precisely Linzey’s point – 
humans are to be the servant species, and that is a costly role: the higher sacrificing 
itself for the lower. This will be discussed further below. 
 In considering the practical implications of moral priority, ecological 
theologians tend to be more concerned with the whole, while animal theologians are 
more concerned with the individual animals. This critique is typified by Daniel 
Cowdin who argues that “exclusive moral concern for individual animals becomes 
incoherent at the level of land management. One thinks immediately of animal rights 
activists protesting the reduction of deer populations running ecologically rampant for 
lack of predators.”74 Cowdin’s language is laden with assumptions such as “land 
management” and “ecologically rampant” that would be picked up by animal 
theologians. His language belies an assumption that humans need to “manage” 
animals and the environment, and that there is such a thing as ecological balance to be 
achieved. The debate between competing moral priorities in ecological and animal 
ethics will be discussed at length in chapter five (119-122). Cowdin’s ideas serve to 
provide us with an indication of the issues at stake. 
 The role that humans should assume in relation to creation is often related to 
the giving on “dominion” in Genesis 1:28. Dominion will be considered at length in 
chapter five (104-107), but Linzey argues that human dominion should be seen 
through the lens of Genesis 1:29, in which humanity is given a vegetarian diet. As 
Linzey is fond of saying, “herb-eating dominion is hardly a license for tyranny.”75 
Dominion is misunderstood when it is interpreted as domination over animals. Instead 
dominion should be understood christologically: Humans are “the servant species.”76 
The concept of the servant species is eloquently expressed by Linzey: “humans are 
the species uniquely commissioned to exercise a self-sacrificial priesthood, after the 
one High Priest, not just for members of their own species, but for all sentient 
creatures. The groaning and travailing of fellow creatures requires a species capable 
                                                 
74 Cowdin, “The Moral Status of Otherkind in Christian Ethics,” in Hessel and Radford Ruether, 
Christianity and Ecology, 271, 
75 Linzey, Animal Theology, 126. 
76 For a full exploration of this idea, see “Humans as the Servant Species,” in Linzey, Animal Theology, 
45–61. 
 24 
of co-operating with God in the healing and liberating of creation.”77 Animal theology 
does not deny human uniqueness, rather it conceives of that uniqueness as rooted in 
our God-given ability to serve creation.  
The conception of humans as the servant species contains within it a strong 
idea of human responsibility towards creation and animals in particular. Even if other 
theologians have accepted the idea of human accountability for creation, few have 
taken on the strong notion of service, instead opting for roles conceived as “stewards” 
or “carers.” 
One prominent example of the theology of “stewardship” is offered by The 
Cornwall Declaration on Environmental Stewardship.78 The Cornwall declaration is a 
position endorsed by Jews, Roman Catholics and Protestants who see care for the 
earth as compatible with the capitalist free market economy. The declaration 
maintains that: “human stewardship … unlocks the potential in creation for all the 
earth’s inhabitants as good. Humanity alone of all the created order is capable of 
developing other resources and can thus enrich creation, so it can properly be said that 
the human person is the most valuable resource on earth.”79 The problem with this 
conception of stewardship is that it takes as read human control and manipulation of 
the earth. Furthermore, it fails to recognise our special duties to other animals, aside 
from the environment, and in particular the significance of animal sentiency. 
Another alternative to service, is the ethical attitude of care. This is frequently 
associated with feminist theologians, and argues that the language of care is 
preferable because it emphasises the nurturing role humans should assume towards 
creation. Care ethics arose as an alternative to, and in dialogue with, animal rights 
language.80 Deane Curtin argues that “an ethic of care has an intuitive appeal from the 
standpoint of ecological ethics. Whether or not nonhuman animals have rights, we 
certainly can and do care for them.”81 Again, “The caring-for model does not require 
that those recipients of our care must be ‘equal’ to us … It is based on developing the 
capacity to care, not the criterion of equality.”82 While it is not possible to offer a 
extensive engagement here, one obvious critique is: What counts as “care” or a 
                                                 
77 Linzey, Animal Theology, 45. 
78 Cornwall Alliance, “The Cornwall Declaration on Environmental Stewardship.” 
79 Cornwall Alliance, “The Cornwall Declaration on Environmental Stewardship.” 
80 For a discussion of the development of the ethics of care see Donovan, “Feminism and the Treatment 
of Animals,” in Armstrong and Botzler, The Animal Ethics Reader, 47-54. 
81 Curtin, “Toward an Ecological Ethic of Care,” in Donovan and Adams, Beyond Animal Rights, 65. 
82 Curtin, “Toward an Ecological Ethic of Care,” 68. 
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“caring attitude”?83 In short, care does not seem to provide a robust enough 
framework to support moral decision-making. 
The relationship of humans towards creation, especially in relation to the idea 
of the servant species, will be discussed further in chapters three (58-62), four (85-87) 
and five (122-124). 
 
g. The life giving Spirit, source of all that is wonderful, animates every creature. 
Approximating the peaceable kingdom is empowered by the spirit 
The Spirit is the source of all that is wonderful and of all moral enlightenment. All 
work towards greater concern for creation is only possible with and through the Spirit. 
The Spirit is the basis of all moral effort, awakening in us moral insights and leading 
us to work towards the peaceable kingdom. 
  In Animal Theology, Linzey discusses the biblical basis for vegetarianism 
(Gen 1: 1.29-30). In his discussion of Genesis, he reflects that, “even though the early 
Hebrews were neither pacifists nor vegetarians, they were deeply convicted of the 
view that violence between humans and animals, and indeed between animal species 
themselves, was not God’s original will for creation.”84 Although Linzey explores this 
idea most clearly in relation to vegetarianism, it is an insight that can be applied to 
many aspects of our relationship with animals. The peaceable kingdom as it is 
envisioned here, is about living a life as free from violence as possible. It is the 
narrative of Noah that makes this clear how violence is not God’s intention, “The 
radical message of the Noah story (often overlooked by commentators) is that God 
would rather not have us be at all if we must be violent. It is violence itself within 
every part of creation that is the preeminent mark of corruption and sinfulness.”85 The 
move away from violence is not to suggest that this is easy or even possible in all 
circumstances. “There may have been times in the past or even now in the present 
where we have difficulty imagining a life without killing for food. But where we do 
have the moral freedom to live without recourse to violence, there is a prima facie 
                                                 
83 The limitations, if not the confusions, of caring are explored in Sztybel, “Being Careful About 
Caring.” For a discussion of this idea in relation to Kathy Rudy’s work, see my Linzey, “Review of 
Loving Animals.” 
84 Linzey, Animal Theology, 126. 
85 Linzey, Animal Theology, 127. 
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case to do so. To kill without the strict conditions of necessity is to live a life with 
insufficient generosity.”86 
 Messer has been critical of the language of approximating the kingdom, as he 
is concerned by the extent to which humans are deemed to be engaged in bringing 
forth the kingdom. “Linzey’s language of ‘approximating’ the peaceable kingdom has 
its dangers, because it tends to obscure this distinction between witnessing to and 
establishing the kingdom.”87 Messer’s argument is based on the idea that the call to 
approximate the kingdom, may not take sufficiently seriously the fallenness of the 
human condition and the world. He questions the idea that humans are capable of 
saving themselves or the world: “We can only live in the world in dependence on 
God’s mercy and forgiveness.”88 The idea that we can help enable the kingdom is to 
downplay our indebtedness to God. Further, he argues that “We are not called to 
inaugurate or establish that kingdom; the attempt to do so risks lapsing into a 
dangerous and potentially inhumane uptopianism or fanaticism.”89 Fanaticism can be 
allayed, according to Messer, if we are attentive to the question of whether taking an 
animal life in particular circumstances is “permitted or commanded.”90 To use his 
example, when alternatives to animal use are found in the field of animal 
experimentation “then avoiding the killing of animals becomes a simple matter of 
faithfulness, not fanaticism.”91 
 Taking seriously the fallenness of the human condition and how far we are 
capable of approximating the kingdom is a fair question to pose. Unlike Boff (as 
discussed in chapter five, 107-112) Linzey grapples with the idea of the fall and to 
what extent humans are capable of acting morally.92 But Messer’s critique simply 
misses the mark, as he fails to account for the role of the Spirit in approximating the 
kingdom. Linzey is clear that, the role of servant species “is the divine work of 
redemption to which humans are called by the power of the Spirit.”93 No moral action 
is possible without the Spirit. God awakens in us moral insight, hope, and can even 
help us attain, in a limited way, moral action moving us towards the kingdom. 
                                                 
86 Linzey, Animal Theology, 135; original emphases. 
87 Messer, “Humans, Animals, Evolution and Ends,” 224. 
88 Messer, “Humans, Animals, Evolution and Ends,” 225. 
89 Messer, “Humans, Animals, Evolution and Ends,” 224. 
90 Messer, “Humans, Animals, Evolution and Ends,” 226. 
91 Messer, “Humans, Animals, Evolution and Ends,” 226-7. 
92 See the chapter, “Animal Rights and Parasitical Nature,” in Linzey, Animal Theology, 76-91. 
93 Linzey, Animal Theology, 55; my emphases. 
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 The kingdom will be discussed in relation to Boff’s liberation theology in 
chapter three (63-65). A further exploration and development of my own ideas on 
moral sight in relation to the kingdom is given in chapter seven (169-174). 
 Brilliant though many of these insights are it would obviously be wrong to 
conclude that Linzey’s work is the final word on animal theology, nor would he want 
it to be. The key issue for this thesis is how and in what direction it should be 
developed. 
 
1.2. Methodology and overview 
This section combines my method with an overview of the thesis as a guide for 
readers. My overarching aim is to investigate whether Boff’s theology can provide a 
new impetus to achieving a fully satisfying theology of sentient creatures, one that 
builds on the foundational insights of animal theology. With the help of Boff, I am 
trying to develop animal theology into a more coherent position. 
The question, however, which might not unreasonably be posed, is – why 
focus on Leonardo Boff? First, he is the only first generation liberation theologian to 
move from focusing on the poor to encompassing the environment in his thought. 
Second, he has written over sixty books,94 which have been translated into multiple 
languages, on liberation theology, the environment, and the poor. Since Boff is one of 
the very few Catholic, liberation theologians, perhaps one of the only Catholic 
theologians, to have addressed the non-human world, he is the obvious starting point 
for developing animal theology. The second chapter addresses in detail the 
importance of his work. It situates Boff’s work in his theological and Brazilian 
context, as well as, reviewing the dominant tradition on animals in Catholic thought 
and in Brazilian culture.  
Boff’s perspective has changed over time, so I have selected the major 
relevant texts of his work that may have some bearing on animal theology. Each of 
those works is given a chapter, in which I begin by summarising the arguments in the 
texts as they relate to creation. In doing so, I seek to isolate both the problems and the 
potential within Boff’s work for a new theological understanding of animals. The 
chapters cover the following ground. The third chapter explores the place of animals 
in Boff’s seminal work of liberation theology, Jesus Christ Liberator: A Critical 
                                                 
94 For his full bibliography, see the bibliography 229-234. 
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Christology of Our Time.95 The fourth discusses animals in the light of Boff’s 
Franciscan work Saint Francis: A Model for Human Liberation,96 which marks the 
beginning of Boff’s work embracing concern for the environment. The fifth chapter 
looks at Boff’s embracing of ecological theology in his Ecology and Liberation: A 
New Paradigm97 and Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor.98 The examination seeks to 
answer the question of whether Boff’s ecological theology sufficiently accounts for 
the life and suffering of individual animals. Throughout these three chapters, based on 
the foundational theological insights outlined in the previous section, I pose two 
methodological questions to his work:  
 
1. What, if any, consideration does he give to animals as a theological 
concern? 
2. What aspects, if any, of his theology could help the development of animal 
theology? 
 
I pose the second question regardless of whether he himself has made the connection.  
 In chapter six, I turn to my third methodological question: 
 
3. Has his theology been a catalyst for greater concern for animals in the 
Roman Catholic Church? 
 
The sixth chapter compares the trajectory of Boff’s thought with that of the Roman 
Catholic tradition, exploring to what extent ideas about animals have developed in the 
last fifty years. I argue that Boff’s ecological work has been a catalyst for change, 
which is seen most clearly in the pontificate of Pope Francis. In Laudato Si’, Pope 
Francis universalises many of Boff’s ideas on the environment and shifts the focus of 
theology towards of ecology and the poor. The last section of the sixth chapter 
explores how Pope Francis’s encyclical is being received in Brazil. 
After exploring these questions in chapter seven I propose to a more animal-
friendly and creation-friendly theology inspired by his work. This section offers 
original theology inspired by Boff: a Trinitarian liberation theology conceiving of the 
                                                 
95 Boff, Jesus Christ Liberator; originally published as Jesus Cristo Libertador. 
96 Boff, Saint Francis; originally published as São Francisco de Assis. 
97 Boff, Ecology and Liberation; originally published as Ecologia, Mundialização, Espiritualidade. 
98 Boff, Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor; originally published as Ecologia. 
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Trinity as Gentleness, Solidarity and Fraternity. I then develop three of his ideas, 
namely – communion as being “for” creation, entering the Triune sight, and a 
Trinitarian model for our relationships with animals  – to produce a more inclusive 
theology. The conclusion summarises the conclusions of the thesis, and suggests 
avenues for further research on the topic. 
Throughout the thesis, most notably in chapters one and five, the interviews 
from my research in Brazil are drawn upon. The aim of the interviews was to achieve 
a better contextual understanding of the perception of Boff’s work, liberation 
theology, ecological theology, and animals. The interviews I performed cannot be 
considered in any sense representative of either the animal movement in Brazil or 
liberation theology, rather they represent personal impressions based on the expertise 
of the interviewee. They are the product of chance and willingness on the part of the 
participants to talk about the realities of Brazil as they saw them at that moment. I am 
profoundly grateful that so many people were willing to share so much of their time, 
energy, and thoughtful engagement. Depending on their expertise, the interviewees 
were asked about liberation theology or the animal movement. Some were also asked 
about the environmental movement in Brazil, and all were asked for their thoughts on 
the work of Boff. The purpose of the interviews is to add supplementary contextual 
knowledge to the thesis wherever possible. 
The interviews followed a series of questions designed to allow the 
interviewee to give wide-ranging answers. Wherever possible the interviews were 
conducted in person, if not possible by email. The questions were viewed as initial 
starting points from which to begin conversations that then flowed into different areas 
depending on the interviewees’ expertise. All the in person interviews were recorded, 
with permission, and then transcribed. The interviews were then sent to the 
interviewees for approval, where they corrected and revised their final transcripts. All 
excerpts used in this thesis have been reviewed and approved. 
The interviewees fall into two categories: liberation theologians and 
practitioners, and those academically engaged in the animal movement and 
practitioners. To help navigate the varying expertise of the interviewees here are brief 
introductions to each of them. Luiz Carlos Susin is the only interviewee who may be 
considered to bridge both categories. He is a professor of theology at Pontifical 
Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul, executive secretary of the World Social 
Forum of Theology and Liberation, and editor of Concilium. Susin is also the first 
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liberation theologian to write a work on animal theology and liberation with Gilmar 
Zampieri, A Vida Dos Outros: Ética e Teologia da Libertação Animal (The Life of 
Others: Ethics and Theology of Animal Liberation).99 Jung Mo Sung is professor of 
religious studies at the Methodist University of São Paulo. He is a liberation 
theologian who writes primarily on theology and economics. Claudio de Oliveira 
Ribeiro is a Methodist pastor and professor of theology and religious sciences at the 
Methodist University of São Paulo. He is a liberation theologian who has written on 
the subjects of liberation theology and gratitude, and pluralism and liberation. Keila 
Guimarães is a member of the Methodist Church in Botafogo, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 
She is the national coordinator for the Shade and Fresh Water Project, which focuses 
on the education of young girls. Her interview is not referred to in the thesis as her 
interview and our meeting primarily served to give context to the practical work of 
liberation theology in Brazil. However, she is included here and in the 
acknowledgements as our time together was particularly informative and inspiring. 
Carlos Frederico Ramos de Jesus is a lawyer and legal scholar. He coordinates 
the animal ethics and law study group in the Faculty of Law at the University of São 
Paulo. Bruno Garrote is a lawyer and a legal scholar. He teaches a course on “The 
Body and Legal Consciousness” in the Faculty of Law at the University of São Paulo. 
Daniel Braga Lourenço is professor of environmental law at the Federal University of 
Rio de Janeiro. His research interests are at the intersection of environmental and 
animal law. Carlos Naconecy is an independent scholar and director of the animal 
ethics department of the Brazilian Vegetarian Society. The only group interview 
conducted was with members of Felinos du Campus at the Pontifical Catholic 
University of Rio de Janeiro. The group exists to care for the colony of stray cats that 
lives at the university. It is made up of volunteers from the university and the local 
community. I spoke to three members: Patricia Österreicher, a faculty member, 
Thaissa da Silva Mocoes Puppin, a student, and Maria Teresa Barcellos, a community 
volunteer. The interview focused on the struggles the group faced in helping the cats, 
and their perception of attitudes towards cats, and animals in general, in Brazil. 
I had also hoped to be able to interview Boff himself during my time in Brazil, 
but unfortunately he was travelling and this was not possible. The first appendix 
contains the questions I sent to him, in English and Portuguese, to which he declined 
                                                 
99 Susin and Zampieri, A Vida Dos Outros. 
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to answer. The second appendix contains sample interview questions to indicate the 
scope and kind of questions utilised. Appendices 3–10 contain edited excerpts of the 
interviews that are cited in the thesis. These excerpts are included to give context to 
the discussions that are referenced. The whole interviews are not included for the sake 
of brevity. The last appendix contains the UTREC authorisation letter. 
 In the next chapter, I indicate the significance of Boff’s work and situate it 
within the Catholic tradition and Brazilian context in which he writes. 
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Chapter 2: Boff and His Context 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to contextualise both Boff’s work and the place of 
animals in Catholic thought and in Brazilian culture. A biographical sketch of the life 
and significance of Boff’s work is offered in order to ground further discussion. The 
place of animals in Catholic thought is briefly considered as a benchmark from which 
to explore Boff’s position. Through the use of interviews conducted in Brazil, an 
exploration of the how animals are understood in Brazilian culture is offered.  
 
2.1. The significance of Boff’s journey 
This thesis focuses on the work of theologian and Brazilian public intellectual 
Leonardo Boff. He was born in Concórdia, Brazil, on December 14, 1938, into a large 
Catholic family of Italian descent. In 1959, Boff completed a study on Franciscan 
spirituality in a Saint Francis of Assisi convent,100 before going on to study 
philosophy in Curitiba, Brazil, and then theology at the Franciscan Faculty of 
Theology in Petrópolis, Rio de Janeiro. Both he and his brother Clodovis were 
ordained priests within the Catholic Church, with Leonardo becoming a Franciscan in 
1965. He “submitted his doctoral dissertation to then-professor Joseph Ratzinger”101 
at the Ludwig-Maximilian University in Munich in 1971 and as such was trained in 
the European tradition, like many of his liberation theology counterparts. His 
dissertation was titled “The Church as Sacrament in the Horizon of the World’s 
Experience: Essay of a Structural-Functional Fundamentalization of the 
Ecclesiology.”102 His intellectual thought was principally formed by his Franciscan 
studies and his student years in 1960s Germany. This period was also shaped by the 
military dictatorship that came to power in 1964 in Brazil and remained in power until 
1985.103 From 1970 until 1992, he was a professor of systematic and ecumenical 
                                                 
100 See http://leonardoboff.eco.br/site-eng/bio/cv.htm. Although not specified, this is probably the Saint 
Francis of Assisi Convent in Salvador, Brazil. 
101 Cox, The Silencing of Leonardo Boff, 28. Cox writes that Boff’s dissertation “was judged by his 
professors to be not only acceptable, but brilliant and unusually promising” (28). One of those 
professors was Ratzinger, who after the publication of Boff’s later work, Church, Charisma, and 
Power, would become Boff’s chief critic as prefect of the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the 
Faith, resulting in Boff’s silencing in 1985. 
102 See http://leonardoboff.eco.br/site-eng/bio/cv.htm. 
103 Pinheiro describes the military regime as responsible “for grave human rights violations that 
affected tens of thousands of Brazilians for twenty-one years. The estimates of numbers of people 
arrested after the coup vary from 10,000 to 50,000. Illegal detention and, in particular, systematic use 
of torture, resulting in death in many cases, became a common practice of the dictatorship’s security 
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theology at the Franciscan Theological Institute in Petrópolis. The Vatican silenced 
him in 1985 after the publication of Igreja: Carisma e Poder (which appeared in 
English in 1985 as Church: Charism and Power,104 hereafter cited as Charism and 
Power) and tried to silence him again in 1992, at which point Boff left the priesthood. 
Asked by interviewer Mac Margolis in Newsweek International in 1999 why he 
remained loyal to the Church, Boff replied, “I define myself more as [a] Franciscan 
Catholic than [a] Roman Catholic.” He elaborated: “Never forget, Saint Francis was a 
layman, he wasn’t a priest or part of the hierarchy. This is possible within the 
Christian faith.”105 Boff’s Franciscan faith is central to all his theological arguments. 
His perspective on Saint Francis underpins his liberation and ecological theology.  
 Boff’s theological journey mirrors and contributes to the Catholic Church’s 
changing position on both liberation theology and ecological theology. Boff’s name is 
largely synonymous with the conflict between liberation theologians and the Vatican. 
Before I turn to the specific events of Boff’s silencing, I will outline that general 
debate between the Vatican and liberation theologians. Then, without going into the 
now well-known details of the controversy,106 I will briefly sketch the events related 
to Boff’s silencing and their significance.  
Liberation theology represented a new strand of thinking in Roman Catholic 
theology, which presented a challenge to the existing orthodox traditions. The obvious 
challenge was that “its deepest insights did not spring from the minds of scholars in 
the great universities of the First World, but rather from small communities of the 
poorest and least literate men and women in Latin America.”107 Even though Boff 
studied in Europe, he argues that the insights of liberation theology spring from the 
context of Latin America.108 Liberation theology’s emphasis on the plight of the poor, 
springing from the New Testament witness of Jesus’s particular concern for the 
                                                                                                                                           
forces, made up of officers of the navy, air force, and army, and of the Civil and Military Police. More 
than 300 young people—students, workers, and militants—were kidnapped, imprisoned, tortured, 
murdered, and ‘disappeared.’” Pinheiro, “Political Transition and the (Un)rule of Law in the Republic,” 
199. This brutal context was the backdrop to Boff’s early work on liberation theology, specifically 
Jesus Christ Liberator in 1972 as well as Francis in 1981.  
104 Boff, Church: Charism and Power; originally published as Igreja: Carisma e Poder. 
105 Margolis, “A Priest and His Message,” 66. 
106 For a sustained discussion of the events between Boff and the Vatican, see Cox, The Silencing of 
Leonardo Boff. To view the documents relating to the silencing of Boff, see Hennelly, Liberation 
Theology. For an account of how Ratzinger understood the events see, Allen, Cardinal Ratzinger, 
especially the chapter “Authentic Liberation,” 131–174. 
107 Hennelly, Liberation Theology, xiii. 
108 He makes this argument in a number of places, but specifically in Jesus Christ Liberator, he states 
that liberation theology emerges from “preoccupations that are ours alone, taken from our Latin 
American context.” Boff, Jesus Christ Liberator, 43. 
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marginalised, was challenging to a rich, established Church. These challenges might 
have been overlooked if not for the speed at which theologies of liberation were 
taking hold and gaining popularity.  
The Vatican’s objections to the theology of liberation fall into three main 
categories, from which other objections flow. The first concern was the apparent 
appropriation of Marxist theory into Christian theology and the subsequent focus on 
the “political.”109 This was especially problematic because of the “revolutionary” 
understanding of Marxist thought and the Vatican’s concerns about violence. The 
concern about violence does not seem to be well founded. Boff and Gutiérrez, among 
other liberation theologians, use the language of “revolution,” but there is no evidence 
that they planned to incite violent revolutionary uprisings. However, it is 
understandable that the Vatican might be concerned with the use of Marxist 
“revolutionary” language given its incompatibility with the non-violent teachings of 
Jesus. In the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith’s “Instruction on Certain 
Aspects of the ‘Theology of Liberation,’” the Congregation recognises the authentic 
“yearning for justice,” but it also maintains that “there are many political and social 
movements which present themselves as authentic spokesmen for the aspiration of the 
poor and claim to be able, though by recourse to violent means, to bring about the 
radical changes which will put an end to the oppression and misery of people.”110 
However, as discussed in chapter two, Boff is very clear that a transformation in 
society needs to occur but that it will be one brought about by God rather than 
humanity, or at least God in cooperation with humanity.  
The second category of critique holds that theologies of liberation 
misunderstood and politicised the ideas of liberation found in the Gospel, which were 
fundamentally to be understood as spiritual liberation from sin: “The first liberation, 
to which all others must make reference, is that from sin … [which] cannot be 
restricted to ‘social sin.’”111 The third critique concerns the focus on orthopraxy over 
                                                 
109 See Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, “Ten Observations on the Theology of Gustavo 
Gutiérrez,” 348–50. There it is stated that Gutiérrez “uncritically accepts” Marxist theory, particularly 
the conception of history, which produces “extreme ambiguity” in his theology, as Marxist theory 
becomes “the determining principle from which he goes on to reinterpret the Christian message” (349). 
For a discussion of Ratzinger’s concerns about Marxism see, Allen, Cardinal Ratzinger, 139–141. 
110 Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, “Instruction on Certain Aspects of the ‘Theology of 
Liberation,’” 395. 
111 Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, “Instruction on Certain Aspects of the ‘Theology of 
Liberation,’” 398. The instruction continues, “To demand first of all a radical revolution in social 
relations and then to criticise the search for personal perfection is to set out on a road which leads to the 
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orthodoxy, or the focus on correct action versus correct beliefs. Ratzinger 
characterises liberation theology as holding that “action is truth … The only decisive 
thing is praxis.”112 Liberation theology is perhaps unfairly criticised as being focused 
on practical action rather than on production of doctrinally sound theology.113 Indeed 
Boff’s focus on orthopraxis is not meant to usurp orthodoxy, rather it is meant as a 
corrective to it. It involved rejecting  “the reduction of the message of Christ to 
systematic categories of intellectual comprehension” and embracing “creating new 
habits of acting and living in the world.”114 It was not that correct beliefs were not 
important, but rather that they needed to be balanced with correct action. Yet sadly 
the rhetoric of the debate became polarised between the “defenders of orthodoxy”115 
and the exponents of orthopraxy. As one of Ratzinger’s biographers noted, the 
distinction between orthodoxy and orthopraxis was at the centre of his concern over 
liberation theology, that “by denying the priority of belief, Ratizinger argued, 
liberation theologians relativize Christian doctrine.”116 
Boff was not the first liberation theologian to be scrutinised by the Vatican. 
Indeed, two years before Boff’s silencing, the Congregation for the Doctrine of the 
Faith wrote “Ten Observations on the Theology of Gustavo Gutiérrez.”117 However, 
Boff was the only liberation theologian to go through a prolonged silencing. Since he 
was one of the more prolific and prominent liberation theologians118 at that time, 
“nearly everyone interpreted [Boff’s] silencing as a clear warning to that whole 
movement.”119 
                                                                                                                                           
denial of the meaning of the person and personal transcendence, and to destroy ethics and its 
foundation, which is the absolute character of the distinction between good and evil.” 
112 Ratzinger, “Liberation Theology,” Liberation Theology, 374.  
113 Although liberation theologians are focused on praxis, nonetheless a great deal of theological 
literature has been produced. This is perhaps most keenly evidenced in Ellacuría and Sobrino’s edited 
volume Mysterium Liberationis which addresses each doctrinal area in turn. 
114 Boff, Jesus Christ Liberator, 47. 
115 Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, “Instruction on Certain Aspects of the ‘Theology of 
Liberation,’” 412. 
116 Allen, Cardinal Ratzinger, 136. 
117 Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, “Ten Observations on the Theology of Gustavo 
Gutiérrez,” 348–50. For a discussion of Ratzinger’s concerns about Gutierrez see, Allen, Cardinal 
Ratzinger, 153–56.  
118 Hennelly comments, “Aside from his writing, teaching, and lecturing, Boff is editor of Revista 
Eclesiástica Brasileira, the most important theological periodical in Brazil, is a member of the 
theological commission for the Brazilian Bishops’ Conference, and is religious editor for Vozes, an 
important publishing firm. Boff, in short, richly deserves his reputation as the most prominent and 
talented theologian in the Portuguese-speaking world.” Hennelly, Liberation Theology, xxiv. 
119 Cox, The Silencing of Leonardo Boff, 3. 
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In 1981 Boff published Charism and Power, but it was not until 1984–85 that 
the full impact of the work was felt. In May 1984, Cardinal Ratzinger, who previously 
had been Boff’s doctoral supervisor and who served as prefect of the Sacred 
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, summoned Boff to Rome to account for 
his views expressed in Charism and Power. The notice that the Congregation for the 
Doctrine of the Faith sent to Boff stated that there were concerns relating to his 
ecclesiology in four main areas: “the structure of the Church, the concept of dogma, 
the exercise of sacred power, and the prophetic role.”120 Boff argues in Charism and 
Power that Church structure and hierarchy are the result of the Church’s growth in 
Roman and feudal societies, and as such the Church has taken on some of the 
characteristics associated with those societies.121 He argues that Latin American base 
communities are organising themselves in a way that has much in common with the 
early Church and that this is an authentic way of being the Church. Indeed, “people, 
especially the poor, are organizing themselves in order to live their faith in a 
communal way … We are dealing with a true ecclesiogenesis, that is, the genesis of a 
Church that is born of the faith of the people.”122 This kind of argumentation was seen 
as a direct challenge to the authority of the Church and led to Boff’s summoning to 
Rome. 
The review of of Boff’s ideas was officially termed a “colloquy” by the 
Vatican; however, it had a feeling more akin to a trial. As Cox described the event, 
“the ‘colloquy’ to which Ratzinger had invited him turned out instead to be a full-
scale interrogation, an ecclesial trial followed by a verdict and, a few weeks later, by a 
sentence.”123 The result of this colloquy was Boff’s receipt of an official notice from 
the Vatican indicating that he should begin a period of “obedient silence” for an 
unspecified length of time. The silencing was to include a ban on all his activities as a 
writer and lecturer, including abstention from his editorial work of the Revista 
                                                 
120 Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, “Notification Sent to Fr. Leonardo Boff regarding Errors 
in His Book, Church: Charism and Power (March 11, 1985),” 427. 
121 See Boff’s discussion in his chapter “The Power of the Institutional Church: Can It Be Converted?” 
in Boff, Church: Charism and Power, 47–64. 
122 Boff, Church: Charism and Power, 131. 
123 Cox, The Silencing of Leonardo Boff, 8. Ratzinger was just one of thirteen cardinals who made the 
decision to silence Boff. In an interview, Boff stated, “I believe his [Cardinal Ratzinger’s] was a 
dissenting vote from the majority, because he knew other books of mine on theology, translated into 
German, and had told me that he liked them. Once, in front of the pope in an audience in Rome, he 
even referred to them favorably.” Boff, “A Brazilian Theologian Once Silenced by Cardinal Ratzinger 
Talks about the Old and the New Pope.” Although Ratzinger was head of the Congregation for the 
Doctrine of the Faith, it does not seem that Boff holds him responsible for his silencing, despite their 
differing theological views. 
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Eclesiástica Brasileira.124 His silencing received a large amount of international 
media attention,125 which highlighted his theology rather than diminishing it, as the 
Vatican might have hoped. Within Brazil there was a great deal of support for Boff. 
Cox comments that “many Brazilians looked upon the Franciscan friar as a religious 
version of Pele, a champion of Latin American religion and Brazilian national spirit 
against outside intruders.”126 This support took the form of protests, statements of 
support from both Catholic and Protestant groups, and public criticism of the 
silencing by ten brave Brazilian bishops. Boff himself did not join any of the protests 
but instead accepted discipline and remained silent, later remarking, “It is better to 
walk with the Church than alone with my theology.”127 
A year later, the silencing was lifted. What prompted this remains unclear, 
though Mario Aguilar has suggested that “his silencing was lifted because there was 
more harm in attracting attention to his writings than from ignoring them as those of a 
radical priest who was on the way out of the Church’s own hierarchical structures.”128 
 In 1992, Boff wrote to the Vatican to renounce his priesthood. He still 
considers himself a member of the Church but now identifies himself as a layperson 
and theologian. It seems he grew weary of the constant scrutiny of his work and 
thought. In “Letter to My Companions on the Journey of Hope,” he explains the 
struggles of his work and his decision to leave the priesthood. “From 1971 onward,” 
he relates that, “I have frequently received letters, warnings, restrictions and 
punishments … I accepted everything and submitted.”129 Despite his acceptance and 
compliance with the terms of his first silencing, between 1991 and 1992 the 
censorship had begun again. He had been removed as editor from Vozes magazine, 
“censorship was once again imposed on everything,” and he again had been banned 
from teaching theology for an unspecified period of time.130 This second round of 
                                                 
124 Cox, The Silencing of Leonardo Boff, 3. 
125 See for example, New York Times, “Theologian in Brazil Says He Is Silenced by Order of Vatican”; 
De Onis, “Brazil Catholics Divided over Pope’s Silencing of Liberal Franciscan Monk”; Time, 
“Religion: Boff Silenced. Rome Disciplines a Scholar.”  
126 Cox, The Silencing of Leonardo Boff, 5. 
127 Boff, “A Brazilian Theologian Once Silenced.” 
128 Aguilar, The History and Politics of Latin American Theology: vol. I, 130. 
129 See “Letter to My Companions on the Journey of Hope,” in Boff, The Path to Hope, 125–26. His 
account of the silencing is here seen in the context of wider scrutinising. This included his twice being 
removed temporarily as chair of theology and the condemning of his views, until it “became like an 
ever-tightening tourniquet rendering [his] work as a theologian, teacher, lecturer, adviser, and writer 
almost impossible” (125). 
130 Boff, The Path to Hope, 126. 
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censorship culminated in his decision to step down from the priesthood, with Boff 
feeling that he could no longer continue. 
Boff’s first work after his renunciation of the priesthood in 1992 was Ecology 
and Liberation, his first work on expressly ecological theology. His later work is 
unsurprisingly characterised by a freedom of expression. Unhindered by the Brazilian 
military dictatorship (after the passing of the 1988 constitution, Brazil returned to full 
democracy) or by possible censure from the Vatican, Boff’s work has a more 
unrestricted feel to it. It is also self-consciously addressed to a more global audience, 
with concerns addressing not just the Church or Latin America, but the state of the 
world. In an oblique reference to his struggles with the Church, the preface of 
Ecology and Liberation indicates this change in his writing: 
 
The pieces collected in this volume were composed in the last two years, 
under the influence of precipitate and momentous political upheavals that have 
affected the author’s life too. But he has only taken a different route. He has 
not changed direction. He has jumped into another trench, but he has not left 
the frontline. The struggle continues. These reflections are the fruit of crisis, 
which always has a purifying effect.131 
 
The references to “political upheavals” concern not just his struggle with the Church 
but also his involvement with the movement for land rights and the concerns of the 
indigenous people in Brazil.132 The new trench he refers to is not just his new position 
as part of the laity133 but also a reference to his newfound ecological concerns. As is 
explored in chapter four, Boff views his ecological work as an extension of his 
liberation theology, in that both the cry of the earth and the cry of the poor are rooted 
in the will to dominate, which victimises both the environment and the poor. Despite 
his being one of the few first-generation liberation theologians to write extensively on 
                                                 
131 Boff, Ecology and Liberation, xi. 
132 Boff reflects on the conflict between capitalism and the indigenous people in the Amazon in his 
chapter “All the Capital Sins against Ecology,” in Boff, Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor. He writes 
that during the Grande Carajás Project, in which land clearing occurred for the mining of ore, “to speed 
up the clearing, many ranchers used the defoliant Tordon 155-Br (Agent Orange) or Tordon 101-Br, 
which is even more destructive, sprayed from a plane, thereby polluting soils and river, and killing 
many people, especially the Nhambiquara Indians, who were almost wiped out” (97). 
133 In his “Letter to My Companions on the Journey of Hope,” Boff also refers to changing trenches: 
“There are moments in a person’s life when, in order to be faithful to himself, he must change. I have 
changed. Not the battle itself, but the trenches from which I shall fight.” Boff, The Path to Hope, 123. 
“Trenches” in this instance refers to the move from the priesthood to the laity within the Church. 
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the environment,134 I will argue that Boff’s ecological theology provides little basis 
for improving the status of animals. Instead his writings on liberation theology and 
Saint Francis provide the most fertile ground for considering the moral status of 
animals. 
 Boff is a prolific author, having written more than sixty books in Portuguese, 
with many of them translated into multiple languages. He is considered a public 
intellectual in Brazil and is often engaged in social and political commentary through 
writing for national newspapers and giving public lectures. His work has often set the 
tone for theological thinking in Brazil. It is not just his wide body of work that makes 
him a tricky scholar with which to engage. Whether it is due to the translation of his 
work from Portuguese or just his style of language, he is frequently difficult to 
interpret. He tends towards grandiose and verbose language, which means his exact 
meaning can be difficult to comprehend. His books tend to offer a theological vision 
but often lack detail and clarity. In this work it will not be possible to cover his vast 
corpus; instead I have selected key texts on liberation, Saint Francis, and ecology. 
These works best indicate how his thinking on creation and especially animals has 
changed over time.  
 With the advent of Francis’s pontificate, concerns about the environment and 
the poor have become mainstream theological issues. Francis’s papacy is marked by a 
concern for the poor, evident in his modest dress and living, his frequent preaching 
and communication on the subject, and his general pastoral focus. His second 
encyclical, Laudato Si’, brings together his concern for the poor with concern for the 
Earth. It is the most sustained reflection on the environment in a papal encyclical to 
date. Chapter five explores how Pope Francis has moved the Church in regard to 
ecology and how this relates to Boff’s work, with special attention paid to Laudato 
Si’. This thesis explores the sensitivity to creation now found in the Catholic 
Church—a sensitivity that, as shall be explored, is in part galvanised by Boff’s work 
on ecology.   
 
                                                 
134 This is not to say that there was not a cohort of Brazilian and Latin American thinkers writing on the 
environment in the 1990s; they just were not considered first-generation liberation theologians. Susin, 
who was Boff’s student, has written on ecological theology and, more recently, animal theology. See, 
for example, Wainwright, Susin, and Wilfred, Eco-Theology; and Susin and Zampieri, A Vida Dos 
Outros. Gebara, a Brazilian feminist liberation theologian, has also written extensively on the 
environment. See, for example, Gebara, Longing for Running Water. 
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2.2. Animals in Catholic thought135  
In order to understand Boff’s theological thinking on animals, it is important to see 
his work within the context of the dominant tradition on animals in Catholicism. 
Although there are alternative voices and thinkers on animals within Catholic 
thought—notably, Saint Francis of Assisi—one thinker in particular has shaped the 
dominant view that has effectively become Catholic orthodoxy. That thinker is Saint 
Thomas Aquinas. Although I will argue that we are seeing a shift in the understanding 
of animals in the Catholic tradition, we have to begin with the orthodox, what 
subsequently became the scholastic position, in order to understand how this has 
influenced Boff and how much the Catholic position has changed. Aquinas makes 
three key arguments concerning the status of animals: (1) animals have no mind or 
reason, (2) animals are not rational and therefore have no immortal soul, and (3) 
animals have no moral status. 
It was Aquinas in his Summa Theologiae, inspired by Aristotelian philosophy, 
who first fully systematised the view that animals were devoid of mental powers. 
“Dumb animals and plants are devoid of the life of reason whereby to set themselves 
in motion,” he writes; “they are moved, as it were by another, by a kind of natural 
impulse, a sign of which is that they are naturally enslaved and accommodated to the 
uses of others.”136 Notice the development of the argument: Animals are on the same 
level as plants in being non-rational (or “irrational” as Aquinas actually puts it). 
Rationality is a sphere entirely reserved for the human species; everything else within 
creation is “devoid of the life of reason.” What directs or “moves” animated beings 
(animals and plants) is not rational direction or any self-chosen goal (because animals 
cannot rationally choose anything), but the movement of others or “a kind of natural 
impulse.” Animals, in other words, act “naturally” or as occasioned by others, rather 
than through deliberate will. And the proof of this is that they are “naturally enslaved” 
and “accommodated” to the uses of humans. The logic is plainly circular, of course: 
how do we know that animals, like plants, are slaves for human use? The answer is 
because we can enslave them. 
The oddness of Aquinas’s doctrine here consists in its lack of a biblical 
starting point. Although he does discuss the meaning of “dominion” and the imago 
                                                 
135 This section draws and expands on my chapter “Animals in Catholic Thought: A New Sensitivity?,” 
187–202. 
136 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, question 64, article 1. 
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dei, such discussions are overlaid by an essentially Aristotelian emphasis on 
rationality. Dominion is understood as “rational domination” allowed for—indeed, 
ordained by—the divine image, which is construed as the possession of rationality.137 
Indeed, as is now widely recognised, Aquinas was a radical in his time, trying to 
reconcile Aristotelian philosophy with Christian faith. But whatever the merits of his 
work in other areas, his influence as regards animals has been profoundly negative.138 
Aquinas effectively baptises an instrumentalist view of animals. We may define 
instrumentalism as the view that animals are here for our use: means to human ends.  
Such a view predates Christianity, of course, but Aquinas’s use of Aristotle 
gives the view new life within the Christian Church. As Aristotle famously wrote, 
“since nature makes nothing without some end in view, nothing to no purpose, it must 
be that nature has made them [animals and plants] for the sake man.”139 Compare that 
with these two lines in Aquinas’s “Summa Contra Gentiles”: “By divine providence, 
they [animals] are intended for man’s use according to the order of nature. Hence it is 
not wrong for man to make use of them, either by killing or in any other way 
whatever.”140 What was thought “natural” or “according to nature” in Aristotle 
becomes in Aquinas a matter of “divine providence” as well.  
Aquinas’s second argument is that animals do not have rational and therefore 
immortal souls. Thomist tradition distinguished between three kinds of souls: the 
“vegetative souls” of vegetables, the “sensitive souls” of animals, and the “rational 
souls” of humans (and angels and demons).141 Only rational souls were thought to be 
incorporeal (capable of withstanding physical death). It is important to see that this 
argument is of a piece with Aquinas’s instrumentalism. Like Aristotle, he embraces a 
natural hierarchy (buttressed in his presentation by divine providence) in which 
creatures are delineated by rationality in descending order: man, woman, animals, 
plants.142 In Aristotle, of course, “slaves” came under women, as his famous 
                                                 
137 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Part 1, QQ, LXXV–CII, question 96. 
138 For a defence of Aquinas on animals, see Barad, Aquinas on the Nature and Treatment of Animals. 
139 Aristotle, The Politics, 1. Viii, 79. 
140 Aquinas, “Summa Contra Gentiles,” vol. II, 220–4; my emphases. 
141 Mascall, The Openness of Being, 257–66. 
142 Incidentally, the view that only men were fully rational (because men were made in the image of 
God) led both to doubts about the souls of women (who Aquinas thought were made in the image of 
God in a secondary way to men) and to the complete rejection of rational animal souls. The view that 
women were “close to the animal state,” to use Thomas’s words, has persisted throughout the centuries. 
The Quaker divine George Fox, for example, apparently met villagers who thought that women had 
“no souls, no more than a goose.” Thomas, Man and the Natural World, 434. Berkman argues that “for 
Aquinas human beings do not have a particularly high ‘slot’ in the order of creation, being ranked the 
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justification for slavery shows and which has an obvious correspondence to his view 
of animals as similarly enslaveable.143 But the central point is that since animals have 
no rational selves, they can have only perishable souls. 
The distinction between “rational” and “non-rational” has led to entrenched 
dualisms in Christian thought that separate humans from the rest of creation. The 
view emerged that animals are, well, “just animals.” For example, whereas humans 
have “spirit,” animals have only “flesh”; humans have “minds,” whereas animals are 
just “matter”; humans are “persons,” and animals are mere “things”; humans have 
rational immortal souls, while animals have non-rational souls. These distinctions in 
favour of humans are reinforced by the historic language we use about animals: 
“brutes,” “beasts,” “irrational,” and “dumb.” Dualistic distinctions have always 
tended to disadvantage animals and elevate humans. 
It is worth noting that the preceding arguments do not of themselves 
necessarily lead to the justification of animal cruelty or abuse. As Linzey has pointed 
out, lack of rationality and absence of an immortal soul should logically usher in a 
greater solicitude.144 If animals are not rational, then this may increase their suffering 
since they experience the raw terror of confinement or injury without knowing why 
they are suffering or for what purpose. If animals are really non-rational, it follows 
that their suffering cannot be softened by intellectual comprehension of the 
circumstances. Also, as C. S. Lewis observed, if animals are not to be recompensed 
with an eternal paradise for the sufferings that they have to undergo in the present 
world, then that surely makes their current suffering of greater, not lesser, 
significance.145 
As we have seen, the strength of Thomism consists in its circularity: God put 
animals here for our use; we know that they are meant to be slaves because they are 
enslaveable; and because they are without reason and therefore are only means to 
human ends, they cannot have individual worth or a rational soul. Although Aquinas 
did not deny that animals feel pain, his position lays the groundwork for Cartesianism. 
                                                                                                                                           
lowest of creatures with intellectual natures. Thus when human and non-human animals are seen within 
the grand scheme of God’s creation, their differences—however significant in their own right—seem 
not so great.” Berkman, “Towards a Thomistic Theology of Animality,” 23. However, this is to 
misconstrue the hierarchy as Aquinas understood it: men, women, then animals (even if one includes 
angels and demons). It is hard to maintain that the differences are not that great when the key one, 
rationality, is the difference between immortality and mortality. 
143 See Aristotle, The Politics. 
144 See Linzey, Why Animal Suffering Matters, chap. 1. 
145 See Lewis, Vivisection. 
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According to René Descartes, animals “act naturally and mechanically, like a clock 
which tells the time better than our own judgement does.”146 Animals, for Descartes, 
are automata, without consciousness, rationality or feeling.147 There are small, yet 
significant, steps from the idea that animals do not have rationality, to the idea that 
they do not have the same kind of consciousness, to the idea they do not feel pain. 
What is significant here is that Descartes’ view is underpinned by the Thomistic 
position on animals. 
Aquinas’s third argument regarding animals is that they have no moral status 
or rather that their treatment should not be governed by moral considerations. Again, 
Aquinas laid out the grounds for this development. We have already seen that his 
instrumentalist view allowed for no limit on the human use of animals. His 
instrumentalist position was buttressed by another consideration: friendship was 
possible only between rational agents, and since animals were not rational, there 
could be no duties of friendship between the two. Aquinas notes that “the love of 
charity extends to none but God and our neighbour … the word neighbour cannot be 
extended to irrational creatures, since they have no fellowship with man in the 
rational life.”148 Therefore, “charity does not extend to irrational creatures.”149 The 
only limit that Aquinas placed on cruelty against animals was that the practise of 
cruelty should not dehumanise the perpetrator.150 The idea that cruelty to animals is 
bad for humans is one that has been incorporated into Catholic moral thinking and 
that is now supported by contemporary science, which will be explored in chapter 
three. 
The preceding criticisms and others of Aquinas have been made before by 
numerous animal advocates, including Andrew Linzey,151 Peter Singer,152 Richard D. 
                                                 
146 Descartes, Discourse on Method in Philosophical Works of Descartes, vol. 11, 115–118. 
147 For further discussion of the Cartesian position on animals and the idea that animals do not feel 
pain, see my chapter, “Animals in Catholic Thought: A New Sensitivity?,” 187–202. 
148 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, question 65, article 3. 
149 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, question 65, article 3. 
150 Aquinas, “Summa Contra Gentiles,” vol. II, 220–24. 
151 Aquinas is discussed in many of Linzey’s works on animals, but see specifically his chapter 
“Reverence, Responsibility and Rights” in Linzey, Animal Theology, 3–27. He argues here and 
elsewhere that “as regards the treatment of animals, Aquinas remains the dominant historical force 
throughout Western Christianity” (19). His legacy for animals consists especially in the attribution of 
rationality only to humans and an instrumentalist view of animals, as discussed previously (Linzey, 
Animal Theology, 18–19). Linzey’s is a view to which I owe a great deal, as stated in the introduction. 
152 See Singer’s chapter “Man’s Dominion … A Short History of Speciesism,” in Singer, Animal 
Liberation, 202–34. Singer argues that for Aquinas “the only reason against cruelty to animals is that it 
may lead to cruelty to human beings. No argument could reveal the essence of speciesism more 
clearly” (213). 
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Ryder,153 H. Paul Santmire,154 Robert N. Wennberg,155 and Ryan Patrick 
McLaughlin.156 In response to these criticisms, there have been many modern 
attempts by theologians to reclaim Aquinas as a positive thinker for animals—
notably, Celia Deane-Drummond,157 Michael S. Northcott,158 Willis Jenkins,159 Mark 
Wynn,160 and John Berkman, among others.161 Space does not allow for a full 
exploration of these views here, but generally, the line of argumentation from those 
wanting to defend Aquinas’s perspective on animals is that his views need to be 
understood within the wider context of his theology. When understood in that way, 
they argue, either Aquinas is more ecologically friendly than commonly suggested, or 
his work is less anthropocentric162 than animal theologians suggest.  
Berkman argues that while Aquinas does say that animals exist for the sake of 
humans, “this does not represent Aquinas’ most considered view of the telos of non-
                                                 
153 See Ryder’s discussion “St Thomas and St Francis” in Ryder, Animal Revolution, 32–36. Ryder 
argues that in the time of the Renaissance, “the speciesism of Thomas Aquinas became a useful 
doctrine to allay any qualms of conscience” (43). Whether this is an entirely fair comment is not clear, 
since Ryder offers little to support his assertion that Aquinas was particularly referenced in support of 
animal cruelty in the Renaissance.  
154 See Santmire’s chapter “The Heightening of the Ambiguity: The Renaissance of the Twelfth 
Century and the Theology of Thomas Aquinas,” in Santmire, The Travail of Nature, 75–95. Santmire 
offers an assessment of Aquinas’s ambiguous legacy for nature, concluding that “Thomas’s conceptual 
resolutions define what the theology of nature is to be, in its overall shape, for many theologians for 
many centuries to come” (95). He provides an altogether more theological and more nuanced 
perspective on Aquinas than Singer or Ryder, but he is clear that Aquinas’s ambiguous theology has 
had a profound impact on subsequent theologies of nature. 
155 See Wennberg’s discussion “Duties to Animals Are Only Duties to Humans: Aquinas and Kant,” in 
Wennberg, God, Humans, and Animals, 120–23. Wennberg agrees with Singer that both Aquinas and 
Kant hold moral theories with no place for animals, and so they “morally condemn cruelty to animals 
without admitting direct moral obligations to animals” by arguing that cruelty to animals is bad for 
humans (121). 
156 See McLaughlin’s chapter “Thomas Aquinas and the Dominant Tradition,” in McLaughlin, 
Christian Theology and the Status of Animals, 8–20. McLaughlin argues that granting animals direct 
moral concern would “jeopardize central pillars of [Aquinas’s] thought”—namely, “Aquinas’s 
understanding of their [animals’] nature (and therefore the rights attached to human nature) or the 
scope of his eschatology.” Aquinas, for McLaughlin, remains “anthropocentric and conservationist” 
(20).  
157 Aquinas is discussed in many aspects of her work, but see especially Deane-Drummond, The Ethics 
of Nature; and Eco-Theology. 
158 See Northcott’s chapter “Creation, Redemption and Natural Law Ethics,” in Northcott, The 
Environment and Christian Ethics, 199–256. 
159 See Jenkins’s chapters “Sanctifying Biodiversity: Ecojustice in Thomas Aquinas” and 
“Environmental Virtues: Charity, Nature, and Divine Friendship in Thomas,” in Jenkins, Ecologies of 
Grace, 115–32 and 133–51. 
160 Wynn, “Thomas Aquinas: Reading the Idea of Dominion in the Light of the Doctrine of Creation,” 
154–65. 
161 Other thinkers, whom there is not space to explore, include Schaefer, Theological Foundations for 
Environmental Ethics, and French, “Beast-Machines and the Technocratic Reduction of Life,” 24–43. 
162 Some thinkers prefer the term “humanocentric” to “anthropocentric” because the former has fewer 
androcentric and patriarchal connotations. However, throughout this work I use the terms 
interchangeably for stylistic reasons. 
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human creatures.”163 He maintains that for Aquinas all creatures are “ordered towards 
‘ultimate perfection,’” and thus “God’s plan in creation, while hierarchical, is by no 
means anthropocentric.”164 However, this view seems hard to reconcile with Aquinas 
himself, whom Berkman quotes as saying that “the less noble creatures exist for the 
sake of the more noble creatures; for instance, the creatures below man exist for the 
sake of man.”165  
Wynn makes a similar argument about creatures being ordered towards 
perfection “rather than directed simply to the service of human beings” and adds that 
“their goals cannot be deemed merely trivial when they come into conflict with the 
ends of human beings—or at any rate, with human ends which do not touch on vital 
human interests.”166 But his own language reveals the anthropocentric nature of the 
position: animal interests are subservient to human ends that “touch on vital human 
interests.” Even at best, Wynn retains the instrumental position that animals can be 
used as resources by humans.  
Jenkins makes an argument that is, by his own admission, controversial—
namely, that “God chooses to move creation to Godself by inviting humans into a 
friendship shaped by their intimacy with all creation.”167 At first sight he appears to 
be suggesting that humans can be friends with other creatures, but as we have already 
seen, this is not permitted within Aquinas’s system. Rather, he means that as “charity 
turns humans toward the world to truly hear and see our fellow creatures,” we grow in 
divine friendship.168 Though I do not wish to deny that humans can grow in closeness 
to God through encounters with the natural world, an idea discussed in relation to 
Saint Francis in chapter three, it is hard to reconcile this interpretation with Aquinas’s 
previously stated ideas about animals, unless we are again to understand animals and 
the natural world as human instruments used as tools towards human ends, albeit ends 
oriented towards the Creator. 
From an ecological perspective, Northcott argues that “natural law ethics as 
we encounter it in Aquinas … provides the strongest conceptual base within the 
Christian tradition for an ecological ethic.”169 His argument is based on a reading of 
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165 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, question 65, article 2. 
166 Wynn, “Thomas Aquinas,” 162. 
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creation that suggests that creation is permeated by divine goodness, upon which he 
bases a natural law ethic.170 Northcott’s argument relies on a conception of creation as 
inherently good. While space does not permit a full discussion here, the problems 
with the conception of creation as unambiguously good will be discussed at length in 
chapter five.  
Deane-Drummond’s ecological argument stems from a consideration of 
Aquinas’s idea of the Chain of Being, which she understands as “affirm[ing] the 
continuity of human life with all life forms: we are an integral part of the whole 
complex chain of creation.”171 She adds to this a consideration of the virtues in 
Aquinas and concludes that “as applied to our treatment of animals, consideration of 
the virtues forces us to stop and reflect, not just on how to treat animals, but on how 
we balance the demands of justice for animals with those for the human 
community.”172 Again, here the underlying argument is that treating animals well is 
good for humans but that animals’ welfare can be secondary to issues of human 
justice. 
These attempts at rehabilitating Aquinas frequently come from ecological 
theologians, such as Deane-Drummond and Northcott, rather than animal theologians. 
As will be discussed more fully in chapter four, ecological theology is often at odds 
with animal theology because it is more concerned with sustaining the holistic system 
than with care for the individual creatures within the system. In this sense it may be 
that Aquinas’s theology is more easily adapted to an ecological worldview. 
Despite these attempts at rehabilitation, it is hard to ignore the legacy of 
Aquinas’s position on animals. Whether or not he has been mischaracterised or 
misused over the centuries, the impact of his work casts a long shadow in terms of 
animals. It is a mistake to minimise the influence of his teaching on animals. Despite 
controversy during his lifetime, even that leading to theological condemnations, his 
thought has become the standard of Christian scholasticism. Even the Protestant 
reformers, such as Luther, Calvin, and Zwingli, never questioned Catholic inheritance 
in this regard. He was canonised only fifty years after his death and has been regarded 
for centuries as the father of Catholic theology. In 1879, Pope Leo XIII stated that 
Thomas’s theology was a definitive exposition of Catholic doctrine, maintaining that 
                                                 
170 See his discussion in his chapter “Creation, Redemption and Natural Law Ethics,” in Northcott, The 
Environment and Christian Ethics, 199–256. 
171 Deane-Drummond, The Ethics of Nature, 77. 
172 Deane-Drummond, The Ethics of Nature, 77. 
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“among the Scholastic Doctors, the chief and master of all [intellectual] towers [was] 
Thomas Aquinas.”173 He exhorts “venerable brethren, in all earnestness to restore the 
golden wisdom of St. Thomas, and to spread it far and wide for the defence and 
beauty of the Catholic faith, for the good of society, and for the advantage of all the 
sciences.”174 In relation to animals, Thomistic formulations have held sway for 
subsequent centuries of Christian thought. His idea that animals have no mental life 
and act not by conscious will but by “nature” or “instinct” has been persuasive right 
up to the present day. It may be argued, quite rightly, that Aquinas represents only 
one perception of animals in the Catholic tradition, but it is hard to ignore his 
impact.175 Under scholasticism, rationality became the arbiter of moral worth, a 
position that is still pervasive today. 
 
2.3. Boff’s Brazilian context 
Boff is undoubtedly a contextual theologian. His theology both grows from and 
speaks to his Brazilian experience and context. However, the cultural construction of 
animals in Brazil is deeply influenced by the dominant tradition on animals, which 
Boff also reflects.176 Through an engagement with the interviews I conducted in 
Brazil, I will explore Boff’s Brazilian context in relation to animals in an attempt to 
better understand the context in which his thought emerges.  
 Bruno Garrote, a legal scholar, summed up the close relationship between 
meat, religion, and the right to bear arms in the popular expression “BBB”: “These 
are the 3Bs: Boi, Bala and Bíblia (cattle/bull, bullet and Bible, respectively). [People 
concerned with BBB] and their influences usually come together here in Brazil.”177 
Although I did not explore perspectives on gun control while in Brazil, the close 
connection between meat, politics, culture, and economics became clear during my 
interviews.178 
                                                 
173 Leo XIII, Aeterni Patris, para. 17. 
174 Leo XIII, Aeterni Patris, para. 31. 
175 For a greater exploration of the impact of Aquinas’s views on animals, see chapter one of Linzey, 
Why Animal Suffering Matters. 
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177 See Appendix 7, “Excerpts from Dr Bruno Garrote Interview.” 
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standards are not enforced see, Appendix 6, “Excerpts from Dr Carlos Frederico Ramos de Jesus 
Interview.” 
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Luiz Carlos Susin, a liberation theologian, spoke about how the greatest 
challenge for animals in Brazil is the meat industry, since “the exportation of meat is 
the most important export in [Brazil’s] economy … it is the centre of our international 
commerce.”179 Brazil is, along with India, the joint largest exporter of beef in the 
world, and the commercial importance of meat exportation cannot be overstated.180 
The importance of the meat industry to the Brazilian economy was demonstrated in 
2017, when JBS, the world’s largest meat-packing company, was embroiled in a 
corruption scandal. JBS, based in Brazil, was accused of bribing meat inspectors to 
ignore food safety problems.181 Although the company denied any wrongdoing and 
the investigation is ongoing, many countries around the globe, including the United 
States, the EU nations, and China, suspended trade in Brazilian beef.182 The impact on 
the Brazilian economy has been considerable, with estimates indicating that “Brazil 
lost between $250m and $300m in meat export revenue” in 2017 “as about 46 
countries … closed their doors to its products in the face of a scandal surrounding the 
alleged sale of rotten meat.”183 Even with exports resuming, the damage to the 
Brazilian economy has continued because confidence in Brazilian beef has been 
damaged, and accordingly, sales have fallen by 19 per cent.184 
 Carlos Frederico Ramos de Jesus, a legal scholar, gave me an insight into the 
relationship between Brazilian agribusiness (or agro-business as he refers to it) and 
successive Brazilian governments. He explained, “The three and a half leftist 
governments we have had, they have spent public money from our development 
public bank (BNDES) to increase their activities to be ‘national champions’ to export 
meat all over the world.”185 Public money is used to support the agribusiness, which 
is seen as a crucial part of the Brazilian economy. The power of the agribusiness even 
extends to government positions: “in Dilma Rouseff’s government … she had as her 
agricultural minister, one of the biggest agro-business women in Brazil, Katia Abreu. 
She was the president of the agro-business association in Brazil before she became a 
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minister.”186 Carlos Naconecy, a philosopher, agreed: “The meat industry here is very 
powerful. The number one financial contributors to the presidential elections here 
were the meat industry.”187 Indeed, agribusiness supports both sides during elections, 
so that whoever is elected, the industry remains in power. Indicating how widespread 
the relationship is, Garrote said, “Most people elected have connections with 
agribusiness. They are owners of some company or large portions of land, or 
indirectly were financed by agribusiness—it is scary.”188 The close alliance between 
the government and agribusiness serves to illustrate how ingrained the industry is in 
the structure of Brazilian society. 
 However, Susin points out that meat is not just an economic hurdle in Brazil; 
it also has strong cultural significance: “There is a culture of meat. For example, here 
in the south of Brazil we have the culture of the gaucho. Gaucho is a traditional figure 
here and in the north of Argentina—the gaucho’s clothes are typical in these regions. 
There is also churrasco—cowboy culture. Meat is fundamental for feasts and 
celebrations—without meat it seems we cannot celebrate.”189 The cultural 
significance of meat is ingrained also in sports associated with cattle farming, such as 
rodeos. 
 The culture of meat is illustrated by the ferocity of the responses when 
discussions of vegetarianism and veganism arise. In my group interview with 
members of Felinos du Campus, a group that takes care of a stray cat colony at 
Pontifical Catholic University in Rio de Janeiro, the members disclosed how difficult 
it was to talk about not eating animals. Patricia Österreicher spoke about how she has 
largely stopped talking about animals because the response can be hostile: “It is very 
hard because they are aggressive, and they make fun of you.”190 Thaissa da Silva 
Mocoes Puppin concurred that for some people caring about animals elicits “a form of 
humiliation … they will make fun of you. You become a sport.”191 That even 
discussions about caring for animals are met with such resistance is a sign of how 
ingrained the culture of meat-eating is in the Brazilian context. The ridicule of 
vegetarians was surprising to hear about, given that as I travelled through Brazil, there 
were a great number of vegetarian and even vegan restaurants, indicating that the 
                                                 
186 See Appendix 6. 
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189 See Appendix 3. 
190 See Appendix 10, “Excerpts from Felinos du Campus, PUC Group Interview.” 
191 See Appendix 10. 
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vegetarian movement is gaining momentum, if only commercially. Naconecy and I 
spoke about the rise in vegetarian and vegan commerce, and he remarked that it has 
been met with great resistance from agribusiness. “Some years ago they did not care 
about vegetarianism or what was happening in the animal movement. Now they are 
starting to react. They buy advertising space in magazines, with adverts that say: 
‘Doctors say eating meat is good for you.’”192 Ramos de Jesus echoed Naconecy’s 
comments on the strong reaction of agribusiness to the vegetarian movement. He 
noted that as part of their media campaign, agribusinesses “have hired many popular 
actors, actresses, singers—some of them were even vegetarian before—and they have 
paid them to taste meat and say how delicious it is.”193 Naconecy and Ramos de Jesus 
agreed, though, that this widespread media campaign promoting meat has been a good 
thing because it indicates that the Brazilian animal movement is having an effect and 
is thus worthy of an expensive media campaign in response. 
 The common idea that animals are just “things” was also articulated in my 
group interview with members of Felinos du Campus. One member, Patricia 
Österreicher, commented that animals “are not seen as living, sentient beings who 
have a right to life and dignity. [They are] just like objects. Even less than objects as 
an object belongs to you and you can sell it. An animal, it is just seen as a 
nuisance.”194 Another member, Silva Mocoes Puppin, agreed with this general 
sentiment: “They are just good for barbeque. We have here in this country kitten 
barbeque.”195 
 Discussion of the instrumental view of animals also arose in the group 
interview. Animals are understood as fulfilling a particular role. Österreicher 
remarked that “they are [considered] resources. Dogs are for shepherding; cats are for 
keeping mice away from grain, and horses [are for carrying].”196 Silva Mocoes 
Puppin concurred with this description of the conception of animals: “They view 
animals as a product. We are going to feed them and use them. They provide 
something that will be used.”197 It is clear from the interviews I conducted that the 
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general conception of animals in Brazil is in line with the dominant Catholic position: 
that animals are resources, here for human use.198 
One of the most common questions I was asked while lecturing in Brazil was 
“why should we care for animals if they have no souls?” This is a concern that springs 
directly from a mischaracterisation of the dominant Catholic view on animals. As 
explored previously, Aquinas never denied that animals have souls; rather, he held 
that they have a different kind of soul from humans. But the view that animals do not 
have souls springs from this position because what is meant is that animals do not 
have rational, immortal souls, or souls like ours.  
 However, despite the difficulties outlined, there are signs of an emerging 
animal movement in Brazil. Daniel Braga Lourenço, a legal scholar, suggested in his 
interview that the movement is “like the Bryan Adams song—we are young, wild, and 
free.”199 And although, as he acknowledged, this has some drawbacks for the animal 
movement, it also means there is a great possibility of change and growth. Carlos 
Naconecy said, “Everything has to be done here … We have a huge amount of 
[animal] victims. We have a mission here.”200  
Indeed, both legal and cultural change were already evident during my 
research in Brazil. As indicated previously, despite the nation’s largely meat-based 
culture, there are a large number of vegetarian and vegan restaurants, even outside the 
large cities. In addition, the legal challenges to practices thought to inflict cruelty on 
animals have been gaining momentum. The legal basis for banning certain practices is 
grounded in the Brazilian constitution, which was adopted in 1988. Article VIII states 
that the government is required to “protect the fauna and the flora, with prohibition, in 
the manner prescribed by law, of all practices which represent a risk to their 
ecological function, cause the extinction of species or subject animals to cruelty.”201 
Animal cruelty is thus considered unconstitutional, which has enabled animal 
advocates to legally petition for the banning of specific practices. For example, farra 
do boi, a practice similar to blood fiestas, was ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme 
                                                 
198 For discussions of the Catholic-based permission to eat meat see, Appendices 6 and 7. Garrote 
implies that the dominant Catholic view on animals has entered “the Brazilian collective 
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199 See Appendix 8, “Excerpts from Professor Daniel Braga Lourenço Interview.” Braga Lourenço also 
discusses the challenges for the animal movement in different parts of Brazil. 
200 See Appendix 9. 
201 Chamber of Deputies, Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil, title VIII, chap. VI, art. 
225, para. 1; my emphases. 
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Court and is now illegal.202 Similarly, vaquejada, an ability rodeo, was ruled 
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court shortly after my visit there.203 Under this 
section of the constitution, there is potentially a lot of scope for legal change. Of 
course, there is resistance, and legal progress is slow, but nonetheless, there is 
hope.204 
 This chapter has laid the groundwork for a discussion of Boff’s own views on 
animals, through an engagement with his biography, the dominant Catholic position 
on animals, and the Brazilian cultural context for animals. In this challenging cultural 
context for animals, it is perhaps not surprising that Boff has largely adopted the 
dominant position on animals. Despite this, there are signs within his theology of an 
attempt to move beyond this position, however unexplored. As I begin a more 
detailed exploration of his thought, I turn in my next chapter to his now classic work 
Jesus Christ Liberator. 
  
                                                 
202 For a discussion of farra do boi see, Appendix 8. 
203 For a discussion of the vaquejada decisison see, Appendix 6. 
204 For discussions of the growth of animal law in Brazil see, Appendices 6 and 8. 
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Chapter 3: The Liberator Who Does Not Liberate Creation 
 
This chapter engages with Boff’s Jesus Christ Liberator. It engages with the first two 
methodological questions, about what consideration he gives to animals and what if 
any of his theology could help the development of animal theology. Sadly, in Jesus 
Christ Liberator the work of Christ is only considered in relation to humanity. Boff 
does not consider the status of animals, or indeed the significance of creation, 
anywhere in this volume. The first part of this chapter outlines three areas in which 
this is most evident: redemption, resurrection, and the kingdom. The tragedy is that 
his anthropocentrism leads to a limited Christology, and therefore to a reduced 
concept of God. The second part of this chapter highlights three areas in which his 
theology could easily include creation and animals. Namely, the idea of incarnation as 
a “being-for-others,” coupled with his concern for the periphery, and his call to 
interpret Jesus contextually. Together these aspects could provide the groundwork for 
a more inclusive Christology that takes into account the place of other creatures. 
These ideas will be developed in relation to animals in chapter seven. 
Boff penned his seminal work Jesus Cristo Libertador: Ensaio de Cristologia 
Critica para o Nosso Tempo in 1972. It was subsequently published in 1978 in 
English as Jesus Christ Liberator: A Critical Christology of Our Time (hereafter cited 
as Jesus). As he acknowledges in his 1978 preface,205 Jesus was written at a time of 
political repression in Brazil,206 and its message of liberation reflects the context in 
which the book was written: “its intent is to underline the liberative dimensions 
present in the life, message, and practical activity of the historical Jesus.”207  
 Although Boff’s work explores a range of different Christological ideas, his 
critical engagement with the doctrine focuses largely on the message of social action 
                                                 
205 Boff notes, “This book was first published in 1972. It was put together in Brazil at a time when 
severe political repression was being exerted against broad segments of the church. The word 
‘liberation’ was forbidden to be used in all communications media. Thus the book did not say all that 
its author wanted to say; it said what could be said. Nevertheless the liberation message was 
understood by Christians.” Boff, Jesus Christ Liberator, xii; my emphases. 
206 On March 31, 1964, General Castello Branco led a coup d’état in Brazil, ushering in a military 
regime that would last until 1985. For a full account of the history and politics of this time, see Green, 
“Introduction,” 1–17; and Dussel, A History of the Church in Latin America, 148–54. Dussel writes 
that after the coup, “rapidly there followed imprisonments, expulsions from the country, censure, 
withdrawal of citizenship, and the beginning of political tortures,” forming what he coined “a perfectly 
organized system of oppression” (149). It is worth noting that while political repression was a reality 
for the context in which Boff was writing, he was not, as far as we know, a specific subject of this 
political repression.  
207 Boff, Jesus Christ Liberator, xii. 
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found in Jesus. The central Christological claim in Jesus is that in Christ we encounter 
God as a “being-for-others.”208 Jesus’s life was oriented towards others, especially 
God, and was lived for them.209 What is given in Jesus, then, is the image of a God 
focused on the needs of others. From this Boff draws implications about how humans 
should orient their lives: “It is by going out of oneself that human beings remain 
profoundly within their own selves; it is by giving that one receives and possesses 
one’s being.”210 Being-for-others is how human beings become fully human: by being 
in relation with others, we become truly ourselves. While a Christology focused on 
the message of the living Jesus may seem unremarkable, in the context of the time, 
this was a strikingly new way to imagine the relevance of the incarnation.211  
 In terms of animal theology, Jesus reveals some of the underlying tensions 
that pervade Boff’s thought. On the one hand, he wants to retain the cosmic 
significance of the Christ-event, yet at the same time, despite his attempts to resist 
anthropocentrism, he sees the event’s relevance largely in terms of humanity. He 
emphasises Christ as liberator, yet the “others” for whom Christ gives his life appear 
to be mostly, if not entirely, human. These tensions will be explored in his ideas of 
redemption, resurrection, and the kingdom, before I turn to consider the more animal-
friendly aspects of his Christology. 
 
3.1. A limited Christology 
a. Anthropocentric redemption  
Jesus’s greatest moment of “being-for-others” is his sacrificial self-giving on the 
cross. This is the moment when God in Jesus takes upon himself the sins of the world, 
suffers, and dies for the salvation of others. God in Jesus is for us as he mediates our 
salvation. To explain how human redemption is possible, Boff utilises Jungian 
psychology, in which Jesus is understood as the “prototype-archetype of the true 
                                                 
208 Boff, Jesus Christ Liberator, 179. See also discussion of Boff’s conception of the incarnation later 
in this chapter in the section “Incarnation as a being-for-others.” 
209 Boff, Jesus Christ Liberator, 195. 
210 Boff, Jesus Christ Liberator, 197. 
211 Boff does, of course, discuss the Council of Chalcedon, but he significantly diverges from orthodox 
doctrine. He holds that Jesus “was lacking a ‘hypostasis,’ a subsistence … He was completely emptied 
of himself and completely full of the reality of the Other, of God the Father.” Boff, Jesus Christ 
Liberator, 196. Although Boff maintains that the lack of hypostasis in Jesus does not make him any 
less human and rather that his being-for-others is the “highest perfection” of humanity (196), many 
theologians would have issues with this conception of the incarnation. This raises a fundamental 
question about the orthodoxy and adequacy of Boff’s Christology, but this question is beyond the scope 
of my work here. 
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human being.”212 Redemption is possible because “the Word, humanizing itself, 
assumed all this reality contained in the collective and personal human psyche, both 
positively and negatively, thereby touching all humanity.”213 It is this kind of 
language that led one reviewer to remark that Boff’s book contains “sporadic flights 
of … abstract jargon.”214  
Boff rather uncritically incorporates Carl Jung’s analysis into his theology. He 
offers no explanation as to why Jung’s analysis in particular should be chosen over 
other systems of analysis. There is no exploration as to why psychological theory is 
relevant here, beyond the fact that its use enables Boff to explain the ramifications of 
the incarnation to all humans through the language of psyches. Beyond this, the 
adoption of Jungian theory is odd for three reasons. The first is that Jung was a 
Western psychologist, and given Boff’s emphasis on Latin America, it seems strange 
that he would not reach for a more relevant Latin American explanation. The second 
is that Boff could have sought a clearer theological, even Christological, explanation. 
Theologians over the years have offered a variety of ways to explain redemption on 
the cross without an appeal to psychology.215 The third is that by focusing on the 
adoption of the “human psyche,” Boff unnecessarily focuses the implications of the 
incarnation solely on the human creature. It is the human psyche that God assumes in 
Jesus, and therefore the human psyche becomes the focus of God’s redemptive work. 
This third problem is the focus of this section. 
The ramifications of Boff’s incarnational theology for redemption become 
clear in his discussion of whether there have been other incarnations in the universe. 
He questions whether the incarnation of Jesus of Nazareth has been the only 
incarnation of the Triune God and concludes that “nothing prohibits this same eternal 
Logos from having appeared and assumed the spiritual and evolutionary conditions of 
                                                 
212 Boff, Jesus Christ Liberator, 203. See Jung, The Collected Works of C. G. Jung, see especially part 
1 of volume 9, “Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious.”  
213 Boff, Jesus Christ Liberator, 203. Boff is drawing upon Jung here and his conception of the 
collective psyche. McLynn, Jung’s biographer, described Jung’s development of the idea: “Jung came 
to the conclusion that there existed something very like what Plato called in the Timaeus the ‘world-
soul.’ Jung’s term for this core of actual and potential human mental dispositions he called ‘the 
psyche.’” McLynn, Carl Gustav Jung, 299–300. Boff is arguing that in the incarnation Jesus assumes 
the collective psyche, and thus his actions affect all humanity. 
214 Kerr, review of Jesus Christ Liberator, 398. This criticism seems fair given Boff’s adoption of 
Jungian analysis and terminology; indeed, it is a criticism that could arguably apply throughout his 
corpus. 
215 For a survey of different explanations of atonement, see Aulen, Christus Victor; and Beilby and 
Eddy, The Nature of Atonement.  
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other beings in other systems.”216 The thrust of his argument here is that the Triune 
God cannot be limited, and so we cannot assume that the Logos would not have 
incarnated herself in other moments and other places in time.217 However, as he 
begins to acknowledge, this idea has profound implications for redemption and 
salvation. He states, “The way redemption was realized here on earth would be 
merely one concrete form among many others by which the Word of God relates to 
creation.”218 Perhaps the postulating of multiple incarnations should give Boff pause 
to question why his Christology might require multiple incarnations. Indeed, perhaps 
it is because he focuses so much on the salvation of the human psyche that he needs to 
postulate other incarnations to explain salvation in other parts of the universe. It is his 
focus on the human psyche being what is assumed in the incarnation that seems to 
limit the redemptive power of the incarnation. Lucy Gardner describes this as a 
tension within incarnational theology, where the focus is misplaced—what she calls 
“the doctrine of incarnation [becoming] … the doctrine of ‘enhumanization.’”219  
By tying his Christology to the human psyche, the incarnation supposed 
carries with it the tendency to jettison materiality. The “psyche” is a nebulous 
concept, and though God may well have taken on the human psyche in the 
incarnation, that is not all that became incarnate. Saint John’s Gospel states that “the 
Word became flesh and lived among us” (John 1:14). It is the word “flesh” (sarx) that 
is significant here. God did not assume humanity but rather flesh, an embodied flesh, 
and humans are not the only enfleshed, embodied beings. Animals have flesh and 
bodies as well. What is taken up and redeemed in the Godhead in Jesus is fleshly, 
embodied existence. The embodied fleshly life is affirmed and redeemed by God in 
the incarnation. The postulation of multiple incarnations would not be necessary if a 
greater affirmation of the material world—and especially other sentient, fleshly 
creatures—were included in Boff’s Christology. If Boff were to adopt a broader view 
of what occurred in the incarnation—for example, that what Jesus took on was not 
                                                 
216 Boff, Jesus Christ Liberator, 216. Boff is not the only theologian to give the idea of multiple 
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concretization like that which was realized within our earthly system.” Boff, Jesus Christ Liberator, 
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218 Boff, Jesus Christ Liberator, 216; emphasis in the original. 
219 Gardner, “Anglican Christianity: Animal Questions for Christian Doctrine,” 39. 
 57 
merely human flesh but creatureliness in itself—redemption could then have 
significance for all of creation, in all parts of the cosmos. 
Indeed, by focusing on the human psyche as the locus of God’s redemptive 
activity, Boff falls prey to the classic problem of redeeming only those particularities 
that Jesus assumed, otherwise known as the scandal of particularity. In feminist 
theological discourse, this has been succinctly summarised by Julie M. Hopkins: “The 
doctrine of the incarnation does not directly address the female sex. Whilst the 
Chalcedon dogma that Jesus Christ was ‘truly God and truly man’ can be interpreted 
to mean that Jesus was truly a divinized human, Church doctrine and practice has 
used the formula to legitimise male supremacy in authority and even in nature.”220 
Although Boff does not stress the masculinity of the man Jesus and so avoids this 
particular expression of the problem, he is still focused on the human psyche as the 
object of redemption. This engenders another set of problems—for example, what are 
the ramifications for those with damaged psyches or those with impaired cognitive 
abilities? How do these factors affect their redemption? The focus on the adoption of 
the particular humanity of Jesus has implications for how we understand our 
relationship with the divine Christ. This is seemingly accepted by Boff, given his 
quoting of Gregory of Nazianzus: “That which God did not assume he also did not 
redeem.”221 Yet he does not fully explore the implications of his incarnational 
theology. It does seem that, at least at this point, human bodies, as distinct from 
psyches, are not redeemed. 
 Moreover, the stress on the collective human psyche as the object of 
redemption is problematic because it limits the redemptive activity of God to the 
human species. While it is right to say that God is concerned with the salvation of 
humanity, since he became incarnate as a human, it is wrong to suggest that God is 
concerned only with human redemption. If what is redeemed in Jesus is the collective 
human psyche, it is hard to see how creation as a whole is redeemed. Indeed, since the 
biblical witness is clear that the Christ-event has significance beyond humanity, to all 
of creation,222 Boff seems to be unnecessarily limiting his theology of redemption to 
                                                 
220 Hopkins, Towards a Feminist Christology, 83. Of course, Hopkins is not the first feminist 
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Johnson, Consider Jesus. 
221 Referenced by Boff, Jesus Christ Liberator, 186. 
222 See Col. 1:19–20 and Eph. 1:8–10. For commentaries see previous note in chapter one. 
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humans. Furthermore, since his incarnational theology centres on Jesus as a “being-
for-others,” it is a natural extension to include nonhumans—that is, all “others”—in 
that redemption. 
 
b. A cosmic resurrection? 
In chapter eleven of Jesus Christ Liberator, Boff considers the resurrected Christ in 
relation to the world. He states that in the resurrection, Christ did not leave the world, 
but rather “he penetrated it in a more profound manner and is now present in all 
reality in the same way that God is present in all things.”223 In Jesus’s death, Boff 
sees Jesus embracing a spiritual cosmic existence: “by the means of the resurrection, 
the new man emerged, no longer carnal but pneumatic, for which the body is no 
longer a limit but total cosmic presence and communion with all reality.”224 For Boff, 
in his resurrected form, Jesus is now a being for the cosmos, and his pneumatic being 
is now present throughout the cosmos.  
The resurrection is seen as an event that reverberates throughout time and 
history, such that Jesus is now present in all reality. Boff defines the resurrection “as a 
total, exhaustive realization of human reality in its relationship with God, with others, 
and with the cosmos.”225 Through the resurrection, Jesus opened the cosmos and 
human beings to the reality of the divine. The bodily nature of the resurrection is 
especially significant: “Through this human being as body, Jesus assumed a vital part 
of matter. Consequently his relationship to our world is one of cosmogenesis. Jesus–
human being is the result of a long process of evolution. As body-spirit, Jesus of 
Nazareth was also a nexus of relationships with the totality of the human and cosmic 
reality that surrounded him.”226 Cosmogenesis is defined as “the origin or evolution 
of the universe.”227 Jesus is understood as the origin of the universe yet also as part of 
the evolution of the universe. “Cosmogenesis” is a term used throughout Boff’s 
corpus, and it is taken up especially in his ecological theology. Boff’s work is 
influenced by Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, from whose work this term is taken. 
Teilhard de Chardin says the following of Christ as the Omega, or cosmogenesis: 
                                                 
223 Boff, Jesus Christ Liberator, 207.  
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225 Boff, Jesus Christ Liberator, 207. 
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Omega: the end-point of cosmogenesis, the culmination of the process of 
hominization or spiritualization, where personal and universal meet in the 
Supra-Personal—a point therefore which is not simply the end of the whole 
process, the last term in its series, but is outside all series, autonomous and 
transcendent, and so is identified with God, the Centre of centres, and with 
Totus Christus.228 
 
In Boff’s consideration of the resurrected Christ, he indicates the openness of 
God to the whole cosmos.229 If the incarnation is Jesus’s being for humanity, then the 
resurrection is Jesus’s being for the whole of the cosmos. That is, “the resurrection 
manifested the full depths of Jesus’ communion and openness.”230 Boff’s discussion 
of the resurrected Jesus moves to what he terms “Cosmic Christology,”231 which 
“professes that Christ is in the beginning, the middle, and end of God’s paths and the 
measure of all things.”232 He references Ephesians 1:10, Colossians 1:16, and John 
1:14 in support of his argument.  
 Although his discussion of how God penetrates all things and is cosmically 
present seems to indicate some sort of cosmic redemption, Boff is far from specific. 
Although it is termed a cosmic Christology, there is little discussion of other beings 
other than humans or even other parts of existence being redeemed. It seems that the 
cosmic Christ is both everywhere and nowhere. The closest Boff comes to explaining 
cosmic redemption is when he states, “The material elements are sacraments that put 
us in communion with him, because they, in the most intimate part of their being, 
pertain to the very reality of Christ.”233 It seems, then, that the whole material 
universe is suffused with the cosmic reality of Christ and assumes a sacramental 
character.234 The conception of the universe as sacramental is a complex one.235 Of 
                                                 
228 Teilhard de Chardin, Hymn of the Universe, 90; emphases in the original. 
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230 Boff, Jesus Christ Liberator, 199. 
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course, creation is pervaded by the Spirit and can therefore reveal glimpses of the 
Creator, but it is not perfect. There is also violence, entropy, and predation in the 
natural world, which belies its sacramental character. The ambiguity in Boff’s thought 
about the nature of cosmic redemption can leave the reader unsure as to how the 
cosmos, beyond the human person, is redeemed. 
Perhaps this can be best seen in his comment: “The Lord lived and travelled 
the narrow path of human beings.”236 He draws on Teilhard de Chardin’s ideas on the 
“process of growing consciousness and complexity in the evolutionary curve.”237 He 
suggests that it is through human consciousness that the universe “finds its highest 
unity and convergence” and that “it is in the human being that the meaning of the 
totality is to be found.”238 In the incarnation and resurrection, the cosmic Christ 
penetrates the cosmos through its highest expression: human consciousness. 
There are several problems with Boff’s use of Teilhard de Chardin to explain 
the cosmological significance of the incarnation and resurrection. The first is that as 
he does with Jung and redemption, Boff adopts Teilhard de Chardin rather 
uncritically, offering very little explanation as to why his theology is preferable or 
applicable. Second, the contention that human consciousness is the highest expression 
of the cosmos is questionable. He simply states that human consciousness is where 
“the meaning of totality” is to be found and offers no explanation for this assertion. In 
so doing, he is echoing Teilhard de Chardin, who writes, “Consciousness manifests 
itself indubitably in man and therefore, glimpsed in this one flash of light, it reveals 
itself as having a cosmic extension and consequently as being aureoled by limitless 
prolongations in space and time.”239 
Third, even if one accepts that human consciousness is “the meaning of 
totality,” it is unclear in what sense or how that leads to Christ having an impact on 
the cosmos. Fourth, the idea that human consciousness is “the meaning of totality” 
may be seen as the arbitrary favouring of human consciousness above any other 
beings’ consciousness. An alternative theocentric approach to ethics and the universe 
is suggested by James M. Gustafson, who suggests that a “moral pause”240 is required 
to reorient ourselves away from anthropocentrism. He argues that “if God is ‘for 
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238 Boff, Jesus Christ Liberator, 214. 
239 Teilhard de Chardin, Hymn of the Universe, 76. 
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man,’ he may not be for man as the chief end of creation. The chief end of God may 
not be the salvation of man. Man’s place in relation to the universe has to be 
rethought, as does man’s relation to God.”241 In short, humans may not be the apex or 
ultimate goal of creation, but that does not necessarily have to diminish God’s 
concern for us. 
Although Boff does not define the term himself, a definition of consciousness 
might be helpful: “the state of being conscious—the fact of awareness by the mind of 
itself and the world.”242 So beings are conscious if they are aware of their own mind 
and the world around them, which is not by definition a uniquely human attribute. 
Though Boff could not have foreseen this when writing Jesus, the idea that human 
consciousness is somehow unique has been discredited by the Cambridge Declaration 
of Consciousness, which holds that “the weight of evidence indicates that humans are 
not unique in possessing the neurological substrates that generate consciousness. Non-
human animals, including all mammals and birds, and many other creatures, including 
octopuses, also possess these neurological substrates.”243 Consciousness, at least 
scientifically speaking, is not then a uniquely human attribute, and to single out 
human consciousness as the culmination of creation is to ignore scientific evidence on 
nonhuman consciousness. Indeed, that the significance of the resurrection needs to be 
attached to the idea of consciousness is in itself rather question-begging. 
Boff goes to great lengths to stress the importance of the humanness of Jesus 
and the importance of the incarnation for humanity, such that his turn to cosmic 
significance seems out of place. If Boff had laid rather more stress on the 
creatureliness of Jesus in the incarnation, this would have paved the way for speaking 
of Jesus as redeeming creation as a whole. The incarnation understood as the adoption 
of creatureliness would have given the resurrection significance for creation without 
need for talk of evolutionary processes and cosmogenesis, terms that add confusion 
rather than clarity to Boff’s theology. 
One possible explanation for his limiting of redemption to humanity might be 
that the scholastic hierarchy of rationality discussed in chapter one underpins his 
conception of the incarnation. Indeed, this seems likely given that his discussion of 
the possibility of multiple incarnations is prefaced with the question “Do other 
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243 Low, “The Cambridge Declaration of Consciousness.” 
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rational beings exist in the cosmos?”244 Although this is not explicitly acknowledged 
by Boff, his belief that human consciousness contains the meaning of totality echoes 
the idea that humans are higher beings because they have rational, immortal souls. 
Aquinas maintained that “of all the parts of the universe, intellectual creatures hold 
the highest place, because they approach nearest to the divine likeness. Therefore, the 
divine providence provides for the intellectual nature for its own sake, and for all 
others for its sake.”245 All things in the universe are oriented towards, and exist for, 
the sake of intellectual creatures—in other words, humans. Although rationality is 
obviously not the same as consciousness, consciousness is nonetheless a requirement 
for rational thought. Thus, rationality in the guise of consciousness again becomes the 
arbiter of meaning and value within creation. In the scholastic hierarchy, only humans 
(excluding angels and demons) are understood to have rationality, and that is the basis 
for their superiority over the rest of creation. More recently, scientific research has 
shown that human and animal cognition—and as a corollary, intelligence—share 
more similarities than is commonly assumed.246 Even when Boff was writing in the 
1970s, there was already growing evidence of the complexity of animal awareness 
and sentiency.247 If Boff were to lay less stress on the importance of human 
consciousness, it might leave greater room for the value of the rest of creation. 
In one sense, Boff is right about the uniqueness of human consciousness, in 
that consciousness is a requirement for moral action. Humans alone, as far as we 
know, are given the ability to make moral decisions. In this sense humans are unique, 
as they are uniquely capable of taking responsibility for other beings. It is this kind of 
consciousness that underlies the idea of humanity as the servant species. The 
uniqueness of humanity, then, consists in its ability to truly be-for-others, in the sense 
of care and responsibility. Though Boff does not bring this aspect of human 
uniqueness to the fore, it is there within his thought, and he could make a great deal 
more of humans as moral beings-for-others. 
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c. A limited kingdom 
The central message of Jesus’s teaching is the preaching of the kingdom of God. The 
kingdom is “a total, global, structural revolution of the old order, brought about by 
God and only by God.”248 That reordering of the world is understood in terms of 
liberation from alienation: “a liberation from sin, from its personal and cosmic 
consequences, and from all other alienation suffered in creation.”249 At once the 
possibility of the kingdom for nonhuman creation seems clear: the kingdom involves 
the freedom of “all” from “alienation suffered in creation.” Tragically, Boff leaves 
this part of his thought unexplored and instead focuses on the kingdom as liberation 
for humanity from everything that alienates us. In order to bring about this new order, 
Jesus “makes two fundamental demands: He demands personal conversion and 
postulates a restructuring of the human world.”250 That is, the kingdom requires first a 
personal change in orientation and attitude, followed by changes in the structure of 
human life. Conversion is a prefiguring of the kingdom and is understood as “the 
implementation of altered relationships at every level of personal and social reality”; 
these new relationships “express concrete forms of liberation and anticipate the 
kingdom of God.”251  
Boff’s discussion of the kingdom indicates the fundamental tensions within 
his thought as regards the work of Christ in relation to humanity and creation. He 
affirms the importance of the kingdom to all creation but explores only its relevance 
to humanity. Here Boff indicates how the scope of the kingdom of God cannot be 
limited: “The kingdom of God cannot be narrowed down to any particular aspect. It 
embraces all: the world, the human person, and society: the totality of reality is to be 
transformed by God.”252 Yet at the same time, he limits his conception of the 
kingdom by focusing only on its implications for humanity: “The kingdom of God is 
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a total, global and structural transfiguration and revolution of the reality of human 
beings; it is the cosmos purified of all evils and full of the reality of God.”253 There is 
a tension here. Although he indicates the kingdom will have cosmic significance, he 
does not envision a complete transformation of creation, perhaps along the lines of the 
peaceable kingdom found in Isaiah 11:6. Rather, the transformation will be in the 
lives of human beings alone.  
This theological tension arises from the lack of clarity in his thought. He does 
not seem to be clear in his own mind about how Christ is significant for creation aside 
from humanity. In Boff’s vision of the kingdom, “pain, blindness, hunger, tempests, 
sin, and death will not have their turn.”254 Since pain, blindness, hunger, tempests, 
and death also affect nonhuman parts of creation, one might assume that this vision 
also includes other beings. However, it is clear from the context, in which Jesus is 
described as “the liberator of humanity,”255 that only human suffering is envisioned. 
In short, it is human suffering that will end in the kingdom. One might argue that 
given the context in which Boff was writing this text, it was fair enough to focus on 
the immediate reality of human suffering. However, even in his later work, the 
suffering of animals in creation does not figure as a theme, as I will explore later on. 
Yet despite his humanocentric focus, his notion of the kingdom has the 
potential to be more inclusive of creation and animals specifically. In his epilogue, he 
expands his vision of what the kingdom might look like: “What [Jesus] offers us by 
way of example is an option on behalf of those who are treated unjustly, a refusal to 
succumb to the will for power and domination, and solidarity with everything that 
suggests greater participation in societal living and fraternal openness to God.”256 
This vision of the kingdom makes room for the possibility of a fuller Christology that 
includes all of creation. The problem is that Boff does not follow through the logic of 
his position to consider the relevance of the kingdom to nonhuman beings. However, 
that Jesus is on the side of “those who are treated unjustly” opens up the possibility of 
the kingdom for nonhumans, as it is not only humanity that suffers injustices. A fuller 
account of what the kingdom might look like for all creation would strengthen Boff’s 
Christology and give it truly cosmic significance. It could be the basis of 
understanding humans as beings for nonhuman others, guardians of creation. An 
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expansion of his theology of the kingdom would enable Boff to iron out some of the 
ambiguities in his thought and make room for a more creation-inclusive Christology. 
 
3.2. Building a more inclusive Christology 
Boff’s ambiguity leads him to inconsistency in his incarnational theology as regards 
creation; however, of all of the works in his corpus, Jesus contains the greatest 
possibility for including animals within his theology. Although he does not expand his 
theological concern to include animals within his theology, Jesus utilises several 
theological ideas that may provide the basis for a more inclusive Christology. I will 
look in turn at (a) incarnation as a being-for-others, (b) contextual interpretation of 
Jesus, and (c) the highlighting of the periphery, to consider how these areas might 
form the foundations of a more inclusive theology. 
 
a. Incarnation as a being-for-others 
The focal point of Boff’s Christology is Jesus’s teachings and his particular 
identification with the marginalised: “He seeks contact with the marginalized, the 
poor, and the despised.”257 The significance of the stressing of the historical Jesus is 
laid out more fully in the epilogue to Jesus.258 By focusing on the historical Jesus, 
Boff draws parallels between Jesus’s time and his Brazilian context, in order to 
emphasise the social and political teachings of the New Testament. He argues, “The 
message of Christ assumes a critical liberating function against repressive situations, 
be they religious or political.”259 The images of Jesus as a countercultural thinker, a 
political figure who argued against the dominant ideas of his day, are particularly 
stressed. It is noted that Jesus “set all the authorities of his day against him”260 and 
that “he was arrested, tortured, and condemned to death.”261 All of this is highlighted 
to indicate Jesus’s struggle to be a “being-for-others.” In emphasising the self-giving 
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of Jesus, Boff’s notion of being-for-others theologises the concern for the other, since 
it is through Jesus’s self-emptying that he is able to fill himself with concern for 
others. Jesus’s being-for-others complements the liberation theology message of 
Jesus’s orientation towards the poor, since the historical Jesus is particularly 
concerned for the poor.  
But there are nonhuman “others” towards whom Jesus can be oriented. It is 
not clear why it is necessary to limit this paradigm to humans alone. The 
identification of Jesus as a being concerned with “others,” particularly the 
“marginalized, the poor, and the despised,”262 leaves open the possibility of those 
others being animal others. Animals are marginalised in society: billions of them are 
killed each year for food, fashion, entertainment, and research. Because they are such 
a marginalised part of God’s creation, it would be a natural extension of Jesus’s 
being-for-others to be on the side of animals. Although this possibility is unexplored 
by Boff, it would be a reasonable extension of his Christological perspective to 
include nonhuman others within the sphere of God’s concern. 
The idea of animals as “other” that humans and God are (or should be) “for” is 
a theme of this thesis. The idea will be returned to in chapter 7, when the idea of 
communion as a being “for” creation is considered.  
 
b. Contextual interpretation of Jesus 
Chapter eight of Boff’s Jesus discusses the titles given to the figure of Jesus. He 
considers the Palestinian Christian names for Jesus (Christ, Son of Man), the Jewish 
Christian names (New Adam, Lord), and the Hellenistic Christian names (Saviour, 
Only Begotten of God).263 The titles given to Jesus indicate how those communities 
made sense of the figure of Jesus, with each group using “the most noble and 
honorable titles they had in their cultures.”264 In chapter twelve, Boff considers the 
name we ought to give Jesus today, and it is in this chapter in particular that he 
emphasises the title of Jesus as liberator. He argues that “each generation ought to 
confront itself with the mystery of Christ and try to give him the names that 
correspond to our living experience of his inexhaustible reality.”265 That is, as we 
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encounter Jesus in the context of our lives, we should ask ourselves how the message 
of Jesus applies in our reality. 
The call to name Jesus for today may be understood as an invitation to 
interpret Jesus today, in our context. Although Boff considers only the human context 
in Jesus, we also can ask: what is the reality for animals, and how would Jesus’s 
message apply? The context for animals has changed beyond all recognition from the 
time of Jesus. For example, in Palestine in the time of Jesus, there were no forms of 
industrialised agriculture or animal research. A Christology for today should grapple 
with these new realities. The non-intensive, or pastoral, farming of animals at the time 
of Jesus was based on a subsistence model of the economy that, while not free from 
suffering and death, arguably involved less suffering than the intensive industrialised 
animal agriculture that is widespread today.  
If Jesus’s name for our context is to be “liberator,” there is no reason that this 
title should be applied only to humanity. Animals are in need of liberation as well as 
humans. Liberation in the context of animals primarily means freedom from pain, 
suffering, oppression, and indeed predation itself. As will be explored in the next 
chapter, liberation in creation has its roots in Romans 8:20–21: “for the creation was 
subjected to futility … in hope that the creation itself will be set free from its bondage 
to decay and will obtain the freedom of the glory of the children of God” (my 
emphases). Theologically, creation is waiting to be liberated from futility, waste, and 
predation. But it also needs to be freed from human control, manipulation, and abuse. 
It is this freedom from human use that we can move towards.  
However, the word “liberation” is not unproblematic when used in regard to 
animals because it carries connotations of alleged violence and terrorism in 
association with groups such as the Animal Liberation Front. In interpreting Jesus for 
our context, I therefore acknowledge that “liberation” is a loaded term for animals, 
one whose negative connotations may be hard to escape.  In using the word in this 
context, I hope to reclaim the word “liberation” for animals—to move away from the 
violent connotations and reclaim a theological sense of liberation in line with Romans 
and liberation theology. A theological vision of setting free that includes freedom 
from oppression for humans and animals.  
Indeed, one of the many things humans and animals need to be liberated from 
is violence. We are engaged in structures that institutionalise violence as defence, as 
entertainment, as research, and as food production, to name a few areas. We need to 
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extricate ourselves from cycles of violence and embrace more gentle ways of living in 
the world. In reclaiming the term “liberation,” I am embracing a peaceful, Christ-
filled version of liberation, one involving a vision of a peaceable kingdom. 
Interpreting Jesus in this context is thus an invitation to look towards a more 
peaceable world, one in which all creation has been liberated from violence.  
 
c. Highlighting the periphery 
Alongside the invitation to interpret Jesus in our own context is an invitation to look 
as Jesus would to the margins and periphery of our context. Boff characterises his 
Latin American liberation theology as a “view from the periphery.”266 That is, it is a 
view that comes from the margins of society. Jesus’s ministry highlights the 
importance of the periphery: “It is the poor, the suffering, the hungry, and the 
persecuted who are blest, not because their condition itself has value but because their 
unjust situation is a challenge to the justice of the messianic king. Through Jesus, God 
has sided with them.”267 God, then, is on the side of those who experience injustice, 
of those who cannot speak for themselves. In Boff’s 1970s context, he saw the focus 
of God on the marginalised as resonating with the poor and oppressed of Latin 
America. However, I argue that the poor, while undoubtedly the focus of Jesus’s 
ministry, are only one of many manifestations of marginalisation in our society today. 
If the poor are marginalised in global society today, and of course they are, 
how much more so are animals? Animals are on the periphery of our existence, and 
although many people share their lives with animals, often their suffering, especially 
the suffering of those with whom we do not share our lives, remains at the periphery 
of our consciousness. Billions of animals are slaughtered every year for food. In the 
United Kingdom alone, nearly 28 million cattle, sheep, and pigs and 870 million 
poultry are slaughtered annually. That is not to mention the 500 million animals used 
worldwide in animal testing and the countless others used in entertainment and 
sport.268 Animals, like the poor, are victims of institutions of oppression. Animals are 
a subject of the periphery and the margins. As I type here in this library, the chair I 
am seated on has a cushion made of leather, and the table is also covered in leather. I 
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am literally writing on top of dead, exploited animals. The use of animals is so 
widespread, systematic, and ubiquitous that unless our attention is specifically drawn 
to the issue, it can be hard to see. Boff reminds us that it is here on the margins of our 
lives, an area most people would rather forget, where God’s concern is located. God 
in Jesus is concerned with those at the periphery, those whom society forgets and 
ignores; it is here that God has chosen to focus his attention. Linzey argues that what 
we see in Jesus’s moral teaching is a paradigm of inclusive moral generosity, 
culminating in the moral priority of the weak.269 While Boff does not explore the 
periphery in relation to animals, his theology can be logically extended to include 
them. 
This chapter indicated the limited anthropocentric thinking within Jesus in 
relation to three areas – resurrection, redemption and kingdom – and sadly indicated 
Boff’s lack of theological consideration of animals. Yet it also illustrated the potential 
of Boff’s liberation theology for animal theology. I hope to have shown that the 
conception of the incarnation as “being-for-others,” coupled with a concern for the 
periphery, and the call to name Jesus for today may provide the foundations for a 
liberation theology of creation, and especially animals, even though this is not 
explored directly by Boff himself. These themes will be returned to in chapter seven 
to help develop a more animal inclusive theology. The next chapter focuses on Boff’s 
Saint Francis and explores Franciscan themes in relation to animal theology.
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Chapter 4: Fraternity Only with Humans 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore Boff’s representation of Saint Francis in 
work of the same name. It again addresses the methodological questions of whether 
Boff is attentive to the theological issue of animals, and whether his theology can help 
develop animal theology. I argue that despite the moral exemplar provided by Saint 
Francis, Boff almost wholly ignores his significance for other creatures. He reinforces 
an anthropocentric focus by limiting the Franciscan concept of fraternity to humanity, 
by interpreting the stories of animals and Saint Francis only in relation to humanity, 
and emphasising his teaching only in terms of the significance of the poor. However, 
there are important themes that Boff brings out of the narrative of Saint Francis that 
can be related to animals: gentleness, praxis, fraternity, and the poor. I explore these 
themes and reframe them to include concern for animals. The ideas of gentleness and 
fraternity will be built upon in chapter seven as part of my development of animal 
theology. 
 Saint Francis was born in Assisi in Umbria, Italy in 1181 or 1182. The son of 
a wealthy silk merchant, Francis grew up in luxury. After a conversion experience at 
twenty-five he gave up all his worldly goods and renounced his father to become a 
penitent. Within a few years he attracted a following as he started to call others to 
become penitents with him. In 1209–10 he compiled his Rule for his Friars Minor and 
gained initial papal approval from Innocent III, after which the friars began to preach 
penance. Francis lived a humble life of poverty and travelled as a penitent 
proclaiming the Gospel. He died on October 3, 1226.270 Saint Francis is one of the 
most popular and iconic saints in Catholic history. Pope John Paul II declared him 
“the heavenly Patron of those who promote ecology” in 1979,271 but Francis is 
perhaps most commonly associated with stories of his relationships with animals.  
Francis’s early biographers, such as Bonaventure and Thomas of Celano, 
retold these narratives and explored their theological significance. According to 
Celano, Saint Francis “overflowed with the spirit of charity, bearing within himself a 
deep sense of concern not only toward other humans in need but also toward mute, 
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brute animals: reptiles, birds, and all other creatures whether sensate or not.”272 The 
narratives are examples of Francis’s deep concern for other beings and his sensitivity 
and care for nonhuman life. They include Saint Francis freeing lambs on their way to 
slaughter and befriending the wolf, saving worms from being crushed underfoot, and 
preaching to the birds.  
However, Franciscan scholars have often overlooked the stories of Francis and 
animals, preferring instead to explore his emphasis on poverty and fraternity. Deborah 
M. Jones wonders, “Why has so little been advanced on the subject of animals by 
Franciscans in the centuries since the death of the founder of the Order?”273 One 
answer suggested by Edward A. Armstrong is that scholars seem to feel embarrassed 
about dealing with the animal narratives. He argues that “more serious writers and 
critics tend either to pass lightly over them, apparently regarding them as trivial, or to 
discuss them in a naïve way.”274 The result of this embarrassment is that the animal 
narratives frequently are not given their full theological consideration or are dismissed 
as part of hagiographical legend.  
Keith Douglass Warner suggests there are good reasons to suppose that these 
legends are more than just hagiographical gloss. He identifies several themes that are 
found only in the narratives associated with Saint Francis—namely, the way “Francis 
relates to animals as brothers and sisters,” “learns or practices humility as a result of 
interacting with animals,” feeds animals “with food or the word of God,” and 
“experiences love and compassion as a result of interactions” with animals.275 
Additionally, none of his interactions involve “demonstrations of power or commands 
to act obediently.”276 Francis does not command the animals; rather, he relates to 
them as brothers and sisters. In short, while it might be tempting to dismiss the animal 
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narratives as just part of the hagiographical tradition of illustrating the holiness and 
power of saints,277 there are unique elements to the animal stories associated with 
Saint Francis. These elements suggest an authenticity and a novelty to Saint Francis’s 
relationship to animals.278 All of this suggests that these stories deserve more 
scholarly attention than they have previously received. However, understanding 
Francis’s relationship to animals is not just a matter of scholarly debate; it has 
practical implications for the attitudes and practices of modern-day Franciscans. 
Saint Francis’s compassion towards animals has become legendary, and yet 
modern-day Franciscans have very little to say about concern for animals. Andrea F. 
Barone recounts comments from her students, such as “Everyone knows that 
Franciscans love nature and animals,” that she maintains demonstrate “a common 
perception: that Francis, and Franciscans, are seen as having the kind of compassion 
that transcends species.”279 Despite this perception, she argues, “Franciscans have yet 
to acknowledge, or make a statement regarding any of the contemporary ethical issues 
involving animals.”280  
All branches of the Franciscan order have offices of “Justice, Peace, and 
Integrity of Creation” (JPIC).281 It might be assumed that animals would be included 
within the sphere of “integrity of creation”; however, they are not the particular focus, 
since the term is wider than just sentient beings, including all that is created. The 
publication Guidelines for the Animation of Justice, Peace and Integrity of Creation 
contains a brief section on how the integrity of creation is understood. The publication 
cites article 71 of the General Constitutions General Statutes of the Order of Friars 
Minor, which itself states, “Following in the footsteps of Saint Francis, the friars are 
to maintain a reverent attitude towards nature, threatened from all sides today, in such 
a way that they may restore it completely to its condition of brother and to its role of 
usefulness to all mankind for the glory of God the Creator.”282 The section in the 
Guidelines briefly expands on each of the themes from the constitution: (1) an attitude 
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of respect, (2) restoration of nature’s condition as brother, and (3) nature’s “role of 
usefulness.”283  
Although many of the ideas mentioned in the discussion to follow are 
examined at later points in this thesis, it is worth considering the form that Franciscan 
concern for creation takes. Let me take each theme in turn. First, the guidelines 
expand on the call for “an attitude of respect”: 
 
Respect means to look at something attentively: to know Nature, to admire it, 
to contemplate it, to love it. It is an invitation to accept Nature and all its 
creatures as gift, to sing to the Highest through all creatures, because all of 
them are an expression of the love of God. Respect leads us to be critical of all 
forms of exploitation and production that disrespect Nature, that damage it in 
irreversible ways.284  
 
The first point to be made is that there are no distinctions made within creation. 
“Nature and all its creatures as gift” are considered as a whole. It may be argued that 
in taking this approach, the Guidelines are simply following Francis himself. This is a 
point that will be considered later. However, the lack of distinctions is significant 
because it does not indicate whether different kinds of respectful attitudes might be 
required in our relationship with creation—for example, different kinds based on 
sentient or non-sentient life.285 A second point is that respect is based in the notions of 
creation as a “gift” and creatures as “an expression of the love of God.”286 A third 
point to consider is that the invitation to “love” and “admire” nature is coupled with a 
corollary call “to be critical of all forms of exploitation.” This could be understood as 
an invitation to oppose animal exploitation, but as yet the Franciscan JPIC offices 
have been silent on this issue. 
Second, the constitution’s reference to restoring nature’s “condition of 
brother” is explained as follows: “Humankind and Nature share a common destiny in 
that they are both creatures and saved (cf. Rom 8). Franciscanism is certainly a 
particular way of seeing and relating to God, but it is also a concrete and specific way 
                                                 
283 Order of Friars Minor, Guidelines for the Animation of Justice, Peace and Integrity of Creation, 19–
20. 
284 Order of Friars Minor, Guidelines for the Animation of Justice, Peace and Integrity of Creation, 19. 
285 Sentiency is an issue that will be explored more fully in chapter four. 
286 The theme of creation as a “gift” will be taken up in chapter five in relation to Catholic teaching. 
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of being in the world and of treating the creatures of Nature: it is structured around 
the idea of universal brotherhood, where plants, animals, all things become brother 
and sister.”287 The idea of fraternity as it pertains to animals will be more fully 
explored later in this chapter. However, again, at this point it is worth acknowledging 
that the “universal brotherhood” makes no distinction between plants and animals. It 
is possible to be equally in fraternity with plants and other sentient beings. 
Third, according to the Guidelines, nature’s “role of usefulness” is understood 
as 
 
useful, but not utilitarian. It is not useful in the economic sense, where things 
and people can be bought and sold and converted into a quantity of money. 
Rather, we are dealing with usefulness that promotes the integrity of 
individuals and of all people. It is a usefulness that springs from love, the 
same love through which the Father desires that all have life in abundance. 
This all leads to the conclusion that human beings are the primary end of all 
that exists, and that no other interest can be placed above them. We need to 
find forms of production that foster individual and collective liberty, along 
with responsible creativity that promotes respect for Creation. We must 
promote equitable relations between nations and continents, respect for 
cultural plurality, and a search for those things that can unite us in peace and 
freedom.288  
 
This statement glosses over and typifies the instrumentalist and anthropocentric 
thinking that has characterised the dominant tradition on animals. Creation is 
understood as here for human use, and “no other interest can be placed above” human 
interests. It is hard, then, to see how the notion of integrity of creation means more 
than creation being important as a means to human ends. The statement also does not 
do justice to the Roman Catholic position in the Catechism of animals as “giving 
glory to God.”289 
 Although there is certainly potential for greater moral thinking about animals 
within the JPIC framework, as it stands it is sadly animal-blind. There are no 
                                                 
287 Order of Friars Minor, Guidelines for the Animation of Justice, Peace and Integrity of Creation, 19. 
288 Order of Friars Minor, Guidelines for the Animation of Justice, Peace and Integrity of Creation, 19–
20; my emphases. 
289 For more on the Roman Catholic position on animals, see chapter six. 
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statements on the moral significance of animal suffering or sentience and no sustained 
discussion of what our relationship to them should be. As Warner wonders in terms of 
the work of JPIC, “what about our work on behalf of Creation? This is definitely the 
weakest of the three.”290 The crucial point here is that this is the tradition in which 
Boff’s thought on Saint Francis and animals emerges—one of institutionalised 
muddled thought and disregard for animals. 
 Again, the Franciscan tradition has laid more emphasis on Saint Francis’s 
teachings of poverty and peace than on his moral example of relations with creation, 
especially sentient beings. It is from this tradition that Boff’s interpretation of Saint 
Francis springs. In 1981 he published his São Francisco de Assis: Temura e Vigor in 
Portuguese, which was published as Saint Francis: A Model for Human Liberation 
(hereafter cited as Francis) in English in 1982. Francis is the beginning of Boff’s 
theological reflection on the nonhuman world. It combines his fascination with 
Franciscan themes and his commitment to liberation theology. 
The central thesis of Francis will be explored in the following sections but 
may be summarised as follows. Humanity needs more gentleness, which Boff 
understands as the ability to care for and enter into communion with others. The 
example of Saint Francis is one of care and communion with the world and all its 
inhabitants. Boff accepts that reorienting ourselves towards a life of gentleness is 
difficult and suggests that one concrete way to implement gentleness is through the 
praxis of poverty. Poverty is given a much wider definition than lack of material 
things and is rather conceived as a profound humility, which involves renouncing our 
desire to dominate and control. Boff suggests that once we have entered into the 
concept of radical poverty, by refusing to live by dominating others, we shall be able 
to live fraternally with all of God’s creation. Fraternity is thus the ultimate goal of the 
Franciscan way of being in the world. This is how Boff interprets Saint Francis’s life 
and teachings, and he holds him up to be the pre-eminent role model for humanity.  
 
4.1. The neglect of Saint Francis’s concern for animals 
a. Limited fraternity 
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Saint Francis offers an alternative way of living in community and of being a church 
based on fraternity.291 The brothers were to be known as “lesser brothers,” and 
Francis considered himself the least of all. In other words, the community was to be a 
community or fraternity of service and equality. But fraternity was more than an idea 
of how the brothers were to live together; rather, it was a vision for how to relate to 
the world. Boff’s understanding of Saint Francis’s fraternity is described in lyrical 
terms and deserves to be reproduced in full: 
 
The fraternity would not be completely open and liberated if it were not open 
upwardly, in a true cosmic democracy with all creatures. To be truly fraternal, 
one must live fraternally with the birds, fire, water, the lark, the wolf, the 
worm on the road, treating all with respect and devotion, gentleness and 
compassion. In other words, the relationship with nature is not primarily one 
of ownership, but rather of living together and of conviviality. We all belong 
mutually to one another in a relationship of equality and symmetry. If there is 
some privilege with respect to the universality of goods, it must be a privilege 
for the poor, the defenseless, and the weak.292 
 
Boff eloquently narrates the vision, but the praxis is obscure. At no point does he 
explore what this practically entails for our relationship with creation and other 
creatures. Since he lists animals alongside non-sentient material elements, it is not 
clear exactly what respect and compassion might entail. Indeed, while the vision 
sounds idyllic, it must be asked, how can one have fraternity with fire? Or cancer cells 
or viruses? The question of the goodness of nature will be explored more fully in 
chapter four, but it is hard to imagine what a fraternity that encompasses everything in 
nature, including natural disasters, famine, and illness, might look like. 
 Like Saint Francis, Boff makes no distinctions between parts of nature, not 
even distinguishing living beings from non-living entities. It might be argued that he 
is just being consistent with the Franciscan vision by treating all of creation with 
                                                 
291 Unlike other monastic orders of Francis’s time, the Franciscan brothers were not to live in 
monasteries; instead they were to live among the people. Also, unlike in the established Church, there 
was to be no hierarchy among the brothers, only a community of radical equality. In other words, Saint 
Francis provides a model of being in communion that is actually subversive of Church structures. For 
other examples of visions of the Church, see Hardy, “Created and Redeemed Sociality,” 21–47. 
292 Boff, Saint Francis, 95. For a popular exploration of the priority that should be given to the weak, 
see Sheppard, Bias to the Poor.  
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respect and compassion. But Francis’s lived example, as depicted in the animal 
narratives, seems to suggest a special care for and gentleness towards God’s sentient 
animals. It is the birds to whom Francis preaches, the lambs whom he frees from 
slaughter, a wolf whom he feeds.293 The lives of animals who can be harmed are what 
interest Francis especially. Although he may have respect and compassion for all of 
creation, he does not preach to stones or rivers. Boff does not provide any detailed 
exploration of Francis’s relationship to animals, apart from the previously cited 
example of inclusive-sounding language without any substance. While Francis may 
have not made distinctions in his language about nature, his actions, such as freeing 
lambs from slaughter, reveal that some sentient members of the fraternity may require 
more care and compassion than others.  
Moreover, Boff’s phrase “cosmic democracy” is odd, since it is unclear how 
animals and plants could participate in this. The fact that animals cannot consent or 
represent themselves is one of the main arguments for extending moral solicitude 
towards them.294 As Bauckham rightly suggests, “when Boff refers to Francis’s view 
of the world as a ‘cosmic democracy,’ the description is too modern to be entirely 
appropriate, and it does not distinguish a ‘democracy’ of political rights from one of 
mutual service.”295 
In response it might be argued that Boff is putting forward a new way of being 
with creation296 that is more than a list of ethical prescriptions—a new attitude 
towards our relationship with the world. Boff writes that Saint Francis “lives this 
same peaceful and creative attitude with the animals. He frees the caged birds, the 
sheep led to the slaughterer, and is indignant with those who mistreat animals.”297 
This is a fine account of Saint Francis’s radical relationship with the animals—freeing 
animals who are going to be slaughtered is indeed a strong moral message, one that 
                                                 
293 The question of whether Saint Francis was a vegetarian has been the subject of some debate. Sorrell 
argues that Francis embraced the Gospel diet that saw all animals as clean and therefore eatable. But he 
is clear that Francis’s rule entailed a variety of dietary proscriptions for his followers, which certainly 
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294 See the discussion in Linzey, Why Animal Suffering Matters, 21. 
295 Bauckham, Living with Other Creatures, 204. 
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relationship to creation as one based on an idea of mutuality built on the notion of courtesy. As such, 
Bauckham suggests that “Francis regards all the creatures … as brothers and sisters, because they are 
fellow-creatures and fellow-members of the family of those who serve God.” Bauckham, Living with 
Other Creatures, 203–4. This is a better explanation of how Francis saw the relationship between 
himself and other creatures; however, this is Bauckham’s view of Francis. It is not clear that Boff 
conceives of the relationship as one based on mutuality and service. 
297 Boff, Saint Francis, 98. 
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goes beyond respect and compassion—and it is quite clearly liberation for animals 
themselves. However, Boff makes little of this point; it is an almost throwaway 
thought unexplored at the end of a section. There is no call to liberate the animals, to 
reduce their suffering, or even to consume less meat.  
Indeed, in a moment where Boff could say something positive about our 
relationship with animals, he turns promisingly to the narrative of Saint Francis and 
Brother Wolf. In the story a wolf is terrorising the town of Gubbio. Saint Francis 
recognises that the wolf is hungry and convinces the wolf to stop hurting people if the 
people feed him. This is a legend that could be used as an example of how to live 
peacefully in mutually symbiotic relationships with creation, how to feed animals 
who are in need of care. Instead, the lesson Boff gleans from the story is one of non-
violence among humans, a lesson that, albeit important, ignores the story’s 
significance for human relations with the nonhuman world. Boff humanises the 
legend: the wolf is not a wolf, but instead “the legend deals with two actors who 
confront one another and whose only relationship is one of violence and mutual 
destruction.”298 He stretches the narrative into a metaphor: the wolf is no longer a 
living being in need of food but rather is the inner human wolf who needs to learn the 
peaceful way of life that Saint Francis offers. While I do not want to take away from 
the important message of peace that Boff brings to the fore here, it ought to be noted 
that this is a missed opportunity to look at the multiple levels of the narrative and 
expound on the concept of a universal fraternity.299 
Boff argues that Saint Francis lived “the radical fraternity of all beings.”300 
From an animal perspective this certainly seems a positive message—namely, the 
recognition that “all beings” can exist in a fraternal relationship. At this point one 
might expect an exploration of what the fraternity of all beings might mean for 
humanity’s relationship with the nonhuman world. However, Boff quickly qualifies 
this statement: “Francis lives this experience of Christ as Brother. From there comes 
the discovery of the umbilical cord that unites all human beings, the understanding of 
the Church as fraternity and as universal confraternization blossoms.”301 In just a few 
short sentences we have moved from a fraternity of “all beings” to “all human 
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beings.” Sadly, Boff’s interpretation of Saint Francis is less radical than Saint Francis 
himself.  
 
b. Impoverished anthropocentrism  
Boff writes that “modern humanity has forgotten that in our activity with nature we 
must deal not only with things, but also with something that affects us at our deepest 
level. We do not simply live in the world. We colive.”302 The idea that we “colive” in 
the world and that we must renounce the will to dominate could have powerful 
implications for how we exist in the world with other beings. The notion of coliving 
could reorient our thinking towards more fraternal living with the rest of creation. 
However, it is circumscribed by Boff’s emphasis on humanisation: “there is no doubt 
that we must organize the systematic satisfaction of our basic needs and humanize the 
world.”303 While his critique of domination and possession is telling, the underlying 
perspective remains wholly anthropocentric.304 It is humanity’s basic needs that need 
to be satisfied, not the needs of all of God’s creatures. This perspective seems out of 
step with Saint Francis himself, who cared deeply about the basic needs of creatures, 
especially animals. “Humanizing the world” is a double-edged notion, since it implies 
an extension of human power rather than its renunciation.  
Just after Boff reminds us that we “colive” in the world, he states, “We cannot 
achieve our identity while denying a friendly and fraternal relationship with our 
natural world.”305 Fraternity is not about living in a harmonious relationship with 
God’s creation but about achieving “our identity.” Further, he rather gives the game 
away, when despite his protestations about possession, he refers to “our natural 
world.” But of course, it is not our world but God’s world: fraternity and ownership 
do not easily cohere. Again, he argues that “to be radically poor [is] to be fully 
human” since “only the vere expropiatus, the one who has truly disappropriated him, 
can become a frater menor, a brother of all.”306 However, since the fraternity 
envisaged by Saint Francis clearly extends to brother and sister creatures, poverty 
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cannot be only about humans becoming more human. Unfortunately, the truth of the 
critique is in the title of the work: “a model for human liberation.” 
Elsewhere, Boff refers to how Francis “let things be.”307 “Letting be” is 
understood as a part of Boff’s critique of domination, but he does not extend the logic 
of the position to include animals. The potential significance of this attitude towards 
other creatures should not be minimised. To let be is, as Boff rightly judges, to 
renounce possession, manipulation, and control.308 When understood in relation to 
animals, this attitude’s ethical and theological ramifications are gargantuan. It means 
that instead of seeing animals as here for our use, we should rather celebrate their 
natural lives and respect them by leaving them alone. Linzey argues for the 
importance of “letting be” in regard to animals, suggesting that the significance of this 
position may be summarised thusly: “animals have the right to be left alone.”309 Sadly 
again, in a moment in which he could extend Franciscan concern to animals, Boff 
fails to recognise the significance of Saint Francis’s relationship to creation. 
 
c. Interpreting Saint Francis’s relationship to animals 
It seems clear, then, that Boff has insufficiently grasped the radicality of the 
Franciscan message in relation to animals. Although Francis frequently refers to the 
narrative of the life of Saint Francis, Boff reads off that life into a series of principles 
such as gentleness, poverty, and fraternity.310 Though the importance of these themes 
should not be dismissed, Boff is inevitably involved in a process of abstraction that 
runs the risk of distorting Francis’s actual life. That is to say, Francis does not put 
forward a series of rules or principles by which to live; rather, he provides a lived 
example of a Christlike life in the world.  
The narratives of Saint Francis and animals easily can be written off as some 
kind of hagiographical gloss—that is, as a way of embellishing his legend or as an 
illustration of his extraordinary life. But these stories pack a much greater theological 
punch than is often appreciated: Linzey argues, “as we grow in union with, and love 
for, God the Creator, so we should likewise grow in communion with, and love of, 
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God’s other creatures.”311 This is not an unusual idea in the lives of saints. Thomas 
Merton wrote, “It was because the saints were absorbed in God that they were truly 
capable of seeing and appreciating created things, and it was because they loved Him 
alone that they alone loved everybody.”312 
Saint Francis’s relationship with creation may be conceived as simultaneously 
a throwback to and an anticipation of the new and renewed creation. Merton wrote 
eloquently of the peace of creation, shared with animals: “The beasts and the trees 
will one day share with us a new creation and we will see them as God sees them and 
know that they are very good.”313 The peaceable relations Francis has with creation 
are suggestive of the cosmic peace expressed by the concept of the sabbath in Genesis 
2:3—“So God blessed the seventh day and hallowed it, because on it God rested from 
all the work that he had done in creation.” Jürgen Moltmann explores the theological 
significance of the sabbath in his God in Creation. He argues that the sabbath is an 
“ecological day of rest,”314 and “when the sabbath is sanctified, a time is sanctified 
which is there for the whole creation. When the sabbath is celebrated, it is celebrated 
for all created being.”315 The sabbath signifies the beginning of creation but is also an 
anticipation of the future state of peaceableness.  
Robert Murray also argues that the biblical accounts “present the vision of 
harmony restored between heaven and earth, humankind and other creatures.”316 
God’s goal in creation can be understood as peace or, as Murray puts it, “the cosmic 
covenant.”317 By enacting a peaceable relationship with creation, Francis anticipates 
the messianic peaceableness that is promised to all creation. As Linzey and Ara 
Barsam indicate, “the theological significance of Francis’ life may be understood as a 
prefiguring of that state of peaceableness within creation which will finally be 
accomplished at the end of time.”318 
Celano recounts how Saint Francis preached to the birds:  
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My brother birds, you should greatly praise your Creator, and love Him 
always. He gave you feathers to wear, wings to fly, and whatever you need. 
God made you noble among His creatures and gave you a home in the purity 
of the air, so that, though you neither sow nor reap, He nevertheless protects 
and governs you without your least care.319 
 
Again, preaching to other creatures may seem strange, until the command to preach 
the Gospel to the whole creation is brought to mind: “And he said to them, ‘Go into 
the world and proclaim the good news to the whole creation’” (Mark 16:15). Linzey 
argues that “as God is the Creator of all, so all things are to be included within the 
work of salvation.” He continues, “By befriending and protecting animals, Francis 
manifested in his life the very divine generosity which he believed to be at the heart 
of the cosmos.”320  
Boff claims that “the Franciscan world is full of magic, of reverence and 
respect.”321 But this is to claim both too much and too little—too much in that the 
world of Saint Francis is not a world of make-believe or fantasy. Neither, more 
importantly, is it a world of human tricks and apparitions. Saint Francis is not a 
wizard. To claim all this is to see Francis as a wonder-worker in the sense in which 
Jesus was sometimes understood in the Gospels. The statement also claims too little 
in that what is actually demonstrated in the life of Saint Francis is an enchanted 
world.322 To enchant may be defined as “to delight and charm.”323 What is revealed in 
Saint Francis is the true status of the world as an enchanted place full of delight—that 
is, a place in which God’s own Spirit enlivens and charms creation. Creaturely 
inspiration is not some human manufacture; it is testimony that the third person of the 
Trinity is immanent in all things, but especially Spirit-filled, enfleshed, living 
creatures. Bonaventure writes of how “it was that by God’s divine power the brute 
beasts felt drawn towards [Francis] … it seemed as if he had returned to that state of 
primeval innocence.”324 What Saint Francis does is represent to humans God’s own 
interest in the creation that he has made. Animals are fellow creatures, created on the 
same day of creation, also loved by God and blessed by him. As David Kinsley 
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comments, “for Francis what we refer to as ‘dumb nature’ is far from dumb; it is 
eloquent in singing and testifying to the beauty of its creator.”325 
 
4.2. The Franciscan promise 
a. Gentleness as an orientation to the world 
Boff’s Francis begins with the description of Saint Francis offered by Saint 
Bonaventure: “Saint Francis was a man of God. And because he was a man of God, 
he always lived what is essential. And so he was simple, courteous, and gentle with 
everyone, like God in His mercy.”326 Boff later defines gentleness in this rather 
convoluted line: “Gentleness, or also care, is the compassionate Eros, capable of 
feeling and communing with the other, which is not detained in the enjoyment of its 
own desires, but rather rests in the other with tenderness and love.”327 He reaches this 
definition by utilising the concepts of pathos and eros (which he capitalises in his 
work). He states that pathos is the capacity to feel and to create feeling in others.328 
For Boff human existence is feeling: “Not the cognito, ergo sum (I think, therefore I 
am), but the sentio, ergo sum (I feel, therefore I am).”329 Related to pathos is eros, 
understood broadly as passion. “Eros does not only imply a feeling, but a co-feeling, a 
consent … having com-passion … an entering into communion.”330 Eros is 
differentiated here from its popular representation as sexual desire. The best 
expression of eros is “oblative love,” involving disinterested joy and service to God 
and neighbour.331 Eros, then, is self-giving love, the basis of communion. 
Saint Francis thus is appealing as the human expression of eros as a way of 
correcting the “terrifying lack of gentleness”332 in contemporary culture. He is held up 
as a model of gentleness for our time in how he demonstrates communion with God, 
human beings, and other creatures. Saint Francis is more than a saint; rather, he is the 
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“purest figure (gestalt) of Western history,” who models how we can relate 
“panfraternally” to the created world.333 
At first glance, Boff’s generalised interpretation of Saint Francis may appear 
strange, until we appreciate that it has its genesis in the work of the existential 
psychologist Rollo May. May’s work, especially his Love and Will334 and Power and 
Innocence,335 came to prominence during Boff’s time as a student at the University of 
Munich in Germany. Indeed, Boff cites May’s admiration of Franciscan innocence, 
which is described as “the preservation of an infantile clarity at an adult age.”336 May 
draws on the work of Sigmund Freud and Jung, as well as, his personal experience as 
a psychologist. His conviction in the aforementioned works is the dialectical 
relationship between love and will, and between power and innocence. He argues that 
when power and innocence are not in balance in individuals, they can become 
destructive. May is almost certainly the influence behind Boff’s characterisation of 
eros as gentleness, since May understands eros as “the source of tenderness … the 
longing to establish union, full relationship.”337  
Some aspects of May’s thought, and Boff’s use of it, should be emphasised. In 
the first place, May’s writing, like Boff’s, sometimes tends towards generalisations 
and grandiose ideas, which may or may not be transferable to Boff’s interpretation of 
Saint Francis’s life. Second, May’s work is that of a humanist psychologist who is 
principally, if not wholly, concerned with human relations with other humans. 
Nowhere does May consider the relationship of humans to animals or to the creaturely 
world. It might then be suggested that May’s analysis encourages the focus on 
humanity in Boff’s interpretation of the Franciscan narrative.  
Nevertheless, understanding Saint Francis as a model of gentleness, however 
that characteristic is conceived, is a good starting point for repositioning human 
relations with other creatures. Whatever we make of Boff’s interpretations of the 
notions of eros and pathos, we can be sure of the importance of gentleness in Saint 
Francis’s ministry to all creation. This can be seen in the narrative of Brother Worm, 
which recalls how Saint Francis would move worms from his path, so they would not 
be harmed by other passers-by. Boff’s contention is that we need more Saint Francis–
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like gentleness and compassion in the world and greater sensitivity to the beings 
within it.338 Although this might seem a rather obvious point—that the world needs 
more gentleness and kindness—it is rather central to a kinder world for other 
creatures. The need for more gentleness and compassion in the way humans relate to 
the world is a highly commendable notion and one that should be welcomed by most 
environmental and animal-friendly thinkers. 
The case for gentleness is strengthened further when it is appreciated that the 
link between animal abuse and human violence is one of the most researched fields of 
applied psychology.339 It is now well established that there is a specific relationship 
between violence to humans and violence to animals that merits at least some 
consideration. Marie Louise Petersen and David P. Farrington in their research 
discovered that “of 64 inmates: 48% of those convicted of rape and 30% convicted of 
child molestation had histories of animal cruelty,” and “of 28 sexual homicide 
perpetrators: 36% committed acts of animal cruelty in childhood, and 46% in 
adolescence.”340 Although such statistics need to be interpreted with care, it is clear 
that there is a statistical link of significance. Indeed, it is now possible to make 
predictive judgements based on previous relationships of abuse. For example, 
research by Jack Levin and Arnold Arluke shows that it is possible to predict that 
children involved in hands-on cruelty to dogs and cats will become serial killers.341 In 
short, the evidence overwhelmingly shows that violence against animals leads to 
violence against humans.342 We need to take account of animal abuse, not least of all 
because violence against animals is part of a cycle of violence in which there are 
human victims. It is a system in which humanity has become too desensitised to 
violence. We need greater sensitivity to violence and suffering if we are to enter into a 
wholesome relationship with the rest of creation. A world with greater gentleness 
towards all sentient creatures is vital to reducing the cycle of violence in the world.  
 
b. Praxis as a refusal of domination 
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341 Levin and Arluke, “Reducing the Link’s False Positive Problem,” 163–71. 
342 See Gullone, Animal Cruelty, Antisocial Behaviour, and Aggression. 
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Boff’s thesis is that gentleness, as Saint Francis’s attitude to creation, is to be 
implemented through the “new praxis of Saint Francis.”343 This “new praxis” is born 
out of Francis’s conversion experience, after which Francis began to identify himself 
with the poor. Praxis begins with poverty, which is not defined solely in material 
terms. Poverty is defined by Boff as “a way of being by which the individual lets 
things be what they are; one refuses to dominate them, subjugate them, and make 
them the objects of the will to power. One refuses to be over them in order to be with 
them.”344 Obviously, poverty defined in these terms is a herculean challenge requiring 
an “an immense asceticism” that necessitates the renunciation of domination, control, 
and manipulation.345 The desire to possess is what alienates humans from each other 
and the world. In order to enter into the Franciscan worldview, as Boff conceives of 
it, one is required to abandon ideas of possession and the will to dominate, in order to 
move into a different kind of relationship with the world.  
Indeed, Boff suggests that the more “radical” the poverty, the easier it is to 
embrace reality and commune “with all things.”346 In short, “poverty is thus a 
synonym for humility; this is not another virtue, but an attitude by which the 
individual is on the ground, in the earth, at the side of all things.”347 He argues that 
this is not an idealised version of Saint Francis and nature, but rather it is an 
opportunity to re-evaluate how we relate to the rest of creation. But he emphasises 
that such poverty is the result of immense struggle and perseverance: 
 
It was at the end and not at the beginning of his life that Francis composed the 
hymn to Brother Sun. To begin where Francis ended is a disastrous illusion. 
Making the effort to retrace the path, in great humility, trying to become one 
with things, especially the smallest, is to feed the hope that perhaps our world 
may also be transformed and may reveal its fraternal and filial character.348 
 
                                                 
343 Boff, Saint Francis, 39. 
344 Boff, Saint Francis, 39. For a similar defence of the vow of poverty in monasticism, see Williams, 
Poverty, Chastity and Obedience. 
345 Boff, Saint Francis, 39. The theme of renouncing domination will reoccur in Boff’s later ecological 
work, as he explores what this might mean in terms of our relationship with the environment. 
346 Boff, Saint Francis, 39. 
347 Boff, Saint Francis, 39. 
348 Boff, Saint Francis, 40. 
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Despite Boff’s insistence that this is not a romantic ideal, the language used to 
describe the vision remains grandiose and idealised. However romanticised the 
notions, Boff interprets fraternity as the end result of poverty. It is this conception of 
poverty, understood as profound humility, that opens up the possibility of universal 
fraternity, especially with other sentient beings. 
 The conception of poverty as a refusal to dominate other beings, while not 
explored in relation to animals by Boff, could have radical implications for how we 
relate to creation. If humanity took up this praxis of radical poverty, it would mean 
abandoning the use of animals for food, clothing, entertainment, sport, and research, 
to name a few areas. The refusal to live by dominating others would mean the end of 
animal exploitation in all its forms. An attitude of being “at the side of all things” is 
perhaps a more radical notion that Boff realises, since it would involve a reordering of 
how all humanity lives with creation. 
 
c. Fraternity with all creation 
Fraternity is one theme in the life of Saint Francis to which Boff devotes a great deal 
of time. Francis’s biographer Celano writes of how Francis “called all creatures his 
brothers and sisters” as one who had “arrived at the glorious freedom of the children 
of God.”349 Celano seems to suggest that Francis has fulfilled the Pauline vision 
depicted in Romans: “For the creation waits with eager longing for the revealing of 
the children of God; for the creation was subjected to futility, not of its own will but 
by the will of the one who subjected it, in hope that the creation itself will be set free 
from its bondage to decay and will obtain the freedom of the glory of the children of 
God” (Rom. 8:19–21). The theological implication here is that humans, once 
redeemed in Christ, should rescue other creatures from bondage, and these creatures 
will likewise be redeemed. A fuller explanation of the animal-positive understanding 
of this passage, in line with Celano, is suggested in a Church of England report titled 
Man in His Living Environment: 
 
Both the sufferings of animals and the sufferings of Christ could lead to 
cynicism if considered in isolation. But in the context of Easter and Pentecost 
the suffering of Christ takes on new meaning and this new meaning gives 
                                                 
349 Thomas of Celano, “First Life of St. Francis,” 81. Cited by Boff in Saint Francis, 34. 
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point to the groaning and travailing of all creation. Jesus is the revelation of 
God and of the true nature of man and he is also the redeemer of all mankind. 
And on man, thus redeemed, falls some responsibility for the redemption of all 
creation.350 
 
In short, then, the role of humanity is to aid in the redemption of creation. Saint 
Francis is a moral example of how to aid in the redemption of other creatures and how 
to be a child of God. 
This thought is echoed from a different perspective by Saint Francis’s other 
biographer, Saint Bonaventure, who argues that when Saint Francis “considered the 
primordial source of all things, he was filled with even more abundant piety, calling 
creatures no matter how small, by the name of brother and sister because he knew 
they had the same source as himself.”351 The insight that animals are our “brothers” 
and “sisters” in creation was an immensely radical thought in the thirteenth century, 
predating the discoveries of Charles Darwin and evolution. Notice how Saint Francis 
arrived at this conclusion not through any geo-biological speculation, but through 
reflection on the doctrine of God as Creator and Father of all.  
This is recognised by Boff as a “distinct way of being-in-the-world, not over 
things, but together with them, like brothers and sisters of the same family.”352 He 
continues: 
 
The Franciscan world is full of magic, of reverence and respect. It is not a 
dead and inanimate universe; things are not tossed here, within the possessive 
appetites of hunger; nor are they placed one beside another. They are alive and 
have their own personality; they have blood ties with humanity; they live in 
the same Father’s house as humanity. And because they are brothers and 
sisters, they cannot be violated, but rather must be respected. It is from this 
that Saint Francis, surprisingly, but consistent with his nature, prohibits the 
brothers from cutting any tree at the roots, that they might bud again.353 
 
                                                 
350 Church Information Office, Man in His Living Environment, 65. 
351 Bonaventure, “The Life of St. Francis,” 254–55. 
352 Boff, Saint Francis, 35. 
353 Boff, Saint Francis, 35; my emphases. 
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The statement that other creatures are our brothers and sisters and “cannot be 
violated” is an encouraging one from an environmental perspective. But it is unclear 
exactly what this means in context. Boff understands fraternity as a way of being in 
relationship—of being not above creation but alongside it. He states that “fraternity 
places Francis on the same level as the creatures. [Francis] does not define himself as 
distinct from them, by emphasising what makes him different.”354 It is worth noting 
how different this approach is from Francis’s near contemporary Aquinas, who 
focused on the differences between humans and other creatures.355 Instead, Saint 
Francis sings along with other creatures. Boff suggests, “Modern humanity has 
difficulty signing along with things because we are not with them.”356 The call of 
Saint Francis, then, is to orientate ourselves towards being with the rest of creation as 
opposed to lording over it. Fraternity is then understood as an orientation towards 
creatureliness, towards seeing ourselves as fellow creatures. 
 It is worth noting here, despite my critique of Boff, that this fraternal 
understanding of creation is a step beyond the dominant instrumental view of nature. 
Previous theological thought, notably illustrated by Charles Davis, reflects a 
scholastic view of nature. Davis argues that “nature … is open to man’s exploitation. 
No longer is it regarded as sacred and untouchable. This is the inevitable consequence 
of man’s scientific understanding of nature. Nature ceases to by mysterious. What 
man intelligently masters, he proceeds to dominate and control.”357 Davis is here 
legitimising a dominionism view of nature: dominion is made possible by our 
scientific understanding of creation, and that dominion over nature is God’s will. In 
the context of the dominant instrumentalist interpretation of creation, Boff’s 
embracing of an attitude of “reverence and respect”358 is positively enlightened. 
 Although Boff does not explore what fraternity with other sentient creatures 
might look like, the answer is nonetheless there within his interpretation of Saint 
Francis. Revealing the “fraternal and filial character” of this world would involve a 
radical reassessment of the way humans treat other beings and an imagining of what 
that new fraternal relationship might look like. Saint Francis began such a 
reimagining. The stories of Saint Francis tell of his liberating of animals on their way 
                                                 
354 Boff, Saint Francis, 37. 
355 See further discussion of this in chapter one. But the principal difference, from which other 
distinctions follow, is rationality.  
356 Boff, Saint Francis, 37–38. 
357 Davis, God’s Grace in History, 21. 
358 Boff, Saint Francis, 35. 
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to slaughter. Saint Bonaventure writes that Saint Francis “often paid to ransom lambs 
that were being led to their death, remembering that most gentle Lamb who willed to 
be led to slaughter (Isa. 53:7) to pay the ransom of sinners.”359 The identification of 
suffering animals with Christ, along with their liberation from slaughter on Christ’s 
behalf, communicates a powerful message about animal suffering. It might be argued, 
then, that the Franciscan idea of fraternity includes within it the liberation of animals 
from suffering and death. Fraternity thus is a much more liberatory concept than Boff 
himself allows. 
 
d. The poor and nonhuman creatures 
The primary lens through which Boff sees Saint Francis is one of poverty. Saint 
Francis’s purpose, as Boff characterises it, was to evangelise and live among the 
poor.360 The Franciscan way of being a Christian, of living with the poor, has a 
particular resonance for Boff’s Brazilian context. Living among some of the poorest 
communities in the world, he finds the message of Saint Francis’s identification with 
and compassion for the poor especially poignant. Brazil has seen a great many 
political and economic changes in the twentieth century; however, social inequality 
and widespread poverty have remained consistent.361 In this context of massive 
inequality and poverty, the figure of Saint Francis is appealing. Saint Francis’s 
identification with the oppressed and the marginalised would have been doubly 
poignant at the time Boff was penning Francis, given the military regime.362 
Moreover, Saint Francis’s life of being with the poor resonates with liberation 
theology’s emphasis on “the preferential option for the poor.”363 Both Boff and 
Francis see in the Gospel God’s self-identification in Jesus with the poor, and they 
                                                 
359 Bonaventure, “The Life of St. Francis,” 255; emphases in the original. 
360 Boff, Saint Francis, 115. 
361 Sachs states, “According to the 1998 Human Development Report published by the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), the poorer half of the Brazilian population, which held 18 percent 
of the total annual income in 1960, saw its share sink to 11.6 percent in 1995. At the same time, the 
richest 10 percent went from holding 54 percent of the domestic income in 1960 to 63 percent in 
1995.” Sachs, “Quo Vadis, Brazil?,” 332. 
362 Dávila reports how the Brazilian dictatorship “relied on widespread torture, detention, and 
harassment of political opponents” to ensure its power. Dávila, Foreword, xii. 
363 Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation, xxv. The term has been used in different ways, but was first 
articulated as a theological principle by Gutiérrez in 1971. The term encompasses the idea that God in 
Jesus is on the side of the poor, and is particularly concerned with the poor, the weak, and the 
marginalized. It became the central message of liberation theology. Gutiérrez articulated this concern 
as “an option for the poor is an option for the God of the kingdom whom Jesus proclaims to us … [God 
has a] predilection for the poor, the hungry, and the suffering.” Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation, 
xxvii. 
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make this the heart of their theological work. Francis interprets this as a call to give 
up his wealth and influence and live a life of poverty and humility alongside the poor 
and other creatures. Boff interprets the Gospel as meaning that God is on the side of 
the poor and that this is where his theological focus should be. In short, he focuses on 
the message of the poor, not only because the message is there in the life of Saint 
Francis and indeed the Gospel, but also because that is the context in which Boff is 
writing.  
Saint Francis is undoubtedly concerned with the poor. However, there are 
points in Francis in which Boff’s focus is so centred on the plight of the poor that it 
seems he may be missing other messages within the Franciscan narrative. For 
example, he writes: 
 
Identified with the world of the poor, Francis accepts the poor’s universe of 
representation. This is organized by means of the logic of the subconscious 
and is expressed by way of symbols. Francis’ entire language is laden with 
archetypal symbolism. The mysteries of Jesus are represented by him in a 
concrete manner, very much in the way of the people. Thus, he was the one 
who introduced the living celebration of Christmas through the manger scene, 
with the sheep, the ox, and the donkey.364 
 
There are some suggestions that Saint Francis is responsible for the addition of 
animals to the nativity story. For example, Dominic Alexander recounts that “Francis 
is also said to have built a nativity scene one Christmas at Greccio, and the hay from 
this holy installation cured animals of their illnesses, and eased difficult births for 
women who lay upon it.”365 However, to suggest that Francis alone is responsible for 
the inclusion of animals in the story of Christ’s birth is to miss out on the longer 
tradition of narratives of Jesus relating to animals and those narratives’ significance. 
In fact, the first known recording of animals at Jesus’s birth is found in the apocryphal 
literature of the Gospel of Pseudo-Matthew: “And on the third day after the birth of 
our Lord Jesus Christ, Mary went out of the cave and, entering a stable, placed the 
child in the manger, and an ox and an ass adored him. Then was fulfilled that which 
was said by Isaiah the Prophet, ‘The ox knows his owner, and the ass his master’s 
                                                 
364 Boff, Saint Francis, 124; my emphases. 
365 Alexander, Saints and Animals in the Middle Ages, 170. 
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crib.’”366 The nativity narrative and other stories of Jesus and animals found in the 
apocryphal literature367 serve to illustrate that the Christ-event has significance 
beyond humanity to the whole of creation, including animals. 
Putting aside the validity of the nativity story, it seems reductive to 
characterise the animals in Francis’s narratives as “symbols.” While of course it is 
true that animals have been used to symbolise many things in human language over 
the centuries, Boff may be missing a larger theological point—which is that the entire 
creation, not just humanity, is affected by the coming of Jesus. In that sense, animals 
in the nativity story are true symbols, in that they participate in what they point to.368 
Their presence in the story is not merely archetypal as Boff suggests; rather, they 
symbolise that all of creation is caught up in the Christ-event. That animals and 
creation in general are involved in the Christ narrative is suggested in both Ephesians 
and Colossians, in which “all things” are taken up into Christ (Eph. 1:10; Col. 
1:20).369  
Moreover, while Boff carefully explores Saint Francis’s identification with the 
poor, he interprets the poor in a solely humanocentric way. However, the ministries of 
both Saint Francis and Jesus emphasise the poor, weak, vulnerable, and marginalised, 
descriptors that can apply beyond the human realm to how we treat vulnerable 
nonhuman creatures. As I wrote in chapter two, theology from the periphery can be 
applied to all beings who are oppressed and marginalised, including animals. 
However, in practice the periphery rarely means anything other than the human 
periphery, the human margins. We forget that humanity exists as part of a larger 
creation, and if we could begin from the periphery of creation, we would have a 
radically different view. This is an argument that I suggest can be applied to most of 
Boff’s corpus. I will go on to expand on this argument in relation to his ecological 
theology in the next chapter. 
                                                 
366 “The Gospel of Pseudo-Matthew,” in Elliott, The Apocryphal New Testament, 94. 
367 Again in Pseudo-Matthew, there is a story about the child Jesus greeting lions who come to worship 
him (“The Gospel of Pseudo Matthew,” in Elliott, The Apocryphal New Testament, 97–98). In the 
Infancy Gospel of Thomas, the child Jesus molds sparrows out of clay (“The Infancy Gospel of 
Thomas,” in Elliott, The Apocryphal New Testament, 75–76). In the Protoevangelium of James, the 
significance of Christ’s birth is envisioned as affecting all creation, with birds, sheep, and goats 
becoming still (“Protoevangelium of James,” in Elliott, The Apocryphal New Testament, 64). All of 
these accounts illustrate that Francis is part of an unfolding tradition of creation relating to the Creator. 
368 For a discussion on symbols, see Tillich, Systematic Theology. He states that “The symbol 
participates in the reality which is symbolised” (9). 
369 See chapter one note for commentaries. 
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As we have seen in this chapter, Boff does not given any sustained 
consideration of animals in his work on Francis. The major themes Boff explored can 
easily be applied to nonhumans, but he simply does not make that connection. I have 
explored Boff’s anthropocentric lens in regard to Francis. Boff reflects the blindness 
of the Catholic tradition even when confronted with a figure that liberates us from 
traditional anthropocentric perspectives. However, Boff’s analysis contains ideas that 
could easily be expanded to become animal-friendly. I will return to these ideas, 
especially gentleness and fraternity, in my development of animal theology in chapter 
seven. Many of the ideas explored in this chapter, such as the refusal of domination 
and fraternity, underpin Boff’s next conceptual move into talking about the 
relationship of the poor to the environment in his ecological theology. Indeed, it may 
be argued that his ecological theology is a natural continuation of his Franciscan 
theology. The next chapter will explore Boff’s ecological theology, and question if 
there is space within it for the moral considerations of animals. 
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Chapter 5: Cosmological Liberation without Animal Liberation 
 
This chapter considers Boff’s turn towards ecological theology in his works Ecology 
and Liberation and Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor. I return again to my 
methodological questions of what theological consideration does Boff give to animals 
and what of his theology may help the development of animal theology. I argue that 
Boff avoids the narrow anthropocentrism of Jesus, but sadly remains insufficiently 
attentive to the animal issue. His ecotheology embraces a holistic approach to the 
cosmos that sees humans as co-piloting the universe with God. The focus on 
interdependence and balance within eco-systems fails to take account of falleness and 
violence in the world, especially as regards animal suffering. Boff’s ecotheology is 
fundamentally incapable of taking into account the suffering of individual animals as 
it is too focused on a holistic approach. Yet, his ecotheology represents a significant 
shift in his work and, at least notionally, he accepts the rights of other creatures, a 
shift from simple anthropocentrism.  
In the 1990s, Boff turned his attention from liberation theology to incorporate 
ecological theology into his thinking. In 1993, he published Ecologia, Mundialização, 
Espiritualidade in Portuguese, which was subsequently published in English in 1995 
as Ecology and Liberation: A New Paradigm (hereafter cited as Ecology). Shortly 
after in 1995, he penned Ecologia: Grito da Terra, Grito dos Pobres in Portuguese, 
which was published in English in 1997 as Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor 
(hereafter cited as Cry). Both texts represent an attempt to relate the problem of 
poverty to larger ecological concerns. Boff argues that current ecological problems 
have come about because of a misguided view of growth and development. In order to 
address this crisis, we need not only a new approach to development and economics 
but also a radical reimagining of how humanity should interact with the earth. The 
guiding idea for this new relationship to the world is ecology.  
 Boff draws upon the first definition of ecology offered by German biologist 
Ernst Haeckel in 1866. Haeckel defined it as “the study of the interrelationship of all 
living and nonliving systems among themselves and with their environment.”370 The 
concept of relationality is what is significant for Boff: “The basic concept of nature 
                                                 
370 Haeckel, Allgemeine Entwicklungsgeschichte der Organismen, quoted in Boff, Cry of the Earth, Cry 
of the Poor, 3. 
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seen from an ecological standpoint is that everything is related to everything else in 
all respects. A slug on the roadway is related to the most distant galaxy.”371 Boff 
expands this conception to go beyond the created order and include human social 
relations: “Ecology stands for the relations, interaction, and dialogue of all existing 
creatures (whether alive or not) among themselves and with all that exists … Ecology 
encompasses not only nature (natural ecology) but culture and society (human 
ecology, social ecology, and so on).”372 The central idea is the interrelated and 
interdependent conception of the universe that springs from this perspective. Boff’s 
hope is to use the relational conception of ecology and apply it on a larger scale to the 
global environmental crisis.  
He argues that humanity has lost its sense of connection to and dependence on 
the world because of the way humans have thought about their relationship to the 
world. He argues that thought about the earth has been dominated by belief in two 
supposed “infinites”: (1) “inexhaustible” material resources and (2) unlimitable 
human progress. “Both infinites are illusory,” he claims.373 The focus of the Western 
capitalist paradigm, which is based on these infinites, is one of unlimited growth 
without regard for any other species or the damage human growth inflicts on the 
environment. Boff identifies the underlying problem as the desire for power. “The 
will to power is not necessarily perverse,” he writes; “the issue is the will to power as 
domination.”374 In an extension of his Franciscan ideas, he argues that the structural 
issues of poverty and the environmental crisis are both rooted in the will to power as 
domination.375 He provides a critique not only of how we interact with the 
environment but also of how we participate in an economic system that commodifies 
its weakest members. It is not just that humans use and abuse the environment for its 
resources; it is that we are part of a structural system that does not question whether 
we have the right to do so. 
 
5.1. Ecology and the neglect of animals  
                                                 
371 Boff, Ecology and Liberation, 10. 
372 Boff, Ecology and Liberation, 9. This is the broader definition of ecology embraced by Pope Francis 
in Laudato Si’. See chapter six for an exploration of how Pope Francis uses the language of ecology. 
373 Boff, Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor, 2. 
374 Boff, Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor, 74. 
375 Boff extends his critique of the will to dominate, discussed in the previous chapter, to humanity’s 
relationship with nature. He argues that humanity views itself as having power and dominion over 
nature: “this conception has consecrated and underpinned the violence and aggression unleashed 
against nature since the beginning of the modern era.” Boff, Ecology and Liberation, 85. 
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a. Ecology and overdependence 
As described previously, Boff draws on the scientific conception of ecology but 
expands it beyond its original biological definition. In particular, he embraces James 
Lovelock’s notion of the planet as “Gaia,”376 evolutionary theory,377 and Stephen 
Hawking’s A Brief History of Time.378 In considerable detail, he explores how life 
developed from the big bang through to the formation of life on Earth. Life exists in a 
delicate balance: if only a few elemental changes were to occur, life as we know it 
would cease to exist. While Boff uses a variety of scientific theories, such as 
evolution and Gaia, to inform his discussion, it is ecology that remains the guiding 
principle of his argument.  
Life is guided by what Boff refers to as a “cosmogenic principle.”379 He 
argues that the very fundamentals of life are grounded in “four original 
interconnections: gravity, the electromagnetic force, and the strong and weak nuclear 
forces.”380 These forces, which have not been wholly explained by science yet, 
“should probably be understood as modes of primordial action through which the 
universe itself acts, interacts with its elements, and is self-regulating.”381 The 
cosmogenic principle is an idea that explains the evolution of the universe with an 
appeal to the divine and these four scientific principles. The principle is the 
foundation of life itself and can be thought of as a primordial action, or what Boff 
later calls “divine energy.” He combines the aforementioned scientific theories with 
Teilhard de Chardin’s ideas on the divine universe.382 Teilhard de Chardin’s 
description of the “divine milieu” conveys a similar image: “God reveals himself 
everywhere … as a universal milieu, only because he is the ultimate point upon which 
all realities converge.”383 In both Boff and Teilhard de Chardin, God is present 
                                                 
376 Lovelock, Gaia; The Ages of Gaia; and Scientists on Gaia. 
377 See Margulis and Sagan, Microcosmos; Swimme and Berry, The Universe Story; and Jantsch, The 
Self-Organizing Universe. 
378 Hawking, A Brief History of Time. 
379 Boff, Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor, 45. This term is related to the definition in chapter two of 
cosmogenesis as “the origin or evolution of the universe.” The Concise Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. 
“cosmogenesis.” Note the similar use of language in Jesus and Cry about the universe: “cosmogenesis” 
in Jesus (209) and “cosmogenic” in Cry (45). 
380 Boff, Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor, 45. 
381 Boff, Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor, 45; my emphases. 
382 Teilhard de Chardin’s use of “cosmogenesis” is explored in chapter two. But for reference he sees 
Jesus as the cosmogenic alpha and omega—the beginning and end of the universe. 
383 Teilhard de Chardin, Le Milieu Divin, 114; emphases in the original. 
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throughout—and is the force driving—the universe, but Boff overlays his analysis 
with an appeal to evolutionary theory.384 
One problem with Boff’s adoption of ecology as the basis of his 
environmental theology is his overdependence on the idea itself. Ecology (or rather, 
what he perceives it to be) is Boff’s sole standard of critique. He repeatedly uses 
phrases such as “anti-ecological”385 and “ecological contradictions”386 and questions 
whether views and actions are compatible with ecological ideals or not, to critique 
ways of interacting with the world. Whether something is ecological becomes the 
norm by which to judge its moral validity. The danger is, however, that the concept 
becomes deified—that is, it constitutes the standard by which human actions should 
be judged. Ecology becomes God. It may be argued that his over-reliance on the 
concept leaves little room for a theological interpretation. Boff could have reached for 
a theological explanation of caring for creation based on biblical ideas, but instead 
ecology becomes the arbiter of moral action.  
Boff critiques other forms of scientifically led developments, such as genetic 
engineering and cybernetics, for suggesting a technological messianism that will 
eventually save humanity from its problems. Boff argues that “we now have a 
technocratic messianism that claims it will be possible to give everyone more than 
abundant food, housing, medical care, and leisure.”387 However, he does not hold 
ecology up to the same standard of critique. Boff is arguing that ecology, which is 
primarily a scientific exploration, will eventually deliver humankind from the current 
crisis. Is this not a kind of ecological “messianism”? Although he is critical of other 
scientific ideas, especially the idea of scientific progress, he adopts this concept of 
ecology rather uncritically. He does not attempt to see the limitations of the concept, 
although, as will be shown, they are not insubstantial. 
 
b. All in God, God in all 
“All in God, God in All” is the title of chapter seven of Cry. At first sight it appears 
that Boff is advocating pantheism—namely, that the world is identical with God. And 
there are passages that do suggest that God is intimately present in, if not identical 
                                                 
384 In particular, Boff draws on Swimme and Berry, The Universe Story; Barrow and Tipler, The 
Anthropic Cosmological Principle; Longair, The Origins of Our Universe; Lovell, Emerging 
Cosmology; and Sagan, Cosmos, among others. 
385 Boff, Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor, 80. 
386 Boff, Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor, 128–29. 
387 Boff, Ecology and Liberation, 75. 
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with, creation. “God did not create the world in time, but with time,”388 avers Boff. 
Again, he speaks of “an otherness that comes from God without being God but which 
depends on God, bears the marks of God, and points towards God.”389 He picks up 
process cosmology (after Whitehead390 and his followers Hartshorne,391 Ogden,392 
Cobb,393 Griffin,394 and Haught395) and concurs with its assessment that instead of 
God and the world set facing one another, God is “set within the process of the world 
and the world is regarded as within God’s process.”396 Once again, “God is not 
identified with the cosmic process … but God is identified in the cosmic process.”397 
Yet Boff resists pantheism because it apparently does not allow for 
“difference.” In pantheism, he argues, “everything is identical; all is God”: “The 
heavens are God, Earth is God, the rock is God, bacteria are God, the human being is 
God, each thing is God … That is obviously wrong. One thing is not another; there 
are differences in this world. Panentheism respects such differences, while pantheism 
denies them.”398 He thinks that by making this distinction between pantheism and 
panentheism, he can save his schema from the well-known philosophical 
difficulties.399 But they are still present within panentheism, for while God may not be 
identical with creation, God is nevertheless identified with the processes within 
creation and therefore cannot be absolved from responsibility for the processes that 
cause misery in our world. And Boff does not confront the obvious process that 
characterises the natural world and that brings in its train waste, futility, suffering, and 
death—namely, predation.400 As it stands, his system undergirds the appropriateness 
of predation as a system willed and indeed sustained by the Creator. Boff therefore 
                                                 
388 Boff, Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor, 144–45; emphases in the original. 
389 Boff, Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor, 144. 
390 See Whitehead, Process and Reality. 
391 See, for example, Hartshorne, Beyond Humanism; Man’s Vision of God and the Logic of Theism; 
The Divine Relativity; and Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes. 
392 See Ogden, The Reality of God and Other Essays; and Ogden and Hartshorne, Theology in Crisis. 
393 See Cobb and Griffin, Process Theology; and Cobb, Process Theology as Political Theology. 
394 See Griffin, God, Power, and Evil. 
395 See Haught, The Promise of Nature; and The Cosmic Adventure. 
396 Boff, Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor, 147; my emphasis.  
397 Boff, Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor, 147; my emphasis. For another ecological process theology, 
see McFague, The Body of God. McFague suggests that the world is envisioned as God’s body as “a 
way of thinking of God’s transcendence in an immanental way—that ‘the world is our meeting place 
with God’” (vii).  
398 Boff, Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor, 153. 
399 For a discussion of the problems of pantheism and panentheism, see Owen’s classic work Concepts 
of Deity—on pantheism, 65–75, and on panentheism and process theology, 75–89. For a discussion of 
the problems in Hartshorne’s process conception of God, see Gunton, Becoming and Being. 
400 For a consideration of the theological issues with God creating a world in which there is predation, 
see Lloyd, “Are Animals Fallen?,” 147–60. 
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opens himself up to the criticism that he is blind to animal suffering—that he does not 
even register it as a theological or moral issue. That observation is reinforced by the 
fact that there is not even a mention in either book of the plight of animals or any 
discourse on the meaning of their creaturely existence. There is not even one 
paragraph devoted to animal suffering.401  
The problem with such a close identification of God’s will with ecology is that 
this threatens to overlook entropy in the natural world as represented by violence, 
disease, sickness, and death. This perspective fails to see the moral evil that entropy 
represents and how it needs to be overcome and redeemed. Hence, the moral 
imperative to care about the suffering of animals is undermined—for if God is content 
with this system, why should we ourselves seek to change it? In short, many 
Christians do not care for animals for the simple theological reason that they do not 
think that God does. Sadly, Boff’s system as a whole does not provide the necessary 
theological corrective to this moral indifference.402 
Even more problematic is the oft-reported yet still telling objection to process 
thought and panentheism—namely, that such a God is so circumscribed by the 
processes he has created that he cannot actually save us from them.403 How can God 
liberate us from the very process within which he resides and indeed organises and 
refashions the world? Boff ironically embraces the notion of a suffering (passible) 
God, tellingly quoting a passage in which Julian of Norwich writes that “all creatures 
who could suffer were suffering with him”404 and, even more tellingly, quoting the 
line from William Bowling in the seventeenth century that “Christ poured out his 
                                                 
401 For an attempt to reconcile animal suffering with the God of process theology, see McDaniel, “Can 
Animal Suffering Be Reconciled with Belief in an All-Loving God?,” 161–70. As McDaniel makes 
clear, there are arguments to be made that may reconcile predation with a process theology God. 
However, Boff sadly does not consider predation and suffering as a theological problem. 
402 For a theological account that sees the role of humanity as “saving” the natural world from itself, 
including animals, see Torrance, Divine and Contingent Order. For a recent philosophical defence of 
the need to intervene to prevent predation in the natural world, see McMahan, “The Moral Problem of 
Predation,” 268–93. McMahan argues that “we have a moral reason to try to prevent animals from 
suffering and dying from these causes [predation and other causes of animal suffering in nature]” 
(291). For a discussion of McMahan’s position, see Lazo, “Consequentialism and Thought 
Experiments in Philosophy Comes to Dinner.” 
403 One somewhat hyperbolic statement of this position is given by Gunton in relation to Hartshorne’s 
process theology God. Gunton argues, “Whatever the value of the exposure of the contradictions and 
moral shortcomings of the classical concept of God, it is of little benefit to overthrow a tyrant if he is 
replaced by an ineffectual weakling, and this is the impression that remains.” Gunton, Becoming and 
Being, 221. 
404 Julian of Norwich, Revelations of Divine Love, 40, quoted in Boff, Cry of the Earth, Cry of the 
Poor, 180. 
 100 
blood as much for cattle and horses as for men.”405 But nowhere does he actually take 
into account the sufferings of animals in a systematic way or eke out the challenge of 
such suffering for dogmatic and moral theology. In other words, while notionally 
accepting the connection between the suffering of Christ and the suffering of 
nonhuman creatures, Boff fails to develop the connection as a possible answer to the 
problem that predation itself raises—namely, how the bondage of suffering is to be 
redeemed. 
However, Boff’s system could be revised if only he would take on board the 
notion that the pain and suffering of fellow creatures needs to be included in any 
consistent and thoroughgoing liberatory work in theology. Of course, this would 
require a much more attentive ear to the groaning of creation envisioned in Romans 8 
and a more positivist account of human responsibility to other sentients. It could be 
done, but Boff has yet to do it.  
 
c. Human uniqueness 
At first sight, it appears that Boff’s thoroughgoing rejection of anthropocentricity 
would result in an equally thoroughgoing rejection of human uniqueness, but that is 
not so. Anthropocentrism is properly understood as the view that “nothing has 
intrinsic value, nothing has otherness and meaning apart from the human being. All 
beings are at the disposal of human beings, to serve as their property and under their 
control, so that humans may attain their desires and projects.”406 In short, “human 
beings feel that they are above things rather than alongside and with things.”407 Boff 
goes even further and argues that it is not only anthropocentrism at work here but also 
androcentrism—that is, male domination over women and the rest of creation. As he 
explains, man “regards woman as part of nature that he must possess exclusively, 
domesticating her and subjecting her to his rational, objective, and voluntarist 
logic.”408 The will to dominate is thus identified as the root of the problem of 
humankind’s relationships to the world and to each other. 
                                                 
405 Quoted in Bradley, “El Cristo Cósmico,” 116, cited by Boff, Cry, 180. For a fuller discussion of 
nonconformist voices, see Sampson, Animal Ethics and the Nonconformist Conscience. 
406 Boff, Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor, 70; my emphases. 
407 Boff, Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor, 70; emphases in the original. 
408 Boff, Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor, 71. This also represents in Boff’s own work a significant 
step forward, for while he had previously denounced anthropocentrism in Francis, androcentrism was 
previously not considered. 
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In Cry, Boff rails against the notion that the world was made for human use or 
pleasure, or even “for us.” However, humans nevertheless occupy a unique place, as 
they should, within his ecotheological system and in his theology in general. He 
argues that “consciousness driving the universe toward accelerating the pace of 
evolution, toward being more highly organized and more directed,” and thus 
specifically human consciousness enables human beings to become “co-creators”409 
of the universe. This is similar to Boff’s view of human consciousness already 
discussed, but to this he adds the idea that humans are “co-piloting”410 the governing 
of creation. He does this to underline humanity’s special role; we are not just products 
of evolution but rather the reflexive part of the universe, with responsibility for it. 
Here he again may be drawing on the work of Teilhard de Chardin, echoing 
Teilhard’s thought on human consciousness as moving the universe towards the 
“Omega Point”: 
 
The conclusion is inevitable that the concentration of a conscious universe 
would be unthinkable if it did not reassemble in itself all consciousnesses as 
well as all the conscious; each particular consciousness remaining conscious 
of itself at the end of the operation, and even (this must be absolutely 
understood) each particular consciousness becoming still more itself and thus 
more clearly distinct from others the closer it gets to them in Omega.411 
 
Although Teilhard de Chardin does not posit humans as co-pilots, he nonetheless sees 
human consciousness as moving the universe towards its destination. As Ursula King 
writes, “in Teilhard’s vision the human being is not a static center, but ‘the axis and 
leading shoot of evolution.’”412 As previously discussed, the idea of human 
consciousness as the apex of creation can be a problematic one, if not conceived in 
terms of responsibility for creation. 
Although Boff’s critique of anthropocentrism is maintained throughout Cry, it 
does not go far enough. Boff retains what he refers to as an “anthropic principle”: 
“human beings accordingly establish a basis, a reference point, whose function is 
                                                 
409 Boff, Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor, 56–57. The concept of human consciousness as a driving 
force within creation is an expansion of his ideas on human consciousness found in Jesus. 
410 Boff, Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor, 122. 
411 Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man, 287; emphases in the original. 
412 King, Spirit of Fire, 175. 
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cognitive, which merely reveals their singularity as a thinking and reflexive 
species.”413 He is suggesting that human cognitive abilities and consciousness single 
humans out as unique within creation. He argues that the anthropic principle does not 
place humanity above the rest of creation since “that uniqueness does not entail a 
break from other creatures but strengthens our relationship to them, because the 
principle of understanding, reflection, and communication first exists within the 
universe.”414 Boff defines anthropocentrism as the idea that “everything throughout 
the fifteen-billion-year-story exists solely for the human being, man and woman. 
Hence, everything culminates in the human being.”415 But this is precisely the 
implication of his anthropic principle, since humans are the pinnacle of creation and 
the only reflexive part of it—which is tantamount to saying that humans are the 
culmination, and by implication the most important part, of creation. The argument 
that humans have a special role to play in creation because of their cognitive and 
moral abilities is not in itself problematic, but Boff does not define human uniqueness 
in terms of service or responsibility towards creation. 
Boff writes that “as much as we are part of the universe (collapsed universal 
wave), an axis in the vast current of beings and of living things, each individual 
human being possesses his or her own irreducible uniqueness.”416 This apparently 
derives from the fact that each human being “is unique and consciously knows that he 
or she is unique.”417 He argues that we are not dealing here with quantities but with “a 
new quality of creation expressed through human pathos (feeling), logos (reason), 
eros (passion), nomos (law), daimon (inner voice), and ethos (ethics).”418 But his list 
of distinctly human attributes or qualities is little more than a refashioning of the 
scholastic theological demarcations between humans and animals, as discussed in 
chapter one.419 The historical claim was that animals do not possess a mind, an 
immortal soul, or much sentiency (if any), and have no spiritual standing. But since 
Boff grounds his ecotheology in empirical evidence concerning the world as it is, then 
we must by the same token question the empirical basis for his awarding some or 
                                                 
413 Boff, Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor, 22. Boff is drawing on the work of Teilhard de Chardin and 
the work of Barrow and Tipler, The Anthropic Cosmological Principle. 
414 Boff, Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor, 22. 
415 Boff, Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor, 70. 
416 Boff, Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor, 59. 
417 Boff, Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor, 59. 
418 Boff, Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor, 60. 
419 See the section “Animals in Catholic thought” in chapter one. 
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most of the aforementioned attributes uniquely to human beings. Consider that there 
is now ample scientific evidence demonstrating that all mammals and birds (at least) 
are sentient.420 In other words, humans are not the only species capable of feeling, as 
Boff seems to imply; indeed, the overwhelming evidence is that mammals experience 
suffering only to a greater or lesser extent than we do ourselves. Similar evidence also 
contradicts the notion that animals are incapable of logos (reason) or, most oddly of 
all, eros (passion).421 Again, far from not observing nomos (law), it can be claimed 
that animals more perfectly obey it than human beings do themselves since animals 
cannot choose to do otherwise. It is only human beings, in fact, who are fully enabled 
to live contrary to what is for other species natural law—that is, strictly speaking, the 
law of nature.  
Moreover, Boff falls into the trap, so common to theological expositors, of 
supposing that humans alone are conscious individuals. According to the scholastic 
view, discussed in chapter one, there are persons and things. Persons are living, 
conscious subjectivities, whereas animals are simply non-individualised collectivities. 
In fact, however, there are no grounds for denying individuality to sentient creatures. 
In the words of Tom Regan, animals are “the subject-of-a-life” and therefore bring 
subjectivity into the world.422 
None of this is meant to deny that Boff is right in supposing that only human 
beings possess ethos (ethics). As far as we know, human beings alone are moral 
agents, responsible for their actions, in a way other creatures are not.423 In that sense 
the anthropic principle is valid; human beings are uniquely able to know the 
difference between right and wrong and to acknowledge duties to other creatures that 
                                                 
420 For a discussion of these issues, see Rollin, The Unheeded Cry. 
421 For a discussion of these issues, see Benz-Schwarzburg and Knight, “Cognitive Relatives yet Moral 
Strangers?”; and DeGrazia, Taking Animals Seriously. 
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outside the scope of this thesis, but for an argument that animals can be moral, see Bekoff and Pierce, 
Wild Justice. For alternate perspectives, see Clark, The Nature of the Beast; and more recently, 
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those creatures cannot acknowledge to us.424 Indeed, the case for the right treatment 
of animals relies precisely on this basis. But contrary to Boff’s approach, this does not 
require the denigration of animals as beings without feeling, reason, passion, or law. 
And most of all, it does not require the denial of individuality to fellow sentients. 
 
d. Dominion and domination 
As already noted, Boff locates domination and the will to power as integral to the 
Western capitalist paradigm. He states that “there is no denying that in contemporary 
societies human beings have made themselves the centre of everything … everything 
must be at their service.”425 He argues that human beings, personally and collectively, 
strive for “dominium terrae, the conquest and domination of the Earth.”426  
He locates the theological justification for this view in the granting of 
dominion in Genesis: “The biblical text leaves no doubt when it says, ‘Be fertile and 
multiply; fill the earth and subdue it. Have dominion over the fish of the sea, the birds 
of the air’ (Gn 1:28). These texts present a clear call to limitless demographic growth 
and unrestricted dominium terrae.”427 Boff is emphatic: “There is no getting around 
the meaning of these texts. The learned exegesis of so many who keep trying to 
situate and re-situate such texts in the context of Middle Eastern anthropology in 
order to dispel their anti-ecological tenor [Boff here gives a reference to Jürgen 
Moltmann’s God in Creation] will not do.”428 
But Boff’s own exegesis is itself questionable on many fronts. In the first 
place, he looks at “dominion” (radah) in isolation from the narrative in which the idea 
is embedded. In context, the granting of dominion is contingent upon the making of 
humans in God’s own image, and thus the two ideas belong analytically together. 
God’s granting of dominion is not absolute. Humans must exercise their God-given 
power in accordance with God’s own moral will because they are made in the image 
of a God who is holy, loving, and just. The theology of Genesis 1, therefore, is of 
humanity given special God-like powers for the purpose of caring for God’s own 
                                                 
424 As Lewis once wrote, “it is our business to live by our own law not by hers [nature’s].” Lewis, 
Present Concerns, 79. See also a discussion of this in Linzey, “C. S. Lewis’s Theology of Animals,” 
60–81. 
425 Boff, Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor, 69. 
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good creation. This view is not eccentric, as Boff seems to suppose; rather, it is now 
the established view among Old Testament scholars.429  
In the second place, there is clear internal evidence from the narrative itself. It 
is often overlooked that after the making of humanity in God’s image (Gen. 1:26–27) 
and the granting of dominion (Gen. 1:28), human beings are then given a vegetarian, 
indeed vegan, diet: “And God said, ‘Behold, I have given you every plant yielding 
seed which is upon the face of all the Earth, and every tree with the seed in its fruit; 
you shall have them for food … I have given every green plant for food’” (Gen. 1:29–
30).430 This original vegetarian diet is changed only in Genesis 9:3, after the human 
descent into wickedness symbolised by the Fall and the flood: “Every moving thing 
that lives shall be food for you; and as I gave you the green plants, I give you 
everything” (my emphasis). So although there is indeed a changed relationship in the 
later Genesis narrative, the text itself confirms that the granting of dominion was not 
absolute since even the eating of animals for food was originally forbidden. As 
indicated in chapter one, Linzey remarks that, “herb-eating dominion is hardly a 
license for tyranny.”431 
It is certainly true, however, that dominion has been interpreted within the 
tradition as precisely that: a license for tyranny. The dominant voices within the 
Christian tradition have regarded dominion as unrestricted domination. These voices 
include seminal Christian thinkers such as Augustine, Aquinas, Luther, and Calvin.432 
And Boff is right to allude to this tradition, even if his own exegesis is peccable. But 
in doing so, he overlooks the theological basis for what he previously described as a 
“fraternal” and compassionate relationship with nature.433 Specifically, he disregards 
the biblical basis for vegetarianism (required of both humans and animals) by failing 
to see that Genesis 1 offers a vision of an original creation in which humans dwelt 
peacefully with other animals. Boff claims that “paradise is a prophecy of the future 
                                                 
429 See Jónsson, The Image of God. Jónsson surveys the views of many Old Testament theologians, and 
with the exception of Karl Barth, they all concur that God-given dominion means responsibility.  
430 Cairns comments, “The dominion is certainly connected with the image, and one may say that, 
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431 Linzey, Animal Theology, 126. 
432 For a discussion of the dominant tradition on animals, see McLaughlin, Christian Theology and the 
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projected back upon the past.”434 Undoubtedly, he is correct in this, but Boff crucially 
overlooks the substance of the original vision that concerns earthly harmony between 
animals and humans. Whatever the historicity of the first creation saga, it is wrong to 
minimise or overlook this remarkable eco- and animal-friendly beginning to Genesis. 
The animal-friendly narrative is even more remarkable when one considers that the 
person or persons who wrote Genesis were not themselves vegetarians or pacifists or 
against capital punishment or indeed against aggressive war. Despite their own 
explicit acceptance of violence, they preserved the astonishing insight that God had 
originally willed a peaceful and harmonious creation. 
It is odd that Boff does not discuss in this context the morality of killing 
animals for food and other purposes; indeed, nowhere does he explicitly address the 
issue at all. But one has to ask: What does it mean to critique the common (if 
erroneous) notion of human dominance over the earth if one does not also at the same 
time call into question the wide range of uses to which we subject animals? 
Specifically, he does not address the ethics of vegetarianism and veganism, which are 
now increasingly canvassed on ecological grounds because animal agriculture has 
been implicated in climate change and because systems of animal husbandry are 
inefficient systems of food production.435 Current estimates suggest that animal 
agriculture accounts for 30 per cent of annual greenhouse gas emissions.436 For 
example, “for each litre of milk she produces, a typical cow emits 19 grams of 
methane, which is the equivalent warming effect on the planet as 440 grams of carbon 
dioxide.”437 Indeed, because farmed animals are frequently fed grains and soya, they 
are protein-making systems in reverse. One study suggests that producing one 
kilogram of protein from cattle requires six kilograms of plant protein, indicating not 
only that more emissions are released from animal agriculture, but also that there is 
greater pressure on land to produce animal agriculture.438 Boff notionally sees the 
problem since he mentions the deforestation of land for the unsuccessful Ludwig 
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project, in which “almost 9 million acres (larger than Belgium or Israel)” of the 
Amazon was cleared “to produce wood pulp and a large agricultural project to export 
beef, rice, and soybeans.”439 Explicit here is an acceptance that land is despoiled for 
cattle farming in the Amazon, but he fails to draw out the obvious implications. 
Boff’s lack of consideration of the animal issue weakens rather than strengthens his 
ecological position. 
 
e. Fallenness and violence 
The fallenness of nature refers to the idea that the predation, futility, and decay seen 
in the natural world are not God’s original intention for the world. As such, the world 
can be considered “fallen” and ambiguous.440 Unlike many ecotheologians,441 Boff 
seriously considers the notion of the Fall and the fallenness of the world. However, 
and perhaps paradoxically, at the beginning of his discussion, he adamantly rejects the 
notion of “the fall of nature.” He writes that there is no other belief that more 
“distort[s]” ecology than this doctrine—this “belief that the whole universe has fallen 
under the power of the devil introduced by the human being” and that because of this 
“the universe has lost its sacred character; it is no longer the temple of the spirit but 
the harvest field of the demons; it is corrupt, sinful, decadent matter.”442 This 
demonisation of nature has led people to have “little appreciation for this world, and 
for centuries it has hindered religious persons from having a project to carry out in the 
world.”443 Even more, he writes, “it has impeded scientific research and made life 
harsh, because it made heavily suspect any pleasure, achievement, and fulfilment 
dealing with and enjoying nature. In this way of seeing things, original sin outweighs 
original grace.”444 
These sweeping characterisations simply miss the mark. Believing that the 
natural world is in some sense fallen, or that it exhibits natural evil, does not involve 
us in believing that all earthly experiences of pleasure or achievement or fulfilment 
are “heavily suspect.” Neither does it require us to believe that the whole world is a 
harvest of demons or that there is no goodness or value within it. By overstating the 
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limitations of the doctrine, Boff simply befuddles the issue. It is certainly true that 
there has been an otherworldly tendency in Christian scholasticism that has 
sometimes been taken to be the core of Christian belief. But Boff fails to see that this 
tendency was in its own time an attempt to distinguish between good and evil in the 
natural order.445  
It is particularly ironic that Boff, the liberation theologian, should be cavalier 
about the demonic, since New Testament scholars such as Walter Wink have done 
much to recapture the notion as a relevant moral and sociological tool in theology. In 
particular, Wink suggests that the demonic represents, inter alia, systems and 
structures of dehumanisation and oppression in our world. Wink famously wrote 
Naming the Powers in response to his experiences in Latin America: “The evils we 
encountered were so monolithic, so massively supported by our own government, in 
some cases so anchored in a long history of tyranny, that it scarcely seemed that 
anything could make a difference.”446 Perhaps it is not too much of a stretch to say 
that since Jesus was written at a time of mass torture and oppression in Brazil, Boff 
should more readily appreciate the significance of the language of the demonic. 
Indeed, Aguilar explains, “the most seminal years of Boff’s theological production 
took place while the Brazilian state was arresting and torturing dissenters and within a 
continuous political game of considerable violence.”447 Boff’s ecological theology 
robs us of one category of analysis that helps us to make sense of oppression and 
suffering in our world. 
 One explanation for Boff’s dismissal of the fallenness of nature is his eco-
mystical position. He uses the category of mysticism to bring together his concern for 
the poor and his ecological concerns. Boff suggests that the key to attaining our 
peaceable kingdom is nurturing mysticism. He describes this utopia as “a society of 
brothers and sisters … a just society in which all people would share; a society full of 
tender feeling for the poor and marginalized; a society aware of social consequences 
of the fact that every human being is a child of God.”448 This is not a utopian vision 
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separate from Christian theology but rather one built upon it.449 In this sense those 
people living in base communities and opting for the poor are understood as offering 
“an appropriately contemporary version of the libertarian dimension of the subversive 
memory of Jesus of Nazareth.”450 The struggle to attain the utopian ideal needs to be 
sustained, and here the force that sustains it is mysticism. The term “mysticism” is 
used by Boff “to stress the more radiant aspect of things, the dimension that feeds 
vital energy and the principle of concern, as well as the power to continue through 
failure as well as success.”451 
Mysticism is a tricky concept to define,452 but Boff begins by relating it to 
mystery: “mysterion in Greek is derived from myein, which means ‘discerning the 
hidden, hitherto unspoken nature of reality or an intention.’”453 Thus, mystery 
concerns revelation and illumination. However, mystery is not ineffable; it is 
disclosed in experience: “Mystery is connected with … actual experience, which has a 
universal frame of reference … [it involves] undergoing a communitarian religious 
experience.”454 This experiential and practical aspect of mystery gives life to the 
struggle for liberation. All that is necessary to nurture mystery is encouragement of 
curiosity and openness towards reality. 
For Boff, all those who experience mystery are mystics. Mysticism is not an 
experience reserved for a few. “It is rather a dimension of human life to which all of 
us have access when we become conscious of a deeper level of the self, when we try 
to study the other side of things, when we become aware of the inward richness of the 
other, and when we confront the grandeur, complexity, and harmony of the universe. 
All of us, at a certain level, are mystics.”455 According to Boff, the experience of the 
mysterious is where we encounter God. From there is where faith and theology 
emerge, as a result of that encounter with the divine mystery.456 What is required is a 
                                                 
449 For a discussion of different utopian visions, see Carey, The Faber Book of Utopias. 
450 Boff, Ecology and Liberation, 140. 
451 Boff, Ecology and Liberation, 142. 
452 The classic characteristics of mysticism are defined by Underhill as follows: “Four characteristics of 
true mysticism—It is (1) practical, (2) transcendental, (3) the mystic is a lover, (4) his object is union 
with the Absolute.” Underhill, Mysticism, 70. Underhill sums up by stating that “mysticism is seen to 
be a highly specialized form of that search for reality, for heightened and completed life, which we 
have found to be a constant characteristic of human consciousness” (93). 
453 Boff, Ecology and Liberation, 142. 
454 Boff, Ecology and Liberation, 142. 
455 Boff, Ecology and Liberation, 147–48. 
456 For a discussion of mysticism in the Eastern Church, see Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the 
Eastern Church. Lossky explains the connection between theology and mysticism thusly: “In a certain 
sense all theology is mystical, inasmuch as it shows forth the divine mystery … On the other hand, 
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reclamation of that original experience of mystery, because in the experience of 
mystery, we encounter both God and ethics. Perhaps it is because Boff is so keen to 
explore the mystical side of the universe that he is less willing to see creation as 
fallen, since this conflicts with his perception of God and creation as “good.” 
However, the two ideas do not need to be mutually exclusive; creation can at once be 
fallen and still offer glimpses of the “goodness” of God. 
Despite the foregoing, it is striking that Boff cannot dispense with the notion 
of the Fall entirely. Indeed, he offers a new interpretation of it not wholly dissimilar to 
Paul Tillich’s formulation in his Systematic Theology.457 Boff writes: “Without going 
into all the possible interpretations of the original fall, we assume one that seems to 
shed more light and that is gaining wider acceptance among religious thinkers: the fall 
as a condition of all things within an evolutionary process.”458 Original sin now 
becomes “nature itself in a state of becoming.”459 According to this view, God sets in 
motion an open process “toward ever more highly organized, subtle and better ways 
of being, of life, and of consciousness.”460 Intriguingly, Boff suggests that the first 
page of the script is actually the “last,” a model of the future yet to be attained. The 
Fall is therefore replaced by falls “on the way up,” enabling “more complex and rich 
forms of life to appear.”461 In order to provide justification for this perspective, he 
again turns to Romans 8, where Saint Paul envisions creation groaning as in 
childbirth, awaiting “the freedom of the glory of the children of God” (Rom. 8:21). 
Boff comments that “nature has not yet reached maturity: it has not yet come to its 
final abode.”462 The creation has been subject to “bondage to decay” (Rom. 8:21) not 
by its own will but by the will of the one who subjected it in hope. 
What is perhaps the most disturbing aspect of this perspective is the resulting 
doctrine of God. One view, doubtless a caricature, of process theology is that God is 
getting better. In Boff’s view, the cosmos is getting better, and God with it. It is 
                                                                                                                                           
mysticism is frequently opposed to understanding, as an unutterable mystery, a hidden depth, to be 
lived rather than known” (7). 
457 See Tillich, Systematic Theology. 
458 Boff, Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor, 82; my emphases. 
459 Boff, Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor, 82. 
460 Boff, Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor, 83. 
461 Boff, Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor, 83. The notion of “falling up” is one discussed in Birch and 
Cobb, The Liberation of Life. Birch and Cobb suggest that as animal life evolved on earth, it opened up 
“a new level of order and freedom,” but that “fall upward” also brought with it animal suffering (120–
21). For a discussion of this process understanding of falling upward and animal suffering, see 
McDaniel, Of God and Pelicans, 35–41.  
462 Boff, Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor, 83. 
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moving inexorably towards the end of this open process in which even nature itself 
will reach some kind of “maturity.” What Boff may think is a fine synthesis of eco-
science and theology turns out to be deeply unattractive for multiple reasons.  
First, as already noted, it is difficult to see how God can want to liberate us 
from a system that he himself has willed into existence. To accept that God is directly 
responsible for the ecological life of this planet is to embrace predation, not as a by-
product of the system or a manifestation of disorder, but as God’s actual moral will. 
Boff explains, “We and all things seem to be governed by the law of mors tua, vita 
mea—your death is the price of my life.”463 He continues, “Beings devour one 
another. The cat will always hunt the mouse; it is pointless to preach to the cat to 
show mercy to the mouse. From the victim’s view point, that of the mouse, we have a 
universe that is dramatic and tragic. The cat, in turn, is the victim of the dog, which is 
the prey of the tiger, and so forth up the chain.”464 But Boff cannot have it both ways. 
He cannot properly talk of ecology as God-given and the world itself as “sacred”465 
(with all the overtones of that word) and yet also describe this process as “tragic” and 
yet to reach “maturity.” Even within Boff’s scenario, then, the world is more deeply 
ambiguous than he allows—which is arguably the point of the doctrine of the fall of 
nature. 
Second, the moral bearings that result from this inchoate picture of God are 
deeply troubling from a liberationist perspective. As we have seen, Boff defines the 
human species as “co-creators”466 who are “co-piloting”467 the evolutionary system. 
But again, there is a tension here. If we are co-creators, how do we understand our 
role in the ecological order in which human and nonhuman beings suffer and die? Are 
we to accept the ecological world as God-given, or are we to anticipate—even seek to 
transform, or liberate, the existing order into—something more God-like?468 At worst, 
his ethic could be construed as “the precipice of pessimism,” which Albert Schweitzer 
                                                 
463 Boff, Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor, 82. 
464 Boff, Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor, 82. 
465 Boff, Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor, 115. 
466 Boff, Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor, 57. 
467 Boff, Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor, 84. 
468 For a discussion of this tension within Boff’s theology see Appendix 4, “Excerpts from Professor 
Jung Mo Sung Interview.” Sung argues that Boff is moving between “two contradictory ideas”: that the 
world is “set” by God, but also that we are called to bring about “change.” 
 112 
described as “the fatal resignation into which educated men and civilized humanity in 
general are too apt to sink and thus die.”469  
This leads us to the third disconcerting aspect of Boff’s thought here. If God is 
really compliant with, and indeed a participant in, a self-murdering system of survival 
that characterises the nonhuman world, how confident can we be that the apparent law 
of mors tua, vita mea should not extend likewise to human beings? From whence then 
comes the theological grounding of liberation theology itself? Since, according to 
Boff, we are all part of the one ecosystem, which equally applies to all, why should 
we be concerned either about the cat who eats the mouse or indeed about the capitalist 
who exploits the poor? Are they not both manifestations of what Boff calls 
domination and the will to power? And are they not both sanctioned by the God who 
is declared to be “in” the process? 
If this were really true, then the self-revelation of God in Jesus Christ would 
surely be quite different in character. The Jesus portrayed in the Gospels would laud 
the existing systems of dominance and subservience within both the human sphere 
and the animal one. Linzey half-humorously puts it this way in his Animal Theology, 
in a subsection titled “Jesus Our Predator”:  
 
Instead of healing the sick, the Predator Jesus could only approve of the 
efficiency of God-given ecological systems. Instead of raising Lazarus from 
the dead, the Predator Jesus could comment that death is God’s blessing. 
Instead of preaching the good news of the coming of the kingdom of God, the 
proclamation would run: “Eat and be eaten.”470 
 
In short, if the natural order is God-given and getting better, then we have nothing to 
be saved or liberated from.  
 
f. Whose right? 
In Ecology, Boff turns specifically to the question of ethics. He defines ethics as 
meaning that “human beings not only have responsibility but are concerned to make 
the world as good as possible. This means that the ethical imperative … has a clearly 
                                                 
469 Schweitzer, An Anthology, 120. See also a discussion of Schweitzer’s thought on affirmation and 
negation in the chapter “The Voyage to India,” in Barsam, Reverence for Life, 55–73. 
470 Linzey, Animal Theology, 120. 
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utopian content.”471 The “good” here is defined as follows: “deeds are good or best to 
the extent that they approach or are distanced from the utopian.”472  
His ecological ethics, at first glance, seems to have the greatest potential for a 
discussion of the moral status of animals. Boff suggests that a reorientation towards 
an ecological—that is, a relational—framework can help “us to understand that the 
human race is part of nature and the biosphere, not the center of the universe. It exists 
in profound communion with all other beings.”473 Promisingly, he argues that what 
distinguishes humanity from the rest of creation is not our superiority but our ability 
to act ethically: “Indeed we are capable of assuming the responsibility for preserving 
nature and promoting all forms of life, especially those that are oppressed.”474 An 
ethic that took seriously the responsibility of humanity towards nonhuman animal life 
would indeed be a positive step forward. He goes further to suggest that “all these 
beings, therefore, are also citizens, subject to rights, and should be respected as 
others, in their own otherness, in their own existence, in their own life, and in their 
own communion with us and with our fate and their future, which may also depend on 
us.”475 Initially, this sounds enticing: other creatures are “citizens” who are “subject 
to rights”476 and should be “respected.” However, despite this eloquent vision, the 
practical ethical actions that might be assumed to follow from the vision are left 
unexplored. Boff does not consider what practical steps might be taken to achieve this 
utopian vision.  
His discussion of ethics, like his discussion of domination, builds upon his 
Franciscan theology. Underpinning his ethical vision is the ideal of fraternity, in 
which humanity may enter into a fellowship “with the whole of creation in its infinite 
grandeur, infinite smallness, and infinite variety.”477 He states that “human beings 
live ethically when they decide to stop placing themselves above all others and decide 
instead to stand together with others.”478 This view may be considered problematic 
because it is based on an optimistic view of human nature and assumes that humans 
                                                 
471 Boff, Ecology and Liberation, 81.  
472 Boff, Ecology and Liberation, 81. Boff is keen on the language of “utopia,” but he maintains that 
these are not unrealistic ideas but rather things to be strived for in this life: “Through imagination, 
society and the oppressed dare to transcend their prison and envision a world different from this 
perverse one that denies them participation and life.” Boff, Ecology and Liberation, 104. 
473 Boff, Ecology and Liberation, 86. 
474 Boff, Ecology and Liberation, 86. 
475 Boff, Ecology and Liberation, 90.  
476 I will return to the language of rights later in this section. 
477 Boff, Ecology and Liberation, 90. 
478 Boff, Ecology and Liberation, 31. 
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are capable of such communal behaviour. Of course, the issue of whether fallen 
human beings can identify what the moral thing to do is, let alone complete that 
action, is at the very least questionable.  
The core of Boff’s ecological ethics is given in a paragraph that deserves to be 
reproduced as a whole: 
 
The fact that every being is formed differently to me also lays an ethical 
obligation on me. Only human beings can bless this otherness, live freely with 
it, or wickedly destroy it. This is what grounds our ethical responsibility. The 
environment has its rights, and there is such a thing as ecological justice. 
Everything has the right to continue to exist, within the ecological balance. 
This right produces a corresponding duty in human beings to preserve and 
defend the existence of every being in creation. Today we call this the dignity 
of the earth (dignitas terrae), seen as a whole.479 
 
Let us carefully move through his thought. First, Boff locates humans’ “ethical 
obligation” to creation in the human ability to have power and responsibility over 
creation. This is an extension of his rejection of Christian dominion, understood as 
domination, discussed earlier in this chapter. He argues on the basis of Genesis 2:15, 
where man is commanded by God to “till” and “keep” (“serve” in some translations) 
the garden, that “the human being is a friend of nature, works with the earth (which he 
or she is to till), and acts as the good angel of the earth, in order to safeguard it.”480 In 
short, humans are given responsibility over creation by God, and so we have an 
ethical obligation to it. This is a marked difference from his exegesis of Genesis 1, 
discussed earlier, which is understood by Boff in Cry as granting humanity 
“unrestricted dominium terrae.”481 Given that Boff wrote Ecology before Cry, 
perhaps his position hardened, and he embraced a more critical interpretation towards 
the creation sagas. Or perhaps, since he does not reject his previous interpretation, this 
is an example of inconsistency in his thought. In any case, at this point in Ecology, he 
views our ethical responsibility to creation as grounded in the second creation saga. 
                                                 
479 Boff, Ecology and Liberation, 87; my emphases. 
480 Boff, Ecology and Liberation, 44. 
481 Boff, Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor, 79. 
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His next claim in the previously quoted passage of Ecology is that “the 
environment has rights.” Boff is, perhaps uncritically, entering into the sphere of 
rights language. The discussion of who has rights—humans, nonhuman animals, 
plants, the environment—is the subject of a great deal of philosophical literature.482 
What he means when he uses the term “rights” is unclear, since he does not make an 
appeal to a particular thinker or philosophical tradition. Moreover, he is vague about 
the nature of these “rights.” He does not detail what these rights are beyond existence. 
However, existence as a right in nature is not an unproblematic concept, given the 
predation and disease that characterise the natural world. How the rights of one being 
are to be judged against the rights of another being is also unclear. Does a tree have 
an absolute right to exist, or is its right dependent on other beings, such as humans, 
and their desire to cut down the tree to build a road or building? Boff leaves these 
questions unasked and unanswered. 
His reference to the existence of “ecological justice” is also somewhat odd. 
The natural world, as evidenced by classic ecological texts that Boff draws upon, 
including Aldo Leopold’s A Sand County Almanac,483 is full of predation and 
violence. Leopold’s account of creation is in many ways congruent with Boff’s. 
Leopold states in his foreword: “Conservation is getting nowhere because it is 
incompatible with our Abrahamic concept of land. We abuse land because we regard 
it as a commodity belonging to us. When we see land as a community to which we 
belong, we may begin to use it with love and respect … That land is a community is 
the basic concept of ecology, but that land is to be loved and respected is an extension 
of ethics.”484 The ecological ideal in Leopold, where the world is seen as a 
community and the environment has to be loved and respected, is echoed in Boff. But 
what is the nature of this “love” and “respect” for the land that Leopold speaks of? 
Leopold proclaims the pleasures of hunting and trapping animals, in addition to 
detailing the lives of predators and prey in Sand County. Loving and respecting 
                                                 
482 A full discussion of the language of rights is outside the scope of this thesis, but for a historical 
introduction to the idea of animal rights, see Linzey and Clarke, Animal Rights. For a Christian 
perspective on animal rights, see Linzey, Christianity and the Rights of Animals. For a history of the 
idea of the rights of nature and the environment, see Nash, The Rights of Nature; see especially chapter 
one, “From Natural Rights to the Rights of Nature,” 13–32. For a discussion of animal rights from 
different philosophical perspectives, see Regan and Singer, Animal Rights and Human Obligations. For 
a classic opposition to animal rights, see Frey, Interests and Rights. For a recent discussion of animal 
rights, see Engel and Comstock, The Moral Rights of Animals. 
483 See Leopold, A Sand County Almanac. 
484 Leopold, A Sand County Almanac, viii. See also Leopold, For the Health of the Land. 
 116 
creation for Leopold does not consist of caring for creation but instead consists of 
observing the rule of the jungle: eat or be eaten. What Boff means by ecological 
justice in this framework is hard to know. 
But Boff claims that everything has the right to continue to exist, within the 
ecological balance. This sounds like an invitation to not kill or harm creation, perhaps 
even like an invitation to ethical vegetarianism. Yet no such detailed consideration of 
ethical responsibilities to animals, or creation as a whole, is given. Indeed, on closer 
inspection, the call for ecological balance, as with Leopold, does not require us to 
abstain from using animals or the environment at all. At the most it is a call to respect 
the ecosystems around us, but again no information on how we should do so is given. 
Finally, Boff claims that we are called to “preserve and defend … every 
being” in creation and that this is known as the dignity of the earth. Again, this sounds 
promising—“every being” is to be preserved and defended—yet again it is unclear 
how this might be achieved or what it might practically entail. Should we be 
defending the antelope from being eaten by the lion? Or is it a call not to destroy 
rainforests for human gain? Does the preservation of life entail bringing back extinct 
species through genetic engineering or preserving the species we have? Viruses are 
living entities—should we preserve and defend them as well? 
 Returning to the subject of rights, one explanation for Boff’s uncritical 
adoption of the language of rights may lie in his Brazilian context. During my 
research trip, Naconecy and I discussed the relationship between animals and ideas of 
human slavery in Brazil. He observed that Brazil is a country built on slavery and that 
the practice was abolished only relatively recently, in 1888.485 In terms of moral 
progress, this is a short period of time. He suggests that “The whole idea that a 
creature serves another creature is not such a strange idea here [in Brazil]. It has a 
huge impact on the animal issue.”486 Rights language is arguably still in its infancy in 
Brazil and does not have the same resonance as it might in a Western context. This 
idea was echoed by Silva Mocoes Puppin, who suggested that “when you talk in 
                                                 
485 Brazil was the last country in the world to abolish slavery in 1888. For a discussion of the impact of 
slavery on Brazil, see Roett, The New Brazil. Roett argues that despite the abolition, “former slaves 
remained beholden to their former masters since they had few other employment options” (150). For a 
comparative history of slavery in Brazil, see Bergad, The Comparative Histories of Slavery in Brazil, 
Cuba, and the United States. 
486 See Appendix 9. See also the discussion in Appendix 8. Braga Lourenço argues that “the Brazilian 
people are used to violence in slavery … so in that sense, violence to animals is more acceptable” 
(Appendix 8). 
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terms of rights, it is something completely strange for people here [in Brazil]. It is 
difficult to talk about humans having rights here. We are not used to that.”487 In this 
sense it is perhaps unsurprising that Boff’s use of rights language should be 
underdeveloped. 
In addition, it may be argued that Boff’s undefined moral position may stem 
from his largely undifferentiated attitude to creation. Although he rejects pantheism as 
insufficiently allowing for difference, he himself fails to differentiate between 
different parts of creation. He sees the whole, with human beings within it, but fails to 
see the moral and theological implications of the fact that there are other sentient and 
intelligent creatures in the world who live alongside human beings. It is this arbitrary 
favouring of the human species that has been termed “speciesism.”488 To state the 
obvious, sentient animals are not plants or minerals. They have their own interior 
lives and their own capacity to feel pain and pleasure; they are blessed by God and in 
Genesis are given their own living space alongside humanity, after being created on 
the same day (Gen. 1:24–25). It is therefore inaccurate to speak of creation in an 
undifferentiated way that fails to recognise the particular God-given characteristics of 
some species over and against another.  
Boff writes in an undifferentiated way about creation when, for example, he 
claims that “all beings in nature are citizens, have rights, and deserve respect and 
reverence.”489 But the philosophical catch is that if “all beings” have rights, none have 
rights. He fails to see that in claiming rights for all, he devalues both animal rights 
and human rights, not to mention any special regard for the human poor—for if all 
have rights, there can be no objective ground for privileging the human species in the 
way in which he does. 
To be more precise, the notion of rights belongs analytically to the concept of 
wrongs; hence, we talk of the right not to be wronged or harmed. But what does it 
mean, for example, to speak of the rights of a stone that cannot be wronged? The most 
that could happen to it, we may suppose, is that it could be split in two, but that does 
                                                 
487 See Appendix 10. 
488 The term “speciesism” was first coined by Ryder in the 1970s and has been the subject of 
considerable philosophical work. See, for example, Singer, “Speciesism and Moral Status,” 567–81; 
Regan, “Animal Rights and Human Wrongs,” in Regan, All That Dwell Therein, 75–101; and 
Sapontzis, “Speciesism,” 97–99. See also Ryder’s own expansion on his work in Ryder, Speciesism, 
Painism and Happiness. For a critique of Ryder’s position, see Sapontzis, “Speciesism, Painism, and 
Morality,” 95–102. 
489 Boff, Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor, 133; my emphasis. 
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not constitute harm as such. Rights should properly relate only to those beings who 
can be morally harmed.490 It is possible to talk in a general way about ecological 
harms when one is thinking of a given ecosystem, but even if there is a collectivity 
that can be harmed, that should not detract from the way in which both humans and 
animals (certainly mammals and birds) can be specifically harmed as sentient 
creatures. As already noted, both can be harmed by the infliction of pain, suffering, 
and death, by the despoliation of their habitat, and by the deprivations involved in 
captivity or confinement. 
The inclusion of sentient creatures within the circle of beings to whom we owe 
moral consideration is not a matter of special pleading. Rather, as Linzey explains, it 
arises out of specific considerations, including “the inability of animals to give or 
withhold consent, their inability to verbalise or represent their interests, their inability 
to comprehend us, their moral innocence or blamelessness, and, not least of all, their 
relative defencelessness and vulnerability.”491 Not only are these considerations the 
basis for moral solicitude towards animals, but they also are the very considerations 
appealed to historically to defend the rights of the poor, children, and the 
marginalised—for are not the poor also unable to articulate their interests in a world 
that denies them a voice? And is it not also the case that they too are largely morally 
innocent or blameless in the sense that they are not responsible for the oppression that 
has been heaped upon them? And is it also not the case that their relative 
defencelessness or lack of empowerment, and hence their liability to what Boff calls 
“dehumanization,” is what so especially compels a response of moral generosity?  
Instead, therefore, of privileging the human poor (and seeing all theology 
through that lens alone), Boff should have taken seriously his own forthright rejection 
of moral anthropocentricity and included within his paradigm all suffering and 
oppressed creatures, even and especially suffering nonhuman creatures. As Linzey 
states, “animals and infants constitute paradigmatic cases of innocence and 
vulnerability … the issue of animals cannot be divorced from a wider recovery of 
those considerations that should equally apply to vulnerable human subjects.”492 The 
case is strengthened further when one reflects on the link between animal abuse and 
                                                 
490 Regan articulates this as “the harm principle,” which states that “we have a direct prima facie duty 
not to harm individuals.” Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, 187; emphases in the original. He 
discusses the ways in which animals can be harmed in a section called “Harms,” 94–99. 
491 Linzey, Why Animal Suffering Matters, 3.  
492 Linzey, Why Animal Suffering Matters, 167. 
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human violence that was discussed in chapter three. If real justice is attainable for the 
planet and all those who live on it, the sufferings of animals must be considered as 
well as the sufferings of humanity. 
 
5.2. Eco-holism’s incompatibility with concern for animals 
Boff ties his later theology explicitly to ecology, and in so doing, he also ties himself 
to the pitfalls of ecological thinking. In one regard—namely, the significance of 
individual sentients—his system fails him. The plight of suffering animals simply 
does not appear on his radar. Not one paragraph is given specifically to their 
exploitation or to how humans may alleviate the burdens we place upon them. This is 
why we may properly conclude that Boff is insufficiently attentive to the animal 
issue. This section attempts to consider why Boff cannot seem to consider animals 
within his theological thinking.493 
 
a. Ecological ethics versus animal ethics 
Boff does not recognise the problem of animal suffering because ecology does not 
recognise the problem of animal suffering. Ecology is concerned with the whole and 
with every being within that whole existing in balance. Indeed, the balance of an 
ecosystem is more important than the suffering of individual sentients. Animals are 
one part of an ecosystem, and what is important is that each species exists in balance 
with other species, such that one species does not overwhelm another. This 
perspective leaves very little room, if any, for concern about individual animals. This 
problem is not unique to Boff; it is a weakness with many ecological thinkers. It is the 
“holistic”494 approach set against the individual approach. In this sense ecological 
ethics and animal ethics are frequently in conflict. In my interview with Braga 
Lourenço, we discussed areas in which ecological and animal ethics are in tension. 
                                                 
493 Although Boff does not make the conceptual move from ecological theology to animal theology, 
Susin has made this transition. For an account of his conceptual movement, and why he thinks it is 
problematic for liberation theologians see, Appendix 3. Susin maintains that Boff is “open” towards 
animal theology since “he is a creator of sensibility, he has the possibility to feel more towards animal 
life” (Appendix 3). For an opposing view of why Boff’s ecological theology prevents him from 
embracing concern for animals see, Appendix 8. Braga Lourenço maintains that ecological thinking is 
not a move towards concern for animals: Boff “is concerned about the stability of the planet and that is 
good. But I doubt that his environmental ethics or earth ethics is a step to get to thinking about animals. 
I very much doubt that Leonardo will reach this point” (Appendix 8). 
494 Boff states that “if ecology is not holistic, it is not really ecology.” Boff, Ecology and Liberation, 
41. He references Jan Smuts to define holism as “to grasp the whole in the parts and the parts in the 
whole within another, even higher, whole” (41–42). 
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Among others he used the example of the choice of material for footwear to illustrate 
this tension: “Our concerns are very different. He [the environmentalist] is worried 
about not damaging the environment with plastic, and I am worried about not 
damaging the individual animal that was killed for the shoe.”495 This may seem odd 
since both expound the value of the natural world and the importance of nonhuman 
beings; however, that is often where the similarities end. As Linzey argues, 
“ecologists invariably look upon the whole system of predation as God-given and care 
more for ‘the whole’ than they do for individual animals.”496 Boff argues that only 
beings who possess all his unique qualities can experience “tragedy or fulfilment, 
feelings of frustration or of bliss,”497 which, as already indicated, remarkably 
overlooks more than forty years of work by scientists and philosophers demonstrating 
that animals have interests, beliefs, and desires comparable to human beings.498 
As an example of his thinking in this area, Boff writes that ecological justice 
“entails a new covenant between human beings and other beings, a new gentleness 
toward what is created, and the fashioning of an ethic and mystique of kinship with 
the entire cosmic community.”499 He suggests that we need a new way of engaging 
with the world, specifically “a new ethics; that is, attentiveness to change and the 
ability to adapt to what must be done at each moment—and today that means 
protecting the planet and all its systems, defending and promoting life, starting with 
those that are most threatened.”500 This, I fear, is an example of Boff at his worst—a 
lot of theological gloss and very little concretisation. He argues that this ethic should 
be based on two principles: responsibility and compassion. Boff cites Hans Jonas to 
explain the responsibility principle: “so act that the consequences of your action 
support the continuance of authentic human life on Earth.”501 In other words, we 
should ensure that our actions are in accordance with the continuation of life. Boff 
says, “Good is whatever preserves and promotes all beings in their dynamic 
equilibrium, especially living things, and among living things, the weakest and most 
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496 Linzey, Creatures of the Same God, 49. 
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499 Boff, Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor, 112. 
500 Boff, Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor, 135. 
501 Boff, Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor, 135; referencing Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung, 36. 
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threatened.”502 Boff here is directly echoing Leopold, who writes of his “land ethic,” 
“A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the 
biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.”503 This “new ethic” thus 
promotes and preserves all living beings, so long as everything is kept in ecological 
balance. 
What is missing in Boff’s work is an account of the moral and theological 
significance of human activity in the world as regards nonhuman creatures. He comes 
tantalisingly close to endorsing a “special concern” for the weak and the vulnerable, 
which could include animals, but he falls short. He appeals to notions of co-creator 
and co-pilot, but nowhere does this practically involve speaking up against the 
injustices that humans perpetrate on sentient animals. Boff does not refer to the 
amount of cruelty perpetuated by the human species on other beings capable of 
suffering and pain. The issue simply is not there on his moral agenda.  
This is a terrible lacuna in the work of a theologian who passionately opposes 
suffering and oppression and who, moreover, sees that human beings are uniquely 
equipped in creation to alleviate suffering and minimise exploitation. In other words, 
Boff does not make the obvious link between God-given human capacities for 
altruism and service and the practical aid that humans can bring to what he otherwise 
calls the sickness of the world.504 
His ethics is an attempt to distance his position from the instrumentalist 
position on creation, which is discussed in chapter one.505 Boff argues that ecology is 
opposed to “instrumental reason,” which has become “a veritable ‘earthly demon,’ 
because it threatens to destroy nature.”506 The goal in his ecological thinking is for 
“human beings [to] become integrated into the whole … until they become cultivators 
of the garden of creation as well as its high-priests.”507 Ecological thought is thus 
opposed to instrumental thought because the former, instead of viewing itself as 
superior to the created order, sees itself as part of it, living in communion with it. The 
role of religions in this view, then, is to “help culture to take up this [ecological] 
                                                 
502 Boff, Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor, 136. 
503 Leopold, A Sand County Almanac, 224–25. 
504 Boff, Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor, 63. 
505 As a reminder, the instrumentalist position may be summarised in the words of Aquinas. He argued, 
“By the divine providence, they [animals and plants] are intended for man’s use according to the order 
of nature. Hence it is not wrong for man to make use of them, either by killing or in any other way 
whatever.” Aquinas, “Summa Contra Gentiles,” vol. II, 220–24. 
506 Boff, Ecology and Liberation, 76. 
507 Boff, Ecology and Liberation, 76. 
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position, with, considering the urgency of the matter, dramatic and positive 
consequences for all humanity.”508 However, despite Boff’s critique of 
instrumentalism, the force of his argument is still directed towards humanity, seeking 
“positive consequences for all humanity.” Moreover, what he fails to recognise is that 
he has switched one kind of instrumentalism for another. Ecology has become the 
new instrumentalism—that is, that which serves the goal of ecology is right, and that 
which is deemed “un-ecological” is wrong. 
In short, Boff cannot include individual animal suffering in his schema 
because ecology does not consider individual animal suffering. The focus on the 
whole obscures the individual.509 
 
b. Christologically limited 
Boff’s ecological theology is insufficiently Christocentric. This is especially odd 
when one considers the specifically Christological emphasis of his earlier work in 
Jesus. As indicated in chapter two, Boff easily could have expanded his 
Christological argument to include animals within the special concern that Jesus had 
for the poor, the oppressed, and the marginalised. Indeed, given that this argument 
could be extended to include the natural world, it is odd that Boff does not reach for a 
Christological argument rather than an ecological one. It is worth remembering that 
the classical definition of “oppress” is to “overwhelm with superior weight or 
numbers or irresistible power; lie heavily on, weigh down … govern tyrannically, 
keep by coercion, subject to continual cruelty or injustice”510—a definition that 
applies rather appropriately to our exploitation of billions of animals every year for 
food, clothing, entertainment, and research. 
 Boff writes movingly about how liberation theology began by seeing God in 
the faces of the poor and the outcast; he describes these individuals as “the 
reembodiment of the passion of the Crucified One, who cries out and wants to arise 
for the sake of life and freedom.”511 But the obvious must be stated: human creatures 
are not the only victims of suffering and exploitation in our world. In fact, there are 
billions of nonhuman beings with faces who are exploited for human gain annually. 
                                                 
508 Boff, Ecology and Liberation, 76. 
509 For a discussion of how the good of an individual is related to the common good of the whole see, 
Remele, “Whose Good? Which Community? The Individual, the Whole and the Common Good,” 288–
299. 
510 The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English, s.v. “oppress.”  
511 Boff, Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor, 107. 
 123 
Even if animals are granted only minimal moral status, their burden of suffering 
constitutes one of the greatest amounts, if not the greatest amount, of suffering in the 
world today. Animals also have faces, and it is possible to look into them and 
similarly see the face of “the Crucified One.”512 As indicated in chapter three, Saint 
Francis drew parallels between the suffering of animals and the suffering of Christ. 
As Saint Bonaventure recalls, he liberated the lambs on their way to slaughter in 
memory of the Lamb of God, who had already been sacrificed for us all.513 In short, 
freed from moral anthropocentrism, Boff’s thesis could only be strengthened by the 
inclusion of the faces of suffering animals. 
In parts of Boff’s corpus, it seems like he is going to make the necessary link 
to expound care for animals. But although the framework is there, he does not quite 
make that leap. For example, he expounds God’s special relationship with the 
oppressed but singles out only the human oppressed as the object of God’s concern. In 
his words, “God is father of all, but most particularly father and defender of those 
who are oppressed and treated unjustly. Out of love for them, God takes sides, takes 
their side against the repressive measures of all the pharaohs.”514 Boff is here 
referring to the special place of the human oppressed; however, since God created all 
creation, this should apply to the rest of the oppressed in creation as well. Indeed, it 
ought to apply even more so to the other oppressed within creation since they are 
doubly oppressed by their inability to speak for themselves. 
Although Boff is rightly critical of dominance and the will to power, in his 
thought there is a lack of reflection on the nature of this power and what it means 
theologically. As Linzey indicates, what we see in Jesus is the exercise of God’s 
power manifest in service. Indeed, Linzey writes specifically of how in theological 
terms there can be no lordship without service.515 If this thought is taken seriously, 
humans’ God-given power over animals should therefore be interpreted 
Christologically. The God-given human power in creation is the power to care for 
fellow creatures and to “till and keep” the cosmic garden (Gen. 2:15). If Boff took 
                                                 
512 As discussed in chapter one, one clear example of this is given by Newman, who in a sermon on 
Good Friday in 1842 compared the suffering of animals to the suffering of Jesus on the cross. He 
orated, “Think then, my brethren, of your feelings at cruelty practiced upon brute animals, and you will 
gain one sort of feeling which the history of Christ’s Cross and Passion ought to excite within you.” 
Newman, “The Crucifixion,” 138. For a theological discussion of this sermon, see Linzey, Why Animal 
Suffering Matters, 38–40. 
513 Bonaventure, “The Life of St. Francis,” 255. 
514 Boff and Boff, Introducing Liberation Theology, 51; emphasis in the original. 
515 See chapter three in Linzey, Animal Theology, 45–61. 
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seriously the notion of humans as the servant species, it would enable his vision of a 
more fraternal and compassionate relationship not only with the natural world but also 
with animals in particular. 
 
c. Who are the poor? 
The option for the poor is a theme that runs throughout Boff’s corpus. His arguments 
for the poor have built upon his arguments presented in chapters one and two of this 
thesis, except that in his ecological theology he brings together the oppression of the 
earth and the oppression of the poor. Liberation can never, according to Boff, “be 
restricted to the material, social, or merely spiritual realm.”516 What liberation 
theology addresses is not just poverty per se, but the “inhumanity of poverty”517—that 
is, the interior and exterior restrictions on human beings that result from poverty and 
oppression. Equally, “it is not only the poor and oppressed who must be liberated but 
all human beings, rich and poor, because all are oppressed by a paradigm—abuse of 
the Earth, consumerism, denial of otherness, and of the inherent value of each 
being—that enslaves us all.”518 In short, the earth and the poor are abused by the same 
system, which is the will to power, the will to dominate. Boff is keen to stress the link 
between ecology and liberation theology, and although he sees both the earth and the 
poor as oppressed, apparently this oppression does not extend to animals. 
Boff suggests that the globalised neoliberal capitalist system is “inhuman”519 
that the poor have become only commodities in global exchange. But he then goes on 
to add this rather revealing line: “hence, the most threatened creatures are not whales, 
but the poor who are condemned to die before their time.”520 This line is telling 
because it falsely suggests that nonhuman creatures, such as whales, have not 
similarly become commodities treated as means to others’ ends. It is purely 
anthropocentric rather than theocentric to suppose that the most threatened creatures 
in the world can be only human ones. The facts indicate otherwise. Over two 
thousand whales are slaughtered every year, and even the recent moratorium (by the 
International Whaling Commission, which is solely concerned with the preservation 
of whales as commodities for future exploitation) on commercial whaling has been 
                                                 
516 Boff, Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor, 108. 
517 Boff, Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor, 108; my emphasis. 
518 Boff, Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor, 113. 
519 Boff, Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor, 111. 
520 Boff, Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor, 111; my emphases. 
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ignored by countries such as Japan and Korea.521 Also, the idea that whales are not 
“condemned to die before their time” is extraordinary since whales are slaughtered 
not at the end of their natural lives but whenever they are caught. Boff’s comment can 
make sense only if he is supposing that somehow their being slaughtered for human 
use does not constitute death “before their time.” In other words, despite what he may 
say elsewhere about the need to preserve and defend other beings, Boff actually 
thinks that unlike human beings, animals are properly classifiable as commodities or 
means to human ends. Furthermore, whales are not just “condemned to die before 
their time”; they are killed in excruciatingly cruel ways through use of spears or 
explosive harpoons that pierce the skin but seldom, if ever, induce immediate 
unconsciousness. The death of one individual whale takes a minimum of thirty 
minutes and in the case of larger species up to one and a half hours.522 Moreover, 
cetaceans are remarkably intelligent and socially complex creatures with a larger 
brain capacity than human beings,523 making Boff’s remark even more unfortunate, as 
he has failed to see that whales are sentient beings in their own right, not just things 
here for our use. 
Boff argues that the human poor are “the most threatened beings in 
creation.”524 This statement, however, is difficult to reconcile with his consistent 
rejection of a purely anthropocentric view of creation. Boff’s rejection of that view is 
emphatic and uncompromising: “An arrogant anthropocentrism is at work, one which 
lies at the root of contemporary societies. Human beings understand ourselves as 
being above other beings and lords of life and death over them.”525 Again he 
exclaims, “Anthropocentrism reveals a narrow, atomized view of the human being, 
torn away from other beings. It claims that the sole meaning of evolution and the 
reason for the existence of other beings is to produce the human being, man and 
woman.”526 
But if animals are not here for our use, the question is obvious: How can we 
justify utilising them as commodities—as merely a means to human ends? If we are 
                                                 
521 See Ottaway, “Commercial Whaling,” 41–43. 
522 Ottaway, “Commercial Whaling,” 42. 
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not to be “lords of life and death” over animals, then it is odd that the threat to their 
existence should be deemed less important than a threat to human beings, especially 
because human beings are not under a threat of extinction, whereas some animals, 
such as whales, are. 
 This chapter has focused on Boff’s ecological theology and asked whether it 
includes within it concern for individual animals. Sadly, the holistic focus of ecology 
means that despite his attempts to move away from anthropocentrism, Boff still 
cannot seem to include individual animals within his theological vision. Unfortunately 
this means there is less scope for developing animal theology from his ecological 
ideas. His ecological theology thus proves even less fruitful to the discussion of 
animals than his liberation theology. Yet his ecological theology, as we will see in the 
next chapter, has helped open the door to concern for animals in the teaching of the 
Catholic Church. The next chapter will consider the evolving doctrine of the Catholic 
Church as regards animals, and ask if in the papacy of Francis we are now witnessing 
the emergence of a new moral sensitivity to animals. 
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Chapter 6: A New Catholic Moral Sensitivity?  
 
In March 2013, Cardinal Jorge Bergoglio of Argentina became Pope Francis. He is 
the first pontiff to come from a Latin American country or even from outside of 
Europe—the first, in his own words, from “the ends of the Earth.”527 Also, he is the 
first pope to have taken the name Francis, after Saint Francis of Assisi. In so doing, he 
indicated a new orientation for the Catholic Church. As Boff puts it in his latest work, 
Francis of Rome, Francis of Assisi: A New Springtime for the Church (hereafter cited 
as Francis of Rome), Francis “inaugurates another style of being pope and being the 
church.”528 Saint Francis’s ministry, as discussed earlier, was concerned with the 
poor, humility, and fraternity with all creatures. By taking the name Francis, the new 
pope was not just indicating a solidarity with the poor, though he certainly was doing 
that,529 but perhaps also was indicating a more creature-friendly orientation to his 
papacy.  
 The purpose of this chapter is to explore the Catholic Church’s evolving 
position on animals since Vatican II. I argue that some of Boff’s ideas have been 
incorporated into the latest papal encyclical, Laudato Si’.530 The encyclical is now 
having its own impact on Brazilian theology, and so some of Boff’s theological ideas 
are being re-contextualised. When I began focusing on Boff’s work, his theology, 
although very popular in Brazil, was essentially marginalised in Catholic thought. 
Given his silencing by the Vatican, this is probably an understatement. Now we have 
a Latin American pope who shares similar concerns about the poor and the 
environment. In short, Francis has made Boff’s work current and relevant. Francis’s 
pontificate represents a new direction for the Church in terms of Catholic thought on 
animals, the environment, and the poor. As Boff describes it, “the word break 
(ruptura) is the most adequate to understand the novelty represented by Pope 
Francis.”531 In order to understand how radical the papacy of Francis is, we must first 
explore the dominant tradition that he is disrupting. Since Vatican II, there has been 
gradual movement in terms of attitudes to the environment and animals. This chapter 
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explores the shifting concern for animals and attempts to understand Boff’s role in 
that shift. 
This chapter addresses the third methodological question about whether Boff’s 
work has been a catalyst for greater concern for animals in the Catholic Church. The 
first part of this chapter explores the Catholic position on animals in the post–Vatican 
II era. It then considers Francis’s teaching on animals and creation, especially in his 
two encyclicals, Lumen Fidei and Laudato Si’. I argue that some of Boff’s thought on 
ecology and liberation has been, however unacknowledged, incorporated into Laudato 
Si’. In so doing, Francis has universalised Boff’s theology. In order for that now-
universalised theology to have an impact in Brazil, it needs to be re-contextualised. 
The last section of the chapter considers the need for re-contextualisation, examines 
Boff’s role in expounding Francis’s thought in Brazil, and uses interviews from my 
research in Brazil to indicate the ways in which this process is already beginning. 
 
6.1. The tradition on animals post–Vatican II 
In the Second Vatican Council documents, there is not a single line on care for 
animals or the environment.532 Simply put, these topics were not on the theological 
agenda. In the fifty years since then, the Roman Catholic Church has begun to slowly 
move away from the once all-dominant scholastic view on animals and towards a 
position where care for creation and the earth is a central theological concern.533  
As indicated in chapter one, Aquinas’s views on animals represent the 
dominant scholastic ideas on animals, characterised by instrumentalism and dualism, 
which have held sway over Catholic thought on animals for centuries. In more recent 
times, we have begun to see the gradual move away from simple instrumentalism and 
humanism. However marginalised his example is in practice, Saint Francis has always 
been a challenging, even self-correcting figure within the Catholic tradition. 
Preaching in Assisi on March 12, 1982, Pope John Paul II spoke of how “St Francis is 
before us as an example of unalterable meekness and sincere love with regard to 
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irrational beings who make up part of creation.”534 He continued, “We too are called 
to a similar attitude,” and evoking lines from the encyclical Redemptor Hominis,535 he 
said, “Created in the image of God, we must make him present among creatures ‘as 
intelligent and noble masters and guardians of nature and not as heedless exploiters 
and destroyers.’”536  
Moreover, Pope John Paul II’s 1988 encyclical Sollicitudo Rei Socialis (The 
Concern of the Church for the Social Order) solidifies this change in perspective. 
John Paul writes of the need to respect “the nature of each being” within creation and 
states that “the dominion granted to man … is not an absolute power, nor can one 
speak of freedom to ‘use and misuse,’ or to dispose of things as one pleases.”537 
Notice the movement away from the idea of dominion as domination, and towards the 
recognition that humans should have limited power over creation. This represents a 
small but significant step towards de-emphasising the often-presumed absolute power 
of humans over creation. John Paul is clear that there is no human freedom to “use 
and misuse” creation at will. It is worth noting that papal encyclicals, unlike ad hoc 
statements by bishops or even popes, become part of the magisterium and have 
teaching authority.  
It is the Catholic Catechism, commissioned by John Paul and published in 
1994, that constitutes authentic and authoritative doctrine. It has a small but 
significant section on animals, titled “Respect for the Integrity of Creation,” which 
deserves to be reproduced in full: 
 
The seventh commandment enjoins respect for the integrity of creation. 
Animals, like plants and inanimate beings, are by nature destined for the 
common good of past, present and future humanity. Use of the mineral, 
vegetable and animal resources of the universe cannot be divorced from the 
respect for moral imperatives. Man’s dominion over inanimate and other 
living beings granted by the Creator is not absolute; it is limited by concern 
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for the quality of life of his neighbour, including generations to come; it 
requires a religious respect for the integrity of creation. 
 Animals are God’s creatures. He surrounds them with his providential 
care. By their mere existence they bless him and give him glory. Thus men 
owe them kindness. We should recall the gentleness with which saints like St. 
Francis of Assisi or St. Philip Neri treated animals. 
 God entrusted animals to the stewardship of those whom he created in 
his own image. Hence it is legitimate to use animals for food and clothing. 
They may be domesticated to help man in his work and leisure. Medical and 
scientific experimentation on animals, if it remains within reasonable limits, is 
a morally acceptable practice since it contributes to caring for or saving 
human lives. 
 It is contrary to human dignity to cause animals to suffer or die 
needlessly. It is likewise unworthy to spend money on them that should as a 
priority go to the relief of human misery. One can love animals; one should 
not direct to them the affection due only to persons.538 
 
Although there are clear echoes of the instrumentalist tradition in the lumping 
together of animals with plants and minerals and especially in the way animals are 
seen as legitimate resources for clothing, food, and medical experiments, there is also 
some movement forward. Animals are acknowledged to be “God’s creatures,” cared 
for by God. Animals both “bless” God and give God “glory.”539 Of particular interest 
is the reference to Saint Francis, who is seen as representing a positive tradition 
within the Church. This section in the Catechism is the first official Catholic 
statement acknowledging that animals are important to God, and as such it represents 
a step forward from the idea that they are just human possessions or tools here for our 
use.  
Although it is made clear that animals are here for human use—“are by nature 
destined for the common good of past, present and future humanity”—this sits in 
tension with the statement that our use of animals cannot be separated from “moral 
imperatives.” Significantly, animals are included within the sphere of moral duty; for 
                                                 
538 The Catholic Catechism, paras. 2415–18. 
539 For a discussion on the tensions within the Catechism and significant revisions that occurred in its 
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the first time, humans owe animals something—namely, “kindness.” It is 
inconceivable that this emphasis on kindness and gentleness would have been 
possible without a greater consideration of the figure of Saint Francis. Although there 
is a freedom to use animals, significantly, there are moral limits placed upon what 
humans may do to animals. For example, the use of animals for entertainment and 
sport is notably absent from the list of legitimate uses. 
The last paragraph of the section highlights the continuing ambiguity of 
Catholic thought about animals, seeming to give with one hand and take away with 
the other. Although “it is contrary to human dignity to cause animals to suffer or die 
needlessly,” it is also “unworthy to spend money on them that should as a priority go 
to the relief of human misery.” The paragraph concludes, “One can love animals; 
[but] one should not direct to them the affection due only to persons.” On the positive 
side, the Catechism states that it is wrong to cause animals to suffer or die needlessly. 
This is potentially huge in its implications since so much of our use of animals 
involves suffering and may be judged unnecessary. A strict interpretation of this 
sentence would surely mean questioning the institutionalisation of animal farming 
since it is now well known that we can live healthily on a plant-based diet.540 Less 
positively, though, such actions are deemed wrong not because they are illicit in 
themselves but because they are considered “contrary to human dignity.” While there 
is increasing evidence that humans are harmed (and certainly their “dignity” is 
affronted) by the abuse of animals,541 it is unclear why infliction of suffering and 
unnecessary death should not be ruled out as intrinsically unacceptable.542 
Most troubling, however, are the two odd lines declaring that it is “unworthy 
to spend money on them that should as a priority go to the relief of human misery” 
and that “one can love animals” but “should not direct to them the affection due only 
to persons.” This seems to reflect the old humanist/anthropocentric tradition that 
judges humans as the sole objects of proper concern, with the modification that one 
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can be concerned about animals but should not care too much or rate their suffering as 
a priority. And as for love—well, this is acceptable, so long as it is not deemed to be 
the real love that persons can have only for other persons. As Linzey comments, the 
Catechism “gives the unfortunate impression that even altruistic love of animals is 
misdirected or disproportionate.”543 The Catechism reveals moral tensions about 
animals: they are included within the sphere of moral concern, but their instrumental 
value to humans is also upheld.  
John Paul’s encyclical Evangelium Vita (the Gospel of Life), published in 
1995, sought to provide a consistent ethic of life encompassing a wide of range of life 
issues, from abortion to euthanasia. Although the text is overwhelmingly concerned 
with the sanctity of human life, especially innocent life, which is regarded as always 
inviolable, the role of humans in relation to other creatures receives a small mention. 
The relevant section runs as follows: “As one called to till and look after the garden of 
the world (cf. Gen 2:15), man has a specific responsibility towards the environment in 
which he lives, towards the creation which God has put at the service of his personal 
dignity, of his life, not only for the present but also for future generations.”544 Again, 
the tensions within Catholic thought converge into one apparently contradictory line. 
On the one hand, humans have a specific responsibility to care for creation, but on the 
other, God has put this creation “at the service of his [man’s] personal dignity, of his 
life.” Although this care is “not only for the present but also for future generations,” 
one can only assume that the future generations envisaged are human ones. It is 
difficult to see how this ethic of care can be classed as anything other than a self-
serving exercise for humans and for their future generations. 
The subsequent line continues in the same vein but seems to include animal 
life more directly: “It is the ecological question—ranging from the preservation of the 
natural habitats of the different species of animals and of other forms of life to 
‘human ecology’ properly speaking—which finds in the Bible clear and strong ethical 
direction, leading to a solution which respects the great good of life, of every life.”545 
Each and every “life” (singular), as well as communities of lives, appears to be 
included here, but no specific responsibilities to those individuals are detailed. The 
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section concludes with, again, the re-envisaging of “dominion” as in Sollicitudo Rei 
Socialis, which emphasises the importance of “moral laws” as well as biological ones. 
A more positive interpretation of these lines—and of the encyclical as a 
whole—is provided by John Berkman. In his article “Is the Consistent Ethic of Life 
Consistent without a Concern for Animals?,” he argues that John Paul avoids two 
errors: one termed “the instrumentalization of nature” and the other “the divinization 
of nature.”546 Instrumentalism regards creation as simply matter to be manipulated, 
and divinisation idealises untouched or pristine nature, including, as a corollary, the 
cycles of predation. The human role in creation is “ministerial,” which should include 
anticipation of the peaceable kingdom through the limiting of human violence over 
individual creatures. 
While this interpretation is welcome and certainly possible, it does seem to fall 
foul of the consistent emphasis on humans as made in the image of God, which is 
regarded not so much functionally as ontologically within the encyclical. This renders 
humans so valuable that it appears to downgrade all of the rest of creation. For 
example, moving from creation to human uniqueness, Evangelium Vita includes this 
statement: “Instead we wish to emphasize that God himself is present in human 
fatherhood and motherhood quite differently than he is present in all other instances 
of begetting ‘on earth.’”547 This attempt to assert human superiority on the grounds 
that God is uniquely “present” in human parenting seems exaggerated. A more 
balanced approach would surely acknowledge the commonality of procreation within 
all mammalian species and seek to celebrate analogous relationships of care and 
protection. The reason for this special pleading soon becomes clear, though: human 
procreation transmits “God’s own image … thanks to the creation of an immortal 
soul.” Given this uniquely high place for humans, defined as a matter of ontology 
rather than function, it is difficult to argue that the encyclical does much to avoid an 
instrumentalist view of animals and creation, especially since God has put this 
creation “at the service of [human] personal dignity”—indeed the service of “[human] 
life.”548 
And yet there are signs that the issue has not been entirely resolved. In an 
interview, Cardinal Ratzinger (subsequently Pope Benedict XVI) was famously asked 
                                                 
546 Berkman, “Is the Consistent Ethic of Life Consistent without a Concern for Animals?,” 240–41. 
547 John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae, para. 43. 
548 John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae, para. 42. 
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if humans are allowed to eat animals. He replied that we are “not forbidden” to use 
animals for food but that any use of animals must conform to the biblical directive to 
treat animals with respect. Continuing, he said that “industrial use of creatures”—the 
large-scale, confined rearing of animals known as factory farming—violates the idea 
that animals “are given into our care, that we cannot just do whatever we want with 
them.” Specifically, he responded, 
 
Animals, too, are God’s creatures and even if they do not have the same direct 
relation to God that man has, they are creatures of his will, creatures we must 
respect as companions in creation … [Man] should always maintain his 
respect for these creatures, but he knows at the same time that he is not 
forbidden to take food from them. Certainly, a sort of industrial use of 
creatures, so that geese are fed in such a way as to produce as large a liver as 
possible, or hens live so packed together that they become just caricatures of 
birds, this degrading of living creatures to a commodity seems to me in fact to 
contradict the relationship of mutuality that comes across in the Bible.549 
 
Many animal protectionists seized on these words as indicating a change in Catholic 
doctrine about animals,550 but that, of course, was not the case. Ratzinger was only 
articulating his personal convictions. Statements by bishops, saints, and even popes 
do not always constitute statements of Catholic doctrine as such. There is a hierarchy 
of authoritative statements, which Ratzinger himself spelt out when he was Head of 
the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith.551 
However, Benedict did in papal office articulate responsibility to creation. In 
his “Message for the Celebration of the World Day of Peace” in 2010, he claimed that 
“the Church has a responsibility towards creation, and she considers it her duty to 
exercise that responsibility in public life, in order to protect earth, water and air as 
gifts of God the Creator meant for everyone, and above all to save mankind from the 
danger of self-destruction.”552 This not only echoes previous papal utterances that 
                                                 
549 Ratzinger, God and the World, 78–79. 
550 See PETA, “Pope Benedict XVI Continues Tradition of Papal Concern for Animals”; and Humane 
Society of the United States, “The Roman Catholic Church.” 
551 See Allen, Cardinal Ratzinger, 290–1. For a discussion on the hierarchy of church statements, see 
DiLeo, “Church Authority and Assent”; and Henningsen, “Shedding a Light on Church Teachings.” 
552 Benedict XVI, “Message of His Holiness Pope Benedict XVI for the Celebration of the World Day 
of Peace”; my emphases. 
 135 
humankind has “a responsibility towards creation” but also adds a new note—namely, 
a “duty” to exercise this in public. Christians have a duty to publicly try to protect the 
“gifts of God” on the earth. This echoes the idea that creation is understood in 
Catholic theology as a “gift” and a “task.” It is a gift from God to humans, but receipt 
of that gift involves the task of caring for creation.553 Although in this view creation is 
valued on the basis of what it means for human life rather than valued in its own right, 
public support by the Church for environmental issues is nonetheless a positive step. 
It is worth noting how far the Catholic tradition has moved on the issue of the 
environment and ecology: in just fifty years, the issue has gone from a subject of 
marginal concern to an issue being advanced by successive popes.  
Although, as evidenced here, recent years have seen some movement from a 
purely instrumentalist view of animals, there was not an in-depth consideration of 
either animals or the environment in Catholic theology prior to the pontificate of 
Francis.  
 
6.2. A Latin American pope 
a. Francis of Rome’s early teachings 
The early indications were that the new Pope Francis would be progressive on the 
issue of animals and the environment. In his inaugural mass on March 19, 2013, 
Francis spoke of how “the vocation of being a ‘protector’ [of creation] … is not just 
something involving us Christians alone; it also has a prior dimension which is simply 
human, involving everyone.” And then, in a crucial line of elaboration, he added, “It 
means protecting all creation, the beauty of the created world, as the Book of Genesis 
tells us and as Saint Francis of Assisi showed us. It means respecting each of God’s 
creatures and respecting the environment in which we live.”554 Of course, this is in 
line with the previous papal statements discussed earlier. But it was at that stage the 
clearest statement of responsibility for creation in the modern Roman Catholic 
tradition. Never before had a pope placed such emphasis on “protecting” other 
creatures, and that it should be done at such an early stage of his pontificate was 
remarkable. Of course, what is meant by “respect” in this context is not spelled out, 
and here it may mean something less than how the word is defined by animal 
                                                 
553 The concept of creation as a “gift” and “task” originates in the command to “till” and “keep” the 
garden in Gen. 2:15. This topic will be taken up again in the discussion of Pope Francis. 
554 Francis, “Homily of Pope Francis”; my emphases. 
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protectionists.555 Nevertheless, Francis’s invoking of his namesake provided some 
hope that the legacy of this particular saint would receive greater recognition within 
the Church.  
In his message on the feast day of Saint Joseph the Worker on May 1, 2013, 
Francis emphasised the “dignity and importance of work” and made clear its 
ecological dimension. “The Book of Genesis tells us that God created man and 
woman by entrusting to them the task of populating the Earth and subduing it.”556 
Taken by itself, the line does little more than reiterate traditional doctrine, but as he 
continued, Francis made clear in which sense this “subduing” is meant—subduing 
“does not mean exploiting [creation], but nurturing and protecting it, caring for it 
through their work. Work is part of God’s loving plan, we are called to cultivate and 
care for all the goods of creation and in this way share in the work of creation!”557 
This line of elaboration—in fact, correction—represents a crucial modification in 
doctrine. In one line the tradition of interpreting dominion and subduing in non-moral 
terms is dispensed with. It is simply redefined. 
Francis’s first encyclical, Lumen Fidei (the Light of Faith), co-written with 
Benedict, was published on July 5, 2013. It returns to the theme of humans and 
creation in a section titled “A Light for Life in Society.” The relevant paragraphs are 
worth citing in full: 
 
How many benefits has the gaze of Christian faith brought to the city of men 
for their common life! Thanks to faith we have come to understand the unique 
dignity of each person, something which was not clearly seen in antiquity. In 
the second century the pagan Celsus reproached Christians for an idea that he 
considered foolishness and delusion: namely, that God created the world for 
man, setting human beings at the pinnacle of the entire cosmos. “Why claim 
that [grass] grows for the benefit of man, rather than for that of the most 
savage of the brute beasts?” “If we look down to Earth from the heights of 
heaven, would there really be any difference between our activities and those 
of the ants and bees?” At the heart of biblical faith is God’s love, his concrete 
concern for every person, and his plan of salvation which embraces all of 
                                                 
555 Regan defines “the respect principle” as meaning that “we are to treat those individuals who have 
inherent value in ways that respect their inherent value.” Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, 248. 
556 Francis, “General Audience.” 
557 Francis, “General Audience”; my emphases. 
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humanity and all creation, culminating in the incarnation, death and 
resurrection of Jesus Christ. Without insight into these realities, there is no 
criterion for discerning what makes human life precious and unique. Man 
loses his place in the universe, he is cast adrift in nature, either renouncing his 
proper moral responsibility or else presuming to be a sort of absolute judge, 
endowed with an unlimited power to manipulate the world around him.558 
 
Here there is a strong reaffirmation of the traditional view that the whole creation is 
made for humans. But didn’t Celsus have a point? What is the point of God creating 
an entire world of species for only one of those species? Don’t other species also have 
a right to the grass of the field, the warmth of the sunshine, and the Creator’s store of 
good things? It is one thing to argue that humans have a special place in creation by 
virtue of the imago dei and quite another to suppose that the whole creation was made 
just for them. It is simply untrue that “man loses his place in the universe, he is cast 
adrift in nature, either renouncing his proper moral responsibility or else presuming to 
be a sort of absolute judge, endowed with an unlimited power to manipulate the world 
around him,” if he doesn’t also suppose that the world is made for him. The 
overstatement here turns what could have been an effective—indeed, compelling—
argument about human’s special responsibilities into a needless theological bolstering 
of human supremacy. 
The encyclical continues: 
 
Faith, on the other hand, by revealing the love of God the Creator, enables us 
to respect nature all the more, and to discern in it a grammar written by the 
hand of God and a dwelling place entrusted to our protection and care. Faith 
also helps us to devise models of development which are based not simply on 
utility and profit, but consider creation as a gift for which we are all indebted; 
it teaches us to create just forms of government, in the realization that 
authority comes from God and is meant for the service of the common 
good.559 
 
                                                 
558 Francis, Lumen Fidei, para. 54; my emphases. 
559 Francis, Lumen Fidei, para. 55; my emphases. 
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The notion of creation as “gift” requiring our “protection and care” is admirable 
enough, but for whom is it a gift? Why is it not possible to posit that creation is a gift 
to all creatures and that humanity’s special role, made in the image, is to care for it as 
God intended? It is simply not clear why such a gift has to be the exclusive property 
of the human species; indeed, the reverse argument makes much more sense and 
avoids the theological special pleading.560  
The anthropocentric strain of the encyclical is even more problematic when 
one considers the fresh emphasis on how all creation participates in salvation—for 
example, in the declaration that “at the heart of biblical faith is God’s love, his 
concrete concern for every person, and his plan of salvation which embraces all of 
humanity and all creation.”561 This prompts a notable question: Why would God want 
to create a world for human beings if his plan in Christ is inclusive of all creation? 
In short, some of the ambiguities, even inadequacies, of Catholic thought in 
relation to animals remain. At the same time, the latest three popes have modified 
traditional Thomism, effectively redefined dominion, notionally supported respect for 
animals, and endorsed the human work of protection and care for other species. All 
this is a long way from Aquinas’s cited views on humans and animals. It seems clear 
that the world of creatures will not be forgotten, at least under the pontificate of 
Francis. His first “Urbi et Orbi” blessing on March 31, 2013, included this line: “let 
us become agents of this mercy, channels through which God can water the earth, 
protect all creation and make justice and peace flourish.”562 Although it is a mistake 
to read too much into a few papal lines, these words augured well for further 
                                                 
560 The notion of creation as gift previously emerged in a dialogue between the future pope and Rabbi 
Abraham Skorka when the former was Cardinal Jorge Bergoglio, archbishop of Buenos Aires. On 
caring for creation, Bergoglio says,  
 
We receive creation in our hands as a gift. God gives it to us, but at the same time He gives us 
a task: that we subdue the Earth. This is the first form of non-culture: what man receives, the 
raw material that ought to be subdued to make culture like the log that is transformed into a 
table. But there is a moment in which man goes too far in this task; he gets overly zealous and 
loses respect for nature. Then ecological problems arise, like global warming, which are new 
forms of non-culture. The work of man before God and before himself must maintain a 
constant balance between the gift and the task. When man keeps the gift alone and does not do 
the work, he does not complete his mission and remains primitive; when man becomes overly 
zealous with his work, he forgets about the gift, creating a constructivist ethic: he thinks that 
everything is the fruit of his labor and that there is no gift. It is what I call the Babel 
syndrome. (Bergoglio and Skorka, “Excerpt from ‘On Heaven and Earth.’”) 
 
561 Francis, Lumen Fidei, para. 54, my emphases.  
562 Francis, “‘Urbi et Orbi’ Blessing.” 
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development of Catholic doctrine. It is in this context of shifting thought on animals 
and the environment that Laudato Si’ was penned. 
 
b. Laudato Si’ (2015) 
After the early indications in his pontificate that Francis was concerned with 
humanity’s relationship to the rest of creation, this concern was crystallised in his 
second encyclical, Laudato Si’: On Care for Our Common Home.563 Laudato Si’ 
strikes a different note from Lumen Fidei in tone and style. This is probably due to the 
fact that Lumen Fidei was partially written by Benedict before the end of his papacy 
but it was assumed by, and published within, Francis’s pontificate. Laudato Si’ is the 
first encyclical written fully by Francis, and it represents the most sustained reflection 
on the environment of any papal encyclical and deserves to be examined at length. 
The title of the encyclical is taken from the “Canticle of the Creatures” by Saint 
Francis of Assisi564 indicating the main theme of the encyclical: care for the earth.  
The focus of the encyclical is the environmental crisis, and Francis identifies 
humanity as the cause of this crisis: the earth “now cries out to us because of the harm 
we have inflicted on her by our irresponsible use and abuse of the goods with which 
God has endowed her. We have come to see ourselves as her lords and masters, 
entitled to plunder her at will.”565 In short, the environment is in crisis because of 
humanity’s attitude towards the world as something to be used and abused. This 
encyclical firmly puts environmental concern on the agenda of the Catholic Church. 
Francis draws on previous papal encyclicals, statements of bishops from around the 
world, inspiration from Saint Francis, and scientific evidence as his primary 
resources.566 Aside from Church authorities, the encyclical’s most frequently cited 
modern author is the Catholic theologian Romano Guardini (his book The End of the 
Modern World is cited eight times).567 Francis draws on Guardini’s critique of 
technology and consumerism in particular. The theme of the encyclical is not just the 
                                                 
563 Francis, Laudato Si’. 
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565 Francis, Laudato Si’, para. 2. 
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Commentary on Laudato Si’. 
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environment, though; like Boff before him, Francis links environmental problems 
with the problem of poverty. 
In addressing the environment, Francis makes some key statements 
concerning animals, though perhaps not the sustained reflection that might be 
expected or hoped for. The most positive statement about animals in the encyclical 
could almost go unnoticed if one were not paying close attention to the tradition, since 
the statement is couched in a larger discussion of biodiversity. In this context Francis, 
for the first time in a papal encyclical, states that animals “have value in 
themselves.”568 While this may seem like a small step forward, it is in fact a major 
advancement in Catholic theology. The Catechism, as discussed earlier, stated that 
animals “give glory to God,” but nowhere before Laudato Si’ had the Catholic Church 
in official Church documents affirmed that animals have inherent value. The 
discussion of animal value takes place in the subsection titled “Loss of Biodiversity,” 
where Francis considers the issues of the loss of habitat and species extinction. It is 
one of the key sections in the encyclical in which animals are considered, and here he 
discusses the use of animals as resources. He begins by stating that the loss of habitats 
for animals leads to the loss of species, “which may constitute extremely important 
resources in the future, not only for food but also for curing disease and other 
uses.”569 Thus, Francis appears to sustain the view that animals are resources for 
human use, not ruling out their use as food or to advance medical knowledge. 
However, in the next paragraph he clarifies the use of the word “resource” as follows: 
“It is not enough, however, to think of different species merely as potential 
‘resources’ to be exploited, while overlooking the fact that they have value in 
themselves.”570  
The encyclical’s affirmation that animals have intrinsic value, but retention of 
some permitted use of them as a resource, echoes but goes beyond the language in the 
Catechism. However, the encyclical goes further, stating that “the great majority [of 
animals] become extinct for reasons related to human activity. Because of us, 
thousands of species will no longer give glory to God by their very existence, nor 
convey their message to us. We have no such right.”571 Again, Francis directly echoes 
the Catechism by affirming that animals “give glory to God.” However, by suggesting 
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569 Francis, Laudato Si’, para. 32. 
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that we have “no such right” to bring about the extinction of a species, Francis 
undercuts the idea of human power over animals. Indeed, truly adopting the position 
that we do not have a right to bring about extinction in other species would require 
large-scale change in our behaviour and a great deal of international cooperation to 
bring about that change. 
Later in the encyclical, Francis reaffirms the value of creatures in a discussion 
about ecosystems, in words that seem to echo Boff: 
 
Ongoing research should also give us a better understanding of how different 
creatures relate to one another in making up the larger units which today we 
term “ecosystems.” We take these systems into account not only to determine 
how best to use them, but also because they have an intrinsic value 
independent of their usefulness. Each organism, as a creature of God, is good 
and admirable in itself; the same is true of the harmonious ensemble of 
organisms existing in a defined space and functioning as a system.572  
 
The language of “intrinsic value” used here has been emphasised by creation-friendly 
theologians. For example, Michael Northcott writes, “A second major theme from 
Laudato Si’ which makes a distinctive contribution to Catholic social teaching 
concerns the intrinsic value of other life to God as creator and redeemer of all 
things.”573  
However, this paragraph about ecosystems is not as straightforwardly positive 
as it initially seems. First, there is no distinction between animals and other 
organisms. “Each organism, as a creature of God, is good and admirable in itself.” 
This leaves no distinction between animals and plants or sentient animals and non-
sentient. Second, the beings’ value is related to their value in the “system.” Although 
they have intrinsic value “independent of their usefulness,” the discussion is 
nonetheless contained within a context of their importance to or within ecosystems. 
This is a holistic approach to creation, rather than a consideration of creatures as 
individuals. Third, the acknowledgement of “intrinsic value” is made in the context of 
determining “how best to use them.” As previously seen, the understanding of 
                                                 
572 Francis, Laudato Si’, para. 140; my emphases. 
573 Northcott, “Planetary Moral Economy and Creaturely Redemption in Laudato Si’,” 896–97; my 
emphasis. 
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creation put forth in the Catechism is maintained, given that creatures are still here for 
our “use,” however much value they might have. Fourth, Francis clarifies his 
comments in the following line: “Although we are often not aware of it, we depend on 
these larger systems for our own existence.”574 Again, he reinforces the view that 
these creatures, regardless of their intrinsic value, are important because humans 
depend on them for survival. 
Building on Saint Francis of Assisi’s understanding of fraternal creation, Pope 
Francis’s encyclical understands creation as a “family.”575 Francis states, “because all 
creatures are connected, each must be cherished with love and respect, for all of us as 
living creatures are dependent on one another. Each area is responsible for the care of 
this family.”576 The term “family” is a striking choice because it implies kinship, as 
well as care and love. However, the understanding of creation as a family does not 
necessarily mean a relationship free of hurt and pain. Since Francis is far from 
specific, and in other places in the encyclical eating animals is condoned,577 it is hard 
to be sure what this family relationship entails. But it is a striking metaphor 
nonetheless. The notion of kinship may well be an extension of the Franciscan idea of 
fraternity, discussed in chapter three, in which other sentient creatures are to be 
treated as brothers and sisters. Although the idea of creation as a family is not fully 
unpacked, it represents a significant step forward in a tradition that previously 
considered animals to be “things.”578 
The encyclical continues Francis’s theme of humans as protectors of creation, 
a theme present in his inaugural mass. In this approach, Laudato Si’ again redefines 
human dominion over creation. “If a mistaken understanding of our own principles 
has at times led us to justify mistreating nature, to exercise tyranny over creation, to 
engage in war, injustice and acts of violence, we believers should acknowledge that 
by so doing we were not faithful to the treasures of wisdom which we have been 
called to protect and preserve.”579 Understanding our role in creation as one of 
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protection would have radical consequences and could have a profound impact on our 
relationship with animals. 
Building on the Catechism and the rejection of domination, the encyclical 
further considers the “ultimate purpose” of other creatures: 
 
The ultimate destiny of the universe is in the fullness of God, which has 
already been attained by the risen Christ, the measure of the maturity of all 
things. Here we can add yet another argument for rejecting every tyrannical 
and irresponsible domination of human beings over other creatures. The 
ultimate purpose of other creatures is not to be found in us. Rather, all 
creatures are moving forward with us and through us towards a common point 
of arrival, which is God, in that transcendent fullness where the risen Christ 
embraces and illumines all things. Human beings, endowed with intelligence 
and love, and drawn by the fullness of Christ, are called to lead all creatures 
back to their Creator.580  
 
This paragraph is significant for a number of reasons. First, it declares that the 
purpose of animals is not to serve as a means to human ends. Animals have their own 
ends. This is echoed in the next paragraph, where Francis writes that “each creature 
has its own purpose. None is superfluous. The entire material universe speaks of 
God’s love, his boundless affection for us.”581 That all creatures have their own 
purpose and value underscores that they are not here for our “tyrannical” use. Second, 
this paragraph affirms that humans and animals share God as their ultimate purpose 
and destiny. Third, that the purpose of animals is directed towards the Creator is 
grounds for “rejecting every tyrannical and irresponsible domination of human beings 
over other creatures.” If this statement were taken at its full force, the rejection of all 
“tyrannical and irresponsible domination” would have far-reaching implications for 
how we relate to animals. Fourth, this discussion makes clear that humans are called 
to “lead all creatures back to their Creator.” This seems to echo Romans 8:19–21, 
which, as previously discussed, may be interpreted as meaning that humanity has a 
role to play in liberating creation and returning it to God. This again strengthens our 
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vocation as protectors and indicates that our role towards creation is to be one 
“endowed with intelligence and love.”  
Fifth, at the end of the quoted paragraph’s first line, Francis includes a 
footnote referencing Teilhard de Chardin: “Against this horizon we can set the 
contribution of Fr Teilhard de Chardin.”582 A reference to Teilhard de Chardin in a 
papal encyclical would have been unthinkable just seventy-five years ago. His work 
underwent a great deal of scrutiny by the Church, leading to his being forbidden to 
publish or lecture on religious matters, with a great number of his books published 
posthumously.583 Yet the following line has clear echoes of his thinking: “all 
creatures are moving forward with us and through us towards a common point of 
arrival, which is God, in that transcendent fullness where the risen Christ embraces 
and illumines all things.” Given Boff’s embracing of Teilhard de Chardin’s thinking, 
this is another indication that Pope Francis and Boff are thinking along the same 
trajectory.  
One critique that could be levied against the encyclical is that, like Boff’s 
work, it seems to embrace scientific explanations rather than more theological ideas to 
address the care of our common home. While this is a fair point, this criticism 
potentially overlooks two important other points. First, the encyclical is not addressed 
to Catholics, Christians, or even religious people. Rather, it is addressed to “every 
living person on this planet,”584 and as such the use of science may have been chosen 
specifically to speak to a wider audience. Second, the encyclical is primarily 
responding to the environmental crisis, the understanding of which perhaps requires 
some scientific explanations. 
What is perhaps most disconcerting in the encyclical is the lack of discussion 
of animal suffering. Although Francis echoes the Catechism in saying that “every act 
of cruelty towards any creature is ‘contrary to human dignity,’”585 there is no 
sustained reflection on the topic. Even in his discussion of extinction, Francis refers 
only to the “disappearance” of species. However, animals do not simply disappear; 
rather, they die, and often they suffer painful deaths. The suffering of the individual 
animals who are becoming extinct is not considered a morally relevant issue. This is 
particularly evident, for example, when Francis discusses the depletion of fish stock, 
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which “especially hurts small fishing communities without the means to replace those 
resources.”586 In this moral calculation, the greatest harm done by fishing is the lack 
of fish for people to catch and kill. There is no consideration of the moral relevance of 
the suffering of the fish. 
 But Francis emphatically indicates that animal suffering has negative effects 
on humans, indeed it is: “the same wretchedness which leads us to mistreat an animal 
will not be long in showing itself in our relationship with other people.”587 At first 
sight, Francis appears here to be simply repeating the long Catholic tradition of 
rejecting cruelty to animals on the basis of its negative effects on humans. This is 
most clearly seen, as indicated previously, in the line from Aquinas that injunctions 
against cruelty are designed to: “remove man’s thoughts from being cruel to other 
men, lest through being cruel to animals one become cruel to human beings.”588 
However, in indicating that it is “the same wretchedness,” Francis goes further in 
positing a direct, rather than an indirect, relation between cruelty to animals and 
cruelty to human beings. 
Francis grapples with how much human intervention is wise in attempting to 
resolve the environmental crisis. On the one hand, he wants to be clear that we cannot 
go on as we have been going and that we must make changes to address the 
environmental crisis. On the other hand, “a delicate balance has to be maintained.”589 
That is, his language speaks of both non-intervention and intervention. He seems 
wary of encouraging more human intervention, given that this intervention created 
environmental problems in the first place. 
One of the main themes of the encyclical is that humans need to consume less. 
Consumeristic desires are ultimately stretching the resources of the planet to an 
unsustainable point. Nowhere is this more evident than in the case of animal 
agriculture. A large amount of scientific evidence reveals that animal agriculture is 
the single largest contributor to climate change.590 In this context, it is extraordinary 
that Francis does not call for a reduction in the amount of meat consumed as an 
essential change for sustaining human life, animal life, and the environment. 
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 Despite its advances on animals and the environment, there are some 
underlying tensions within Laudato Si’. Notably, it is hard to resolve the tensions 
between the idea that animals are a “resource” for food and scientific purposes and 
the idea that they also “have value in themselves.” As Susin points out,  
 
In the document Laudato Si’ he [Francis] wrote some things about animals, 
but it is not sufficient … there is a contradiction. This contradiction remains in 
the official Catechism because, on the one hand, animals are creatures of God 
who have inherent value, not just value for human use. But on the other hand, 
there is also the tradition of animals being there for our use, for clothes, shoes, 
food. This is a contradiction that is not deeply reflected upon.591  
 
This underlying tension is found in the Catechism and continues throughout the 
encyclical. Although Francis goes further than any pope before him, the resolution of 
this tension is essential if animals’ suffering is to be reduced. Susin comments on 
another tension within the work as well: as discussed earlier, “Pope Francis speaks 
about the preoccupation with the possibility of extinction. Here the animal is 
considered as a species, not in terms of its own individual life. This is an important 
distinction; all individual [animal] life is important.”592 Like Boff and others before 
him, Francis maintains a holistic approach rather than concern for individual 
sentients. Movement towards concern for individual animal life is crucial if the 
Catholic tradition is ever to address animal suffering. 
 Tensions and limitations aside, Laudato Si’ represents a step forward for the 
Catholic Church in terms of animals. That animals are even considered, however 
briefly, in a major encyclical ensures that they are now firmly on the moral agenda.593 
 
c. Echoes of Boff 
A Latin American pope concerned with ecology, the poor,594 and even animals has 
not emerged in a vacuum. This can be seen as part of an unfolding tradition to which 
                                                 
591 See Appendix 3. 
592 See Appendix 3. 
593 The shift in focus since the encyclical can be seen in the academic discussions now emerging in 
response. I have already contributed to two conferences on the subject: “Laudato Si’: Animals and the 
Environment”; and “Respondent to Fundamental Arguments for Creaturely Care.” In addition, see 
Miller, The Theological and Ecological Vision of Laudato Si’; and Irwin, A Commentary on Laudato 
Si’. 
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Boff himself has made a major intellectual contribution, however unrecognised. Ideas, 
after all, don’t come from nowhere. As Michael Northcott suggests, Laudato Si’ 
brings together “a close relationship between care for God’s creatures and justice for 
the poor,”595 in a manner akin to Saint Francis: “it is not until the publication of an 
encyclical on the protection of creation, by the first pope to name himself after St. 
Francis, that this minority position takes a more central stage in Catholic theology, 
although it had been argued for by other twentieth-century Catholic theologians, 
including Teilhard de Chardin, Thomas Berry, and Leonardo Boff.”596 In other words, 
Laudato Si’ brings into focus themes of care for the poor and care for the 
environment. An encyclical such as Laudato Si’ would not have been possible without 
the groundwork laid by Boff. This is not to suggest that Francis is influenced only by 
Boff or that he is not drawing on other strands of thought as well. But there are clear 
echoes of Boff’s ideas, albeit unacknowledged, throughout the encyclical. A few 
examples may serve to illustrate this. 
 First, both Boff and the pope identify the will to dominate the earth as the 
cause of both the environmental crisis and poverty. As previously noted, Francis 
argues that the earth “now cries out to us because of the harm we have inflicted on her 
by our irresponsible use and abuse of the goods with which God has endowed her. We 
have come to see ourselves as her lords and masters, entitled to plunder her at 
will.”597 Compare this to Boff’s language in his introduction to Cry: “The Earth is 
also crying out. The logic that exploits classes and subjects peoples to the interests of 
a few rich and powerful countries is the same as the logic that devastates the Earth 
and plunders its wealth.”598 The sense that the will to dominate the earth is at the heart 
of the environmental crisis and the oppression of the poor runs through Boff’s work 
and Laudato Si’. This is not to say that Boff is the only thinker to make this 
connection or that Francis is drawing only on his work, but it is striking that they use 
similar language to discuss the same themes. 
Second, Francis observes, “Some circles maintain that current economics and 
technology will solve all environmental problems, and argue, in popular and non-
technical terms, that the problems of global hunger and poverty will be resolved 
                                                                                                                                           
594 Francis, “Audience to Representatives of the Communications Media.” 
595 Northcott, “Planetary Moral Economy and Creaturely Redemption in Laudato Si’,” 901. 
596 Northcott, “Planetary Moral Economy and Creaturely Redemption in Laudato Si’,” 901. 
597 Francis, Laudato Si’, para. 2. 
598 Boff, Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor, xi. 
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simply by market growth.”599 He refers to this as the “technocratic paradigm”600 and 
argues that “we fail to see the deepest roots of our present failures, which have to do 
with the direction, goals, meaning and social implications of technological and 
economic growth.”601 Compare this argument with Boff’s concerns about 
“technocratic messianism” and “technological messianism” (terms Boff uses 
interchangeably). Boff defines the terms as follows: 
 
Science and technology, in particular, nuclear research, avant-garde physics, 
cybernetics, and biotechnology are capable of such far-reaching interference 
with the genetic code and in the transformation of nature as to be within reach 
of solving serious human infrastructural problems. Consequently, we now have 
a technocratic messianism that claims it will be possible to give everyone 
more than abundant food, housing, medical care, and leisure.602 
 
In short, Boff’s “technological messianism” is the idea that science and technology 
will eventually provide for everyone. Boff indicates that this kind of messianism will 
be insufficient to fulfil human needs because it “guarantees survival (providing bread) 
but does not sufficiently promote life (sharing in the production of bread).”603 
Although Francis uses different terms in his analysis to describe the same 
phenomenon, and though he draws on Guardini as well, the argumentation and 
conclusions are very similar. 
Third, Francis calls for an integrated approach “so as to hear both the cry of 
the earth and the cry of the poor.”604 Here he directly alludes to Boff’s work of the 
same name. It is one of the few italicised lines of the encyclical. While not a direct 
citation, it is a clear reference to Boff. 
 Fourth, although Boff is not directly referenced in the encyclical, the Earth 
Charter, of which he is a co-author and a commissioner, is directly referenced: 
 
The Earth Charter asked us to leave behind a period of self-destruction and 
make a new start, but we have not as yet developed a universal awareness 
                                                 
599 Francis, Laudato Si’, para. 109. 
600 Francis, Laudato Si’, para. 111. 
601 Francis, Laudato Si’, para. 109. 
602 Boff, Ecology and Liberation, 75; my emphases. 
603 Boff, Ecology and Liberation, 75. 
604 Francis, Laudato Si’, para. 109; emphasis in the original. 
 149 
needed to achieve this. Here, I would echo that courageous challenge: “As 
never before in history, common destiny beckons us to seek a new 
beginning … Let ours be a time remembered for the awakening of a new 
reverence for life, the firm resolve to achieve sustainability, the quickening of 
the struggle for justice and peace, and the joyful celebration of life.”605  
 
The citation of the Earth Charter is a direct acknowledgement of Boff’s work. Indeed, 
the Earth Charter is not just acknowledged but echoed and deemed “courageous.” 
This comes as close to an endorsement of Boff’s work as is possible without Francis 
directly naming him. 
Let me consider some alternatives to my argument. First, theologian Jung Mo 
Sung, in my interview with him in Brazil, argued that Francis’s and Boff’s positions 
are fundamentally different: “It is important to distinguish between Boff and Pope 
Francis. Leonardo Boff, and others focused on ecology, say that poor people will be 
the most affected by climate change. But the pope says that climate change and 
poverty are created by the same process.”606 That process is capitalism. As Sung sees 
it, Francis does not just go further than Boff, but rather his theology is “different,” 
offering a theological critique of capitalism.607 Sung’s analysis seems to be primarily 
based on his reading of Cry. Boff’s Ecology, however, spells out the link more 
clearly: 
 
We also have to understand the perverse logic that justifies the precise degree 
and type of social order needed to guarantee the production of goods and 
privileges for only a section of society … The same power is used to direct 
and mold nature so that it yields up its goods for unequal distribution. The 
same logic of domination is used for people and for nature … Social injustice 
leads to ecological injustice, and vice versa.608 
 
                                                 
605 Francis, Laudato Si’, para. 207; my emphases. 
606 See Appendix 4. 
607 See Appendix 4. 
608 Boff, Ecology and Liberation, 25. 
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Of course, this is not the level of economic analysis that Sung, who has pioneered 
theological accounts of economics, would find adequate.609 And of course, the 
encyclical is more explicit than Boff. However, it is unfair to suggest that Boff does 
not identify the same capitalist process as the source of both poverty and the 
environmental degradation. 
Second, it must be asked, if Boff had such an impact on Laudato Si’, why is he 
not directly referenced anywhere in the text? As already noted, the Earth Charter, of 
which Boff is a co-author, is cited, but his name remains conspicuously absent. 
However, there are actually remarkably few references in the encyclical as a whole 
that are not taken from other popes, Church leaders, or authorities such as Aquinas 
and Basil the Great. One possible reason is suggested by Celia Deane-Drummond, 
who argues that “Pope Francis navigates between more traditional Catholic social 
teaching on the environment and the more radical suggestions of liberation 
theologians, such as Leonardo Boff, who … have been influenced by ecological 
agendas.”610 While acknowledging Boff’s influence on Laudato Si’, Deane-
Drummond suggests that it is Boff’s indebtedness to Gaia theory that causes his name 
not to be referenced in the encyclical.611 She interprets Francis as resisting because 
“this controversial holistic scientific theory of the earth’s temperature and gaseous 
stability set by the sum total of biological organisms gives value to those organisms 
that contribute to that stability, and so by implication, can interpret human beings as 
parasitic on planet earth.”612 However, since Deane-Drummond acknowledges that 
“Boff does not interpret Gaia in this way, but absorbs Gaian rhetoric uncritically,”613 
it seems odd for her to claim that Francis is resisting a strand of Boff’s thought that 
she herself does not think he subscribes to. She only briefly considers why Boff is not 
referenced, and she provides little to support her argument. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, Boff does reference Lovelock and Gaia, but it seems odd to suggest 
he has such an allegiance to Gaia theory that it would prevent his acknowledgement 
in the encyclical, especially since Gaia is just one of many scientific theories that Boff 
draws upon. 
                                                 
609 See, for example, Sung, The Subject, Capitalism, and Religion; and Sung, Desire, Market, and 
Religion. 
610 Deane-Drummond, “Laudato Si’ and the Natural Sciences,” 393. 
611 Deane-Drummond, “Laudato Si’ and the Natural Sciences,” 394. 
612 Deane-Drummond, “Laudato Si’ and the Natural Sciences,” 393. 
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Perhaps an alternative explanation might be that Boff is just one of many 
thinkers who informed the encyclical, and of course, that is correct. However, from an 
interview with Boff, we do know that while Francis was writing the encyclical, Boff 
sent him some of his books and gave him “counsel,” and “one day before the 
publication of the encyclical, the pope had someone call [Boff] in order to thank [him] 
for [his] help.”614 Although Boff acknowledges that there might be some of his 
influence in the encyclical, he remains adamant that “the encyclical belongs to the 
pope.”615 What is contended here is that Boff has helped create the intellectual milieu 
which has made Laudato Si’ possible. Echoes of his work are contained within the 
encyclical albeit publicly unacknowledged. 
 
6.3. Re-contextualising Boff in Brazil 
Boff’s triumph is that of a theologian once silenced by the Vatican now finding his 
concerns both for the poor and for the environment more prominent than ever in 
mainstream Catholic theology. I have argued that Laudato Si’ contains echoes of 
Boff’s thought, and now those echoes are now being re-considered in Brazil through 
engagement with the encyclical.  This section is an attempt to consider how those 
ideas are being re-contextualised in Brazil, through interviews conducted in Brazil 
and Boff’s own engagement with Laudato Si’.616  
 I briefly consider three issues raised in the interviews: first, the influence of 
Boff and his thought, especially in terms of ecology and animals in Brazil; second, the 
influence of Laudato Si’ and the revised Catholic position on the environment in 
Brazilian thought; and third, the changing perception of animals in Brazil and its 
relation to Boff and the Catholic Church. 
 Perhaps the first thing to note is that Boff is considered a public representative 
of liberation theology in Brazil. Claudio de Oliveira Ribeiro, a Methodist liberation 
theologian, suggested in his interview that in terms of liberation theologians, many 
people “know, for example, Leonardo Boff because he has a public presence in 
television and the internet, but maybe [they know] only Boff,”617 rather than other 
                                                 
614 Hickson, “Liberation Theologian Boff.”  
615 Hickson, “Liberation Theologian Boff.” 
616 My research trip to Brazil took place in 2016 just a year after the publication of Laudato Si’. As the 
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brief. But I include them as an indication of the beginning of the process of re-contextualisation of 
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617 See Appendix 5, “Excerpts from Professor Claudio de Oliveira Ribeiro Interview.” 
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liberation theologians. Indeed, he seems to be more widely known for his liberation 
theology than his ecological theology in Brazil. Ramos de Jesus, a Catholic and 
animal legal scholar, remarked, “at least amongst my Catholic friends, they see Boff 
as a political religious leader: a religious man who has inspired a political approach to 
religion … Boff is seen as advancing a duty to fight inequality, to fight dictatorships, 
to fight every kind of oppression, as a Catholic or Christian duty. My friends see Boff 
in this way.”618 Even in Catholic circles then, Boff is not necessarily associated with 
his ecological thought. Ramos de Jesus remarked, “On the environment and on 
animals, I have not heard them [Ramos de Jesus’s friends] talk about his views.”619 
Although Boff has been writing and speaking about his ecological theology for over 
twenty years now, it is his message of liberation for the poor that has really captured 
the imagination. Those interviewees who were more familiar with Boff’s work (Susin, 
Oliveira Ribeiro, Jung) were aware of his ecological work, both his theology and his 
work in the Brazilian government, but they did not comment on public engagement 
with that aspect of his thought. This suggests that Boff’s ideas on ecology have not 
yet received the same level of public prominence as his liberation theology. Hopefully 
in the wake of the encyclical greater ecological thought might be fostered in Brazil. 
 My research trip to Brazil occurred just one year after the publication of 
Laudato Si’. And yet the ramifications of the encyclical were already being felt in 
Brazil. There was a sense of optimism about the possibility for change, especially 
from those involved in the animal movement. For example, Ramos de Jesus told me, 
 
In the last papal encyclical there were some good parts on the environment 
and on animals. Some friends in my LGBT group, they read and they told me: 
“there is something interesting here for you.” The pope is also worried about 
animals and the environment, so that is good. So perhaps if Pope Francis, or if 
the next pope continues his line of thought, maybe there will be greater 
Catholic concern for this.620  
 
                                                 
618 See Appendix 6. 
619 See Appendix 6. It is unsurprising that Boff is not known for his thought on animals since, as we 
have seen, he has very little sustained thought on animals in particular. However, this was something 
considered by most of my interviewees because it was the area about which I was asking them. 
620 See Appendix 6. 
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The encyclical is being read and discussed in ecumenical circles, at least in Brazil, as 
confirmed by Oliveira Ribeiro:  
 
I organised a book with Protestant views on leadership in Brazil about 
Laudato Si’. I published an article by Olav Fykse Tveit, who is the general 
secretary of the World Congress of Churches (WCC), with other people from 
Brazil—Methodists, Lutherans, Pentecostals, and Baptists. Everybody is 
talking about the encyclical, from the ecumenical perspective and on the 
ecological issues.621 
 
The impact of the encyclical is going further than just the Catholic Church, to other 
churches in Brazil. Oliveira Ribeiro explains, “The good reception is linked to the 
good view among Protestant groups about Pope Francis. Since the beginning of his 
papacy, many church leaders here are excited to see what is going to happen in the 
Catholic Church with his ecumenical openness. Because of this some groups are 
trying to follow their lead.”622 So the initial reception of the encyclical seems 
positive—it is being considered both within the Catholic Church and by other 
churches in Brazil. 
However, Ramos de Jesus also expressed concerns that there is a long way to 
go: “even people in the Catholic Church who are worried about the environment and 
environmental law—and there are many; it is very present in the Brazilian Catholic 
Church—they are concerned with animals as part of the environment, not the animals 
in themselves.”623 It is undeniably true that despite Laudato Si’, there is still more to 
do in terms of the poor and animals in Brazil, and especially theologically in 
advancing the message of care for creation. As Northcott remarks, many will reject 
the positive message for creation in Laudato Si’: “The tenacity of the Latin Christian 
rejection of the intrinsic value of nonhuman creatures, apart from their use to humans, 
is deep and enduring precisely because it is rooted in the theology of the most 
influential Catholic teacher of the second millennium, Thomas Aquinas.”624  
The enduring legacy of Aquinas in Latin American thought on animals is one 
that is hard to escape. This sentiment was echoed in my interview with members of 
                                                 
621 See Appendix 5. 
622 See Appendix 5. 
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624 Northcott, “Planetary Moral Economy and Creaturely Redemption in Laudato Si’,” 903. 
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Felinos du Campos. Silva Mocoes Puppin remarked that often other students tell her 
that “God created man and God created animals to serve man” and that “they 
[animals] are not as important as humans. They are just animals.” Once again an 
appeal is made to rationality: “Why humans are important? Why animals are not? We 
have logic, we are rational, we think.”625 The idea that animals are here for our use is 
deeply ingrained in Brazilian culture—indeed, in Catholic thought in general—and it 
will take a great deal to dislodge those views that have been culturally assumed.  
Boff is a keen blogger, and since Francis’s election on March 13, 2013, he has 
written frequently on the new pope and Francis of Assisi, with particular attention 
given to the poor and ecology. He has been promoting the new theology coming out 
of the papacy since before it was clear that he may have influenced that theology. A 
few examples will serve to indicate his promotion of and engagement with the pope’s 
theology. In one blog entry titled “An Open Letter to Pope Francis: An Assembly for 
Life on Earth,” he launches a petition calling for a global assembly “in defense of life 
on earth.”626 The petition asks for Francis to call an assembly to address issues of 
global hunger, sanitation, war, the destruction of the environment, and “above all, 
humanity and all forms of life [that] are threatened by astonishing climate 
changes.”627 The letter ends with an appeal to Saint Francis: “With respect and a 
fraternal embrace, in the spirit of Saint Francis of Assisi, in communion with all 
forms of life and all of humanity.”628 This open-letter post was penned in 2013, and 
given the content of Francis’s second encyclical, it may be thought of as prescient. 
In another post, titled “Francis of Rome and the Ecology of Saint Francis of 
Assisi,” Boff discusses the ecological message of Saint Francis and his hope that 
Francis will herald a new ecological sensitivity in the Church. One passage in 
particular is worth noting: 
 
What is our ideal? The one inspired by Francis of Assisi. That Francis of 
Rome is converted, by his humility, poverty, and joviality, into a lover of 
Mother Earth and defender of all forms of life, especially of the most 
threatened, the life of the poor. And that he inspires that consciousness in 
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humanity. Francis of Rome has all the charisma needed for him to become a 
beacon of ecological and humanitarian reference for all the world.629 
 
Boff’s hope of a more “humanised,” Franciscan-inspired Church may be coming to 
fruition. In his post “The Current Relevance of the Spirit of Saint Francis,” Boff 
echoes his earlier work by calling for a “cosmic fraternity,” reiterating Saint Francis’s 
ecological concerns: the “posture of cosmic fraternity, seriously undertaken, can 
animate our ecological concern to safeguard every species, every animal and every 
plant, because they are our brothers and sisters.”630 
 Boff’s latest work, Francis of Rome, is written in an informal style similar to 
that of his blog posts and shares many of the same sentiments. In the chapter “Pope 
Francis, Promoter of Ecological Awareness,” Boff considers what inspiration Francis 
can draw from Saint Francis. He hopes that Francis will promote “ecological 
harmony” and a “cosmic fellowship” inspired by Saint Francis.631 Given the focus of 
Pope Francis’s second encyclical and the inspiration he takes from Saint Francis, it is 
fair to conclude that Boff’s hope for Francis’s promotion of ecology has been 
fulfilled. 
 Since the publication of Laudato Si’, Boff has promoted not only the 
encyclical632 but also the message within,633 and has drawn comparisons with his own 
work, especially in connection with the Earth Charter.634 Although I have referenced 
where these posts appear on his blog, he also has published Portuguese-language 
articles in Brazilian newspapers and journals. Boff particularly emphasises the parts 
of the encyclical that echo and agree with his own theology, and thus engages in his 
own re-contextualisation. For example, he praises Francis for going beyond 
environmental ecology and embracing “holistic ecology,” which sees that “all things, 
knowledge, and events are interrelated.”635 Specifically, Boff sees Francis as 
recognising that “global warming results from industrial excesses, [that] the poverty 
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of large portions of humanity is related to the means of production, distribution and 
consumption,” and that “anthropocentrism is a consequence of the illusory belief that 
we own all things and that they only have meaning to the degree that they serve our 
pleasure.”636 It is, of course, true that holistic ecology is a theme in Laudato Si’, but it 
also is to be expected that Boff would promote Francis’s theology when it is in accord 
with his own. 
 In his piece “The Magna Carta of Integral Ecology: Cry of the Earth—Cry of 
the Poor,” Boff indicates in three places where the encyclical draws on or agrees with 
the Earth Charter. First, both highlight “the intrinsic value of each being” yet maintain 
a holistic approach (that is, neither considers individual sentient animals, though Boff 
does not point this out directly). Second, he sees Francis as echoing the charter when 
he argues not for “reform” but for a “new beginning.” Third, as noted previously, 
Francis directly quotes the charter towards the end of the encyclical.637 This argument 
is expounded more fully by Boff in another piece, where he argues, 
 
The encyclical, Laudato sí’, [sic] Caring for the Common Home, and The 
Earthcharter, are perhaps the only two documents of worldwide relevance that 
have so much in common. They deal with the degraded situation of the Earth 
and of life in its many dimensions, departing from the conventional vision that 
is limited to environmentalism. They subscribe to the new relational and 
holistic paradigm, the only one, it seems to us, that is still capable of giving us 
hope.638 
 
In drawing these parallels between his own work and that of Francis, Boff is 
contributing to the furthering of his thesis that an ecological paradigm is the “only” 
theory capable of alleviating the current environmental crisis. 
 Pope Francis reaffirmed his commitment to integral ecology and humanity’s 
role in protecting creation at a conference marking the third anniversary of the 
encyclical. “Humanity has the knowledge and the means to cooperate in responsibly 
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‘cultivating and protecting’ the earth.”639 He again evoked Saint Francis to provide 
inspiration and guidance to help humanity move towards greater care for our common 
home. Hopefully the encyclical will continue to inspire greater concern for the poor, 
the environment, and even animals. As Laudato Si’ is more widely discussed, 
hopefully a greater understanding of the importance of our relationship with creation 
will be fostered in Brazilian theology. Perhaps as the life of Saint Francis becomes 
more prominent, through his adoption by Pope Francis, we might finally begin to see 
the decline of the influence of Thomistic thought, especially with regard to animals. 
Although still focused on the holistic ecological approach to the environment, Boff’s 
work has helped move Catholic thought towards a greater consideration of the moral 
status of animals, a move that will soon hopefully be felt in the lives of Brazilian 
animals. 
 This chapter has argued, in answer to my third methodological question, that 
Boff’s work has been a catalyst for greater concern for animals in the Roman Catholic 
Church. It has considered the post Vatican II Catholic statements on animals in order 
to assess how far the papacy of Francis has moved us in regard to concern for 
animals. Pope Francis has embraced concern for the environment, but there is still 
some way to go in terms of moral solicitude for animals. Nonetheless his papacy, and 
especially his encyclical Laudato Si’, represent a significant shift in Catholic thought 
towards animals. I have argued that Boff’s ecological theology has been a part of an 
intellectual milieu that has enabled this shift. The last part of this chapter focused on 
the re-contextualisation of Boff’s ideas in Brazil through the reception of Laudato Si’. 
I now turn in my next chapter to offer an animal-inclusive Trinitarian liberation 
theology based upon a reconstruction of Boff’s ideas. 
 
  
                                                 
639 Francis, “Address of His Holiness Pope Francis to Participants at the International Conference 
Marking the 3rd Anniversary of the Encyclical Laudato Si’.” 
 158 
Chapter 7: Towards a Trinitarian Theology of Animal Liberation 
 
Although it has not previously been discussed in this thesis, Boff is a dedicated 
Trinitarian liberation theologian. His first major work on the subject, A Trindade, a 
Sociedade e a Libertação, was published in Portuguese in 1986 and subsequently in 
English in 1988 as Trinity and Society.640 Shortly after, in 1988, he published 
Santíssima Trindade é Melhor Comunidade in Portuguese, which was later translated 
into English as Holy Trinity, Perfect Community (hereafter cited as Holy Trinity).641  
This chapter begins with a brief exploration of Boff’s social analogy 
Trinitarian theology and general critiques of social analogy Trinitarian theology. I 
then propose a more animal-friendly and creation-friendly theology inspired by his 
work. Ideas and themes from Boff discussed throughout this thesis are woven together 
with my own ideas to suggest a Trinitarian animal-inclusive liberation theology of my 
own. I begin by offering original theology inspired by Boff – a Trinitarian liberation 
theology conceiving of the Trinity as Gentleness, Solidarity, and Fraternity – 
widening Boff’s theology beyond its anthropocentric focus. I argue that through my 
refashioning of Boff’s Trinitarian starting point, his theology can be opened up to 
include animals. Then I offer a sketch of the fundamental insights of a Trinitarian 
theology of animal liberation by developing three of his ideas: (a) communion as 
being “for” creation, (b) entering into the Triune sight, and  (c) a Trinitarian model of 
our relationship with animals.  
 The last two sections of this chapter touch first on why animal theology 
matters in Brazil and on the unfinished journey of both Boff and the Catholic Church 
in relation to animals. 
 
7.1. Boff’s Trinitarian thought 
 
By the name of God, Christian faith expresses the Father, the Son and the 
Holy Spirit in eternal correlation, interpenetration and love to the extent that 
they form one God, Their unity signifies the communion of the divine 
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Persons. Therefore, in the beginning there is not the solitude of One, but the 
communion of three divine Persons.642  
 
These lines contain the central message of Boff’s Trinitarianism: God in community, 
unity through community. His Trinitarian theology is a form of social Trinitarianism 
in that it stresses the individual persons of the Trinity, over the oneness of the 
Godhead. He does this to highlight the community of the Godhead - the more the 
persons of the Godhead are individuated, the more capable they are of being in 
community with one another. He does not however neglect the unity of the Godhead, 
since unity in and through community is the central message of his Trinitarianism. 
The unity of the Godhead is expressed by the concept of perichoresis: the 
“cohabitation, co-existence, interpenetration of the divine Persons by one another.”643 
In short, the heart of the divine mystery of the Trinity is expressed in community.  
 He offers a communitarian analysis of the divine at least in part to be able to 
stress the human socio-political message of liberation contained throughout his 
corpus. He rejects the monarchical conception of Trinity, in favour of a more 
egalitarian communitarian model. “Strict monotheism can justify totalitarianism and 
the concentration of power in one person’s hands, in politics and in religion.”644 He 
understands patriarchy as a political derivation of monotheism and a monarchical 
conception of the Trinity, “the socio-historical domination of fathers over their 
families, males over females, masculine attributes over feminine ones, found its 
theological-ideological justification in a one-sided representation of God.”645 The 
tendency towards patriarchy and domination are the product of a misrepresentation of 
the divine. A communitarian vision of God is required as a corrective to these 
tendencies. The communion of the Three in Trinity “destroys the figure of the one and 
only Monarch, the ideological underpinning of totalitarian power.”646 Furthermore, 
the goal of human community is to emulate the communion found in the Trinity. 
“Only a human community of brothers and sisters, built on relationships of 
communion and participation, can be a living symbol of the eternal Trinity.”647 In 
stressing this Boff pushes his social analogy far enough to suggest a transformation of 
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the socio-political order. This is the good news of the Trinity: “Society is not 
ultimately set in its unjust and unequal relationships, but summoned to transform 
itself in the light of the open and egalitarian relationships that obtain in the 
communion of the Trinity, the goal of social and historical progress. If the Trinity is 
good news, then it is so particularly for the oppressed and those condemned to 
solitude.”648 The liberation theology message of Boff’s Trinitarian theology then is 
clear, the Trinity is to liberate us from oppression in human societies and move us 
towards communitarian egalitarian living. Indeed the telos of existence will be the 
reconciliation of our world with the communal vision of the Trinity. Boff sees 
humanity as undertaking “a journey through change and liberation processes that 
make creation progressively more like its ultimate goal of communion in the 
Trinity.”649 All of existence then is orientated back to its Creator with the goal of 
eventual union with God through communion. 
Let me now consider some objections to Boff’s form of social Trinitarianism. 
Since I hope to avoid the pitfalls of these critiques they are worth briefly exploring. 
The first is the classical objection to the social analogy, that the individual persons of 
the Trinity are so stressed that the unity of the Godhead is lost, and it ends up in 
Tritheism. In order to have community, the individuality of each person of the 
Godhead is stressed, which can undermine the oneness of the Trinity. Although, Boff 
does not fall into Tritheism, it is easy to see how this might be a charge against him 
since he states, “We believe that God is communion rather than solitude. It is not a 
‘one’ that is primary but the ‘three.’ The three comes first. Then because of the 
intimate relationship between the ‘three’ comes the ‘one’ as expressing unity of the 
three.”650 However, Boff is clear that he avoids Tritheism through the stressing of 
perichoresis, “Perichoresis (circumincession – the interpenetration of the Persons) is 
not added to the constitution of the divine Persons; it is at their origin, simultaneous 
with them and constitutive of them.”651 It is his stressing of the community and his 
rejection of the monarchical hierarchy of the Godhead that leaves him open to this 
charge. 
 The second critique is why just stop at three persons? If community is the 
focus of the doctrine, would not the community be even greater if there were more 
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persons? Boff specifically addresses why there are three Persons of the Trinity. He 
states, “through the Trinity, the solitude of the One is avoided, the separation of the 
Two (Father and Son) is also overcome, and the exclusion of one from the other 
(Father from Son, Son from Father) is overcome … The Third Figure reveals the 
opening and the union of the opposites.”652 There are three because it allows for 
perfect community. However, he does not consider whether that community would be 
more perfect if there were more Persons in the Godhead. He would probably argue 
that no more are needed, because perfect community has been achieved in the Three, 
but an exploration of this might have been helpful. 
The third is that the danger of social Trinitarianism is that it ends up building a 
conception of the divine based, not on divine attributes, but on a perfectly imagined 
human community. In short, it reads from humanity to God, rather than from the 
divine to the human. There are hints of this in Boff’s work, when he says “So human 
society is a pointer on the road to the mystery of the Trinity, while the mystery of the 
Trinity as we know it from revelation, is a pointer toward social life and its 
archetype.”653 Although Boff is clear he is working from the divine to the human, it is 
easy to see how a social conception of the Trinity could be seen as a sort of wish 
fulfilment: God is the very best of human community. It is here where humans may 
once again mistake themselves for the Creator: The best version of human society as 
divine. Further, it could also be suggested that this projection of human community 
overlooks the fallen and ambiguous nature of created human society. The very best of 
human society may reflect some divine inspiration, but there is much of human social 
living that does not. To rephrase Boff, it could be just as easily said that human 
society is a pointer on the road to the mystery of the demonic as the divine. 
Whether or not Boff’s Trinitarian theology overcomes the objections to social 
trinitarianism is a subject for another work. But I hope this exploration might serve to 
indicate its potential limitations and pitfalls. 
From an animal theology perspective, one flaw in Boff’s Trinitarian work is 
his failure to consider the ramifications for the nonhuman creation. Boff understands 
the Godhead as creating to be in communion with other beings who can be in 
communion with the divine. Although Boff sees “traces” of the Triune God within all 
of creation, it is the human creation that God is fundamentally interested in: “Mystery, 
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truth and communion live together in each [human] individual; they are interwoven 
realities that together make up the unity of life. They provide a reflection of trinitarian 
communion and are the ultimate foundation for humanity being the image and 
likeness of the Trinity.”654 What communion with all creation might look like is 
reconceived later in this chapter. I hope in my Boff-inspired Trinitarian animal 
theology, to address the deficiencies in his theology by including the non-human 
creation. 
 
7.2. A Trinitarian theology of animal liberation 
Before I begin my reimagining of the Trinity, I will first offer some thoughts on 
terminology. Boff retains the traditional language of persons within the Godhead. The 
language of person is problematic from an animal theology perspective as it has 
become so associated with the idea of individual human beings. As Catherine Mowry 
LaCugna indicates, “we in the West today think of a person as a ‘self’ who may be 
further defined as an individual center of consciousness, a free, intentional subject, 
one who knows and is known, loves and is loved, an individual identity, a unique 
personality endowed with rights, a moral agent, someone who experiences, weighs, 
decides and acts.”655 This is not how the term was originally understood by the 
Church Fathers,656 but it is how the term has subsequently evolved. Boff does briefly 
discuss the problems of the modern connotations of the word “person,” but opts to 
retain the language because alternatives leave little space for adoration of the 
divine.657 From an animal-friendly theological perspective, the word person has its 
own set of particular problems. In human legal terms, the idea of person is juxtaposed 
with property. Humans, and indeed corporations, are legal persons, but animals are 
classified as property. Whether this should be the case has been subject to a large 
amount of philosophical, legal and theological debate.658 In order to avoid such 
problematic connotations, I will instead return to the language of the Fathers: Opting 
to use hypostasis and ousia, rather than person and substance. This language of 
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hypostasis and ousia contains the original intentions of the doctrine without the 
modern day connotations. 
As theologian Colin Gunton once remarked, “the doctrine of the Trinity is … 
the means by which we conceptualise God as love.”659 Inspired by insights from 
Boff’s corpus, and with the model of Saint Francis in mind, I suggest a creative 
reimagining of the Trinity based on the unique attributes of God, namely, Gentleness, 
Solidarity, and Fraternity.660 Each attribute represents a different way of conceiving 
God’s love for the world. Divine attributes are understood in the traditional sense 
discussed by Roger Olsen and Christopher Hall, where “The functions of the Trinity 
must be wholly unified so that all persons are involved in each, but individual persons 
of the Trinity may be said to be especially at work in certain activities of creation, 
redemption, and sanctification.”661 In conceiving the Trinity as Gentleness, Solidarity 
and Fraternity I am highlighting different conceptions of divine love in which each 
hypostasis of the Trinity is particularly at work, while not denying the unity of the 
ousia. My model of the Trinity will build on traditional ideas of the Godhead, to stress 
a creation- and creature-friendly understanding of the divine. In renaming the Trinity 
as Gentleness, Solidarity and Fraternity, I am attempting to highlight the different 
ways in which we experience God’s love. Yet, this should not result in a confusion of 
the immanent Trinity (God beyond the world) and the economic Trinity (God within 
history), since God in Trinity who acts in history is a reflection of who God is beyond 
the world. God the Father is conceived as Gentleness, God the Son as Solidarity, and 
the Holy Spirit as Fraternity, and they all come together as one in community. Let us 
take each one in turn. 
 The first hypostasis of the Trinity is Gentleness. Out of gentleness God begets 
and creates to be in community with others—first to be in community with the other 
members of the Godhead and second to be in communion with the creation she 
creates. Creation is the overflowing of divine Gentleness and a desire to be in 
communion. Thus, the heart of God’s very being is Gentleness, the drive that has 
enabled creation to be formed. Gentleness is expressed in and throughout creation, in 
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the delicate beauty found in the world. This is not to deny the ambiguity of creation, 
but to acknowledge the touches of the divine witnessed in creation, left by its Creator. 
The conception of God as Father has been critiqued by liberation and feminist 
theologians for seeming to endorse patriarchy and oppression.662 Indeed, Boff is one 
of those theologians who lays more emphasis on community than on a monarchical 
patriarchy.663 The terminology of God the Father is retained here but recast in the 
light of Gentleness. If God’s fatherhood is envisioned as characterised by gentleness, 
it cannot be construed as upholding oppression. God’s gentleness consists in the 
freedom of the creature to be itself. Indeed, it is the conception of fatherhood as 
domineering and oppressive, in a caricature of masculinity, that need challenging. 
True fatherhood is characterised by a father’s gentleness towards his children. In an 
extension of the metaphor from Pope Francis, Gentleness sees all creatures, human 
and nonhuman, as his children. Our truly apprehending other creatures as part of the 
same family, as brothers and sisters, would involve our seeing them through the eyes 
of Gentleness. When we act with gentleness towards our fellow children, we 
demonstrate the fullness of the imago dei. We are made in the image of a gentle God, 
and when we exhibit that behaviour towards others, it brings us into communion with 
the divine. This behaviour is at once made possible by the divine and sustained by it, 
but it also brings us into closer communion with the divine. Saint Francis is the best 
exemplar of this, as his gentleness towards creation brought him closer to God and 
closer to the world. 
 The second hypostasis of the Trinity may be conceived as Solidarity. 
Externally begotten from Gentleness, the Logos exists first in solidarity with the other 
persons of the Godhead. Solidarity through the incarnation embraces materiality and 
fleshly existence in particular. The incarnation is the divine love affair with the world. 
But Solidarity is more than the embrace of the world; it is through solidarity that God 
demonstrates that she is on the side of her creation.  
God is in solidarity with fleshly existence, both human and nonhuman, 
through the incarnation, passion, crucifixion, resurrection, and ascension. In the 
incarnation especially, Solidarity embraces fleshly existence. In the passion God 
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suffers in solidarity with fleshly beings, culminating in solidarity with them in death. 
Wherever there is suffering in creation, God is there, suffering in solidarity. In the 
resurrection, God brings creation into true solidarity with herself through redemption. 
Not only is God with us in our pain, but through that presence God redeems our pain 
on our behalf.664 Redemption is then the greatest act of solidarity, as God takes our 
place in suffering. It is not just human suffering that God is in solidarity with; it is all 
creaturely suffering. God is in the abattoir, suffering with the animals, suffering with 
the people who are forced by their socio-economic circumstances to work there. 
Solidarity is there with and supporting the cetaceans in captivity, the primates in 
laboratories, the minks on fur farms, and the bull in the bullfight. Solidarity is there in 
all suffering, suffering with creation, taking it upon himself, and redeeming suffering 
creation. 
This is a renaming of the Trinity, moving beyond the human to embrace all 
creaturely suffering. It is more than solidarity with the oppressed, although that 
certainly has an important place. Solidarity hugs and encompasses creation. Wherever 
there is oppression, suffering, depression, loneliness, or despair within fleshly 
existence, Solidarity is there with creatures, suffering with her creation. And wherever 
there are people working to oppose these forces, Solidarity is with them, 
strengthening their resolve and giving them hope and light. 
 The third hypostasis of the Trinity is Fraternity.665 Of one being with 
Gentleness and Solidarity, Fraternity delights in perichoretic union and exists in a 
fraternal dance. The Spirit is God’s fraternal outpouring in and through the world. 
Throughout creation the Spirit invites all beings into a fraternal dance. Fraternity 
works to bring us towards Solidarity and Gentleness, to see the divine dance within 
creation. Through Fraternity, God reaches out and creates community in creation, as 
she begets communion in the Godhead.  
God pours out Fraternity onto the world, bringing the world into communion 
with her. Fraternity is God’s great friendship with the world. He invites the world to 
dance with God, to delight and enjoy his creation. Whenever we wonder and awe at 
the beauty of his creation, Fraternity is there, inviting us to see the wonder, and 
Gentleness is there, creating it. But Fraternity is not only present in joy and 
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amazement; Fraternity is also there, bringing us towards Solidarity, in times of 
desperation and suffering. Fraternity brings the light of Solidarity, offering a divine 
hand of love and Gentleness. 
Fraternity is not present just to awaken us to Gentleness and Solidarity, 
though. Fraternity works to bring the spark of moral awakening. Boff rightly sees the 
world as suffused with God’s Spirit, but he sadly confines the work of the Spirit to 
humanity. As we have seen, Boff repeatedly tries to move beyond anthropocentric 
thinking throughout his corpus and yet never entirely succeeds. In order to fully 
remove oneself from anthropocentrism, one must embrace theocentrism, rather than 
eco-centrism. We must ask: How does the Triune God see her creation? Of course, 
such a reorientation is possible only if it is willed and enabled by Fraternity. The role 
of Fraternity, then, is to lead us into God’s sight, to help reveal to us the glory of 
God’s creation. John 16:12 speaks of this: “I still have many things to say to you, but 
you cannot bear them now. When the Spirit of truth comes, he will guide you into all 
the truth.” Fraternity leads us into truth—leads us into moral discoveries. Moral 
awakening is a spiritual awakening. Fraternity brings us into the light of how God 
sees the world and lets us glimpse part of that reality. It is the moral and spiritual 
awakening of Fraternity that allows us to enter into divine communion, or the divine 
dance. Fraternity brings us into communion with each other, with other beings in 
creation, and with creation as a whole, and it is that communion that brings us to 
divine communion. In whom, through whom, by whom, God enables and sustains the 
potential for communion in, through, and with her creation. 
Doubtless, there may be many limitations to my conceiving of the Trinity as 
Gentleness, Solidarity and Fraternity. But, hopefully, it avoids the straightforward 
charge of anthropomorphic projection. My hope is that, inspired by Boff and the 
biblical witness, it may attempt to help us glimpse something of the divine in relation 
to all creation. 
 Boff lays the foundations for my proposed reconstruction in his conception of 
the Trinity as community and communion. 
 
a. Communion as being “for” creation 
Human communion with the divine is the focus of Trinitarian action in Boff’s work 
Trinity and Society. He has a larger section on communion with creation in his Holy 
Trinity. In this latter text “creation is pervaded, within most variegated differences, by 
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a drive toward union, convergence, and communion that mirrors the internal reality of 
the Trinity.”666 However, as in his other works, Boff’s conception of creatures and 
creation contains little regard for sentience. When he discusses communion with 
creation, animals are listed in the same breath as stars, rivers, and stones.667 He makes 
no distinction between creatures in creation. 
 Without denying that the divine is immanent throughout creation, it is possible 
to lay special focus on God’s sentient beings within creation. As is written in Acts 
2:17, “God declares, that I will pour out my spirit upon all flesh” (Acts 2:17 is 
quoting Joel 2:28)—all flesh, human and nonhuman. Indeed, although Boff focuses 
on human communion with the divine, a less anthropocentric perspective on what 
constitutes divine communion in creation is possible. The emphasis on humans is, at 
this point, to be expected in Boff and may well be connected to the previous 
discussion on the neglect of materiality in chapter two. For example, he writes as if 
communion is a quality that only humans share with the divine. “To commune” is to 
“share one’s intimate thoughts or feelings with,” to “feel in close spiritual contact 
with.”668 Communion in the sense of sharing thoughts and feelings is not something 
unique to humans. God as Fraternity sees the world through multiple eyes and 
multiple communions. This means that we must not limit communion in creation to 
human communion. For example, evidence of the emotional lives of animals suggests 
they are capable of experiencing a wide variety of emotions, feelings, and social 
relationships.669 For example, elephants have sophisticated communal relationships 
within their herds, and their practices include performing funerals670 and mourning 
dead elephants.671 The natural world has been classically characterised as “red in 
tooth and claw,” but biologist Frans de Waal has challenged that perspective and 
details how empathy in the animal kingdom is more common than self-interested 
practices.672 Indeed, the idea that some animals may be able to enter into a direct 
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relationship with the divine was suggested at a conference on Laudato Si’ in Rome by 
theologian Oliver Putz, to whom I was a respondent.673  
 The idea of divine communion belongs theologically with Boff’s idea of Jesus 
as a “being-for-others” and the idea of “fraternity” in his Franciscan theology. All of 
these notions share the idea of going outside oneself—of relating to the divine, to 
other humans, and to creation. The importance of communing with others is at the 
heart of Boff’s worldview. We become most ourselves when in communion, when we 
are for others or in fraternity with them. This may be considered the foundation of a 
theology of otherness—that is, a theology that sees the divine and humans as 
fundamentally oriented towards “others” in an attitude of service. These ideas can be 
easily rescued from Boff’s humanocentric focus to encompass other sentient beings. 
If we start with the premise that humans should be “for” other sentient beings, this 
could shift our theological focus, allowing us to see ourselves as part of creation with 
responsibility for it. 
 What would it mean to be “for” creation? Following Boff’s Christology, the 
more being-for-creation we become, the more we see ourselves as part of, even as a 
servant of God in, creation. Most importantly, being for creation entails being inspired 
by Fraternity to recognise other creatures, especially sentient animal beings. Being for 
creation would entail being against animal suffering and death—in short, being on the 
side of creation. 
If we understand communion as the goal of the Triune creation, we should re-
envision our relationships with other creatures, human and nonhuman. This may 
sound like a small point, but so much of human relations is driven by other desires: 
greed, jealousy, ambition, material gain. Such a radical realignment of attitudes would 
be so all-encompassing that it is impossible to even consider without divine help and 
intervention. If communion became the governing idea of human living, this would 
mean seeing other creatures not as a means to our ends, but as other beings with God-
given and sustained lives and value of their own. 
Living in community with God’s other sentient creatures would enable a fuller 
sense of the God-given glory of creation. What is more, from a Franciscan 
perspective, it would reinforce the concept of communion with the divine. Saint 
Francis, as previously discussed, entered into communion with creation, but 
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especially with God’s sentient creatures. He treated birds, lambs, and wolves as 
brothers and sisters. Perhaps by emulating Saint Francis’s compassion to God’s other 
sentient creatures, we may come to appreciate God’s creation more and so grow in 
communion with the divine. Francis’s companions reportedly said, “We who were 
with him have seen him take inward and outward delight in almost every creature, and 
when he handled or looked at them his spirit seemed to be in heaven rather than on 
earth.”674 
What is needed, then, is a radical re-visioning of creation as a God-filled 
community and family. The Triune God is on the side of her created beings and wills 
to be in community with them. It is thus possible to see work for, and on behalf of, 
God’s other creatures as the outworking of God’s fraternal Spirit in us. Being for 
other creatures means allowing the Spirit to work through us as agents of God’s 
Trinitarian wish for creation to be in community. 
 
b. Entering the Triune sight: To see as God sees 
In Jesus, Boff writes of Jesus as “a person of extraordinary creative imagination.”675 
By “imagination,” he does not mean the creative thought usually associated with the 
term, but rather something closer to what might be termed perception: “Imagination is 
a form of liberty … it is the capacity to see human beings as greater and richer than 
the cultural and concrete environment that surrounds them; it is having the courage to 
think and say something new.”676 It is this act of seeing and perceiving that is the 
focus of this section. What Boff terms “imagination” is the ability to see beyond the 
context, to see more than the immediate reality before us. In the epilogue of Jesus, he 
makes clear that the task of theology is to begin by seeing the context: “Theologians 
do not live in the clouds. They are social actors with a particular place in society.”677 
In the context of his writing, this meant seeing the reality of the poverty and 
oppression in Brazil. Accordingly, in the twenty-first century we must ask ourselves, 
what are the realities that we should be seeing? 
A theology of sight enables us to perceive the Triune vision of the world. Use 
of the language of “sight” and “seeing” could be interpreted as being constructed 
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upon a negative binary in which the physical disability of blindness is juxtaposed 
negatively with the positive physical ability to see. This discussion in no way means 
to suggest a negative view of people who are blind or of the physical inability to see. 
Rather, it is the larger notion of perception that blind and non-blind people share that 
is being explored. However, the language of sight is retained for three significant 
reasons.  
First, the language of sight has specific political connotations when it comes to 
animals. Animals often represent an intellectual “blind spot” for many academics—
they may be progressive in many other areas but do not see the issue of animal 
suffering.678 A change in perception is necessary to help move us beyond that so-
called blind spot. As Linzey explains, “at the heart of the animal rights movement is a 
change of moral perception, simple, yet profound: Animals are not our property or 
utilities but living beings with dignity and rights.”679 The change in moral perception 
is a moral awakening. It is an awakening that in theological terms is made possible 
only by the Holy Spirit. As Linzey has elaborated elsewhere,  
 
animals are not just machines, commodities, tools, resources, utilities here for 
us, or means to human ends; rather they are God-given sentient beings of 
worth, value, and dignity in their own right. This is a moral and spiritual 
discovery as objective and important as any other fundamental discovery, 
whether it be the discovery of stars and planets or the discovery of the human 
psyche.680 
 
God awakens in us this moral perception or conversion. Indeed, Boff writes in Jesus 
of how conversion is an important step towards the kingdom.681 What is required here 
is Spirit-filled moral conversion, beginning with a change in moral perception. 
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The ability to see animals as more than tools, machines, or things that are here 
for our use has been the subject of extensive discussion in animal literature. For 
example, in his article “Can We See a Moral Question about Animals?,” Brian Klug 
is “concerned, in particular, with a certain kind of tunnel vision in science which 
subverts the question altogether, preventing it from being seen for what it is: a moral 
question about animals.”682 Klug suggests that the problem with some scientists is a 
belief that the moral question about animals “does not concern them.”683 
Henry David Thoreau writes, “A man sees only what concerns him,”684 and it 
is in this sense that the animal movement is focused on helping others see that animals 
concern them. The issue of “seeing” animals is illustrated by this anecdote from 
Linzey: 
 
The university where I used to work was situated amid acres of eighteenth-
century parkland. Wildlife abounded. From my study window I observed 
families of wild rabbits. Looking up from my word processor from time to 
time, I gazed in wonder, awe, and astonishment at these beautiful creatures … 
Occasionally I invited visitors to observe them. Some paused in conversation 
and said something like, “Oh yes,” as though I had pointed out the dust on my 
bookshelves or the color of my carpet. What they saw was not rabbits. Perhaps 
they saw machines on four legs, “pests” that should be controlled, perhaps just 
other “things.”685 
 
This anecdote has remained with me over the years. The ability to “see rabbits” is the 
capacity to recognise those rabbits as remarkable sentient beings in their own right, 
with their own lives, concerns, relationships, and value. Indeed, in discussions with 
Linzey, the ability to “see rabbits” has become a shorthand term for whether someone 
understands the moral relevance of animals. The language of seeing is central to ideas 
of moral perception. 
A second but related reason for the language of sight is that so much of what 
is done to animals is unseen that part of developing an animal theology naturally 
                                                 
682 Klug, “Can We See a Moral Question about Animals?,” 206; emphases in the original. A further 
discussion of Klug’s views on moral perception can be found in Linzey, “Enemies of Human Beings,” 
23–34. 
683 Klug, “Can We See a Moral Question about Animals?,” 214. 
684 Thoreau, “Autumnal Tints,” 709. 
685 Linzey, Animal Gospel, 40–41. 
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involves bringing the unseen into the light, making the invisible visible. Take, for 
example, the issue of animal agriculture. It is not only that we are removed from the 
farming and slaughtering of animals686—by the distance of modern urban living, by 
the ability to go into supermarkets and purchase animal products that no longer 
resemble the animals they came from, and by the language we use concerning those 
products to create emotional distance (“pork” rather than “pig,” “beef” rather than 
“cow”)—but also that we are specifically kept from seeing the realities of the lives of 
farmed animals. One illustration of this is the passing of so-called ag-gag laws in 
America. These laws, which have already been passed in Iowa and Utah, make it 
illegal to photograph or create sound recordings of any farm in those states without 
the permission of the owner of the farm. There are several moral issues with these 
laws, but for the sake of this discussion, they are most succinctly described by Linzey 
and Priscilla N. Cohn: 
 
What we see, or are allowed to see, affects our moral judgement. That so 
much of industrialized farming is, as a matter of course, hidden from view 
hinders full moral evaluation. There is a complex and not easily defined 
interrelationship between the physical act of seeing and moral perception. Not 
all sight leads to moral insight, of course, but it is at least one way in which we 
can see differently.687 
 
In short, the language of seeing is important because often we are not allowed to see 
and judge for ourselves. Timothy Pachirat, in his book Every Twelve Seconds: 
Industrialised Slaughter and the Politics of Sight, discusses at length the way society 
at large and slaughterhouse workers are separated from what happens in a 
slaughterhouse and the impact that seeing and not seeing has on moral thought. He 
argues,  
 
Where distance and concealment continue to operate as mechanisms of 
domination, a politics of sight that breaches zones of confinement may indeed 
be a critically important catalyst for political transformation. This politics of 
                                                 
686 As Pachirat comments, “distance and concealment shield, sequester, and neutralize the work of 
killing.” Pachirat, Every Twelve Seconds, 9. In his work he discusses four types of distancing 
techniques employed: physical, social, linguistic, and methodological (9). 
687 Linzey and Cohn, “Entitled to Know,” vi. 
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sight, however, must acknowledge the possibility that sequestration will 
continue even under conditions of total visibility. And, it must also remain 
alert to the ways in which distance and concealment provide the historical 
conditions of possibility for its effectiveness.688 
 
Here Pachirat reminds us that although concealment and distance play a key role in 
allowing animal agriculture practices to continue in society relatively unconsidered by 
many, total visibility may not enable the ideological transformation many animal 
advocates wish for. Seeing does not necessarily bring about moral transformation. 
Indeed, in some cases seeing violent acts can either increase insensitivity to violence 
or increase violent acts themselves.689 How the unseen can be brought to light such 
that it produces moral transformation is a key question for animal advocacy. 
Third, retaining the biblical language of sight enables us to ask key theological 
questions that can help guide our moral and theological perception. Let us begin by 
exploring three: (1) Who matters in Gentleness’s sight? (2) Who matters in 
Solidarity’s sight? (3) How do we begin to see with Fraternity in our own context? 
Here follows a tentative attempt to sketch out some potential answers to these 
questions. 
First, in considering the sight of Gentleness, we may begin with God as 
Creator. In Genesis 1, God creates the heavens and the earth, the night and day, the 
water and sky, the land and seas, the plants and trees, the stars, the animals in the seas 
and birds in the sky, the animals on the land, and finally, humans. At the end, “God 
saw all that he had made, and it was very good” (Gen. 1:31; my emphasis). In the 
beginning, then, God created and saw all his creation. In answer to the question “Who 
counts in God’s sight?” we may venture to say, “All of his ‘very good’ creation.” It is 
not merely the humans in the Genesis narrative who are considered “very good” but 
rather “all that he had made.” Of course, this is before the Fall in Genesis, and one 
may not consider the post-Fall creation “very good” in the same way as the Edenic 
paradise. We therefore need to distinguish creation as originally given, which was 
“very good,” from creation subject to the Fall, which should properly be called nature. 
                                                 
688 Pachirat, Every Twelve Seconds, 255. 
689 For reflections on how cultural inequalities affect moral sight in Brazil see, Appendix 9. Naconecy 
argues that “The problem with this [inequalities] is the lack of moral visual sensitivity; you are used to 
seeing violence, inequality and vulnerability, much more than in other countries. This is bad for 
animals.” 
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What God calls “very good” at the end of the first creation saga is a peaceful creation 
wherein every creature has its own place and dignity, with humans made in the image 
of God and holding a vegetarian—vegan, even—dominion over the world. It is when 
these aspects are fulfilled in the sabbath experience that creation is deemed “very 
good.” What is important is that in creation the Triune God creates, sees, and values 
all creatures, not just human creatures. The first challenge of a theology of sight, then, 
is to see ourselves as God does, as one part of her creation. 
Second, in considering who matters in Solidarity’s sight, we may venture to 
answer with liberation theology—the poor and the oppressed. As previously 
discussed, during Jesus’s ministry on the earth, he sought out the poor and the 
marginalised, those who could not speak for themselves. In Matthew 25, we see his 
direct identification with the poor, the sick, the naked, and those in prison: “Truly I 
tell you, whatever you did for one of the least of these brothers and sisters of mine, 
you did for me” (Matt. 25:40). Liberatory theology begins with Jesus, with seeing 
with Jesus: “We see with our eyes the figure of Christ and reread the sacred texts that 
speak of him and had him as a starting point.”690 Thus, the second challenge of a 
theology of sight is to see with Jesus those at the periphery and the margins.  
Third, how do we begin to see with Fraternity in our own context? As Boff 
comments, “the themes and emphases of a given Christology flow from what seems 
relevant to the theologian on the basis of his or her social standpoint. In that sense we 
must maintain that no Christology is or can be neutral.”691 Given that theology is then 
born of a context, the first task of the theologian must be to open her eyes to the 
reality around her, the reality for the marginalised, including the marginalised in 
God’s nonhuman creation. This is possible only with the help of Fraternity guiding 
our sight.692 In terms of animals, we ought to begin first by seeing them as God’s 
creatures and second by seeing the reality of their lives. 
A Triune theology of sight, while an excellent starting point, would be deemed 
insufficient by liberation theologians generally and Boff in particular, for theology 
demands more than perception; it calls for action or praxis. What some of these initial 
                                                 
690 Boff, Jesus Christ Liberator, 43. 
691 Boff, Jesus Christ Liberator, 265. This perspective remains consistent throughout Boff’s corpus: he 
writes with the context as it changes, which is in part what leads him to later write about ecology. 
692 For a discussion of how perception relates to companion animals in Brazil see, Appendix 8. Braga 
Lourenço argues that “We see an abandoned animal and nobody worries about them, it is normal. It’s a 
way of seeing things.” 
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actions might be will be briefly considered in the next subsection, but let us begin by 
truly seeing the reality of animal suffering. 
 
c. A Trinitarian model for our relationships with animals 
The Triune God of Gentleness, Solidarity, and Fraternity wills to be in community 
with creation. God moves outside of the Godhead in creation and communes in, and 
with, that creation. The communal life in creation is willed and sustained by the 
fraternal Spirit that moves within it. This is classically expressed by Saint John of the 
Cross: “To behold [all creatures] and find them very good was to make them very 
good in the Word, His Son.”693 The Triune God makes all creatures good through 
Solidarity. This is not to say that creation is now unambiguously good, which is 
obviously false, as our previous discussions of predation, entropy, and death in the 
natural world illustrate. But with Fraternal guidance and enlightenment, we may move 
closer to communion with creation and with the God who wills and sustains that 
creation. 
 How would it change our way of being in creation if we modelled our 
relationships on a communitarian vision of the Trinity: Gentleness, Solidarity, and 
Fraternity?  
 Saint Francis oriented himself to the world with an attitude of gentleness 
towards all creation, but especially towards the poor and animals. The first step, then, 
is to model our behaviour on Gentleness. Mahatma Gandhi famously argued, “If 
we could change ourselves, the tendencies in the world would also change”694—a 
remark often misquoted as “Be the change you want to see in the world.” We must, 
with the help of Fraternity, begin by examining our attitude to the world and 
reorienting ourselves towards gentleness towards all creation. How would our actions 
in the world change if we began from a place of gentleness? One answer is that this 
reorientation would bring us in closer solidarity and compassion with creation.  
 In the words of Boff and Boff, “underlying liberation theology is a prophetic 
and comradely commitment to the life, cause, and struggle of these millions of 
debased and marginalized human beings, a commitment to ending this historical-
social iniquity.”695 Solidarity with the poor in this context has, in practical terms, 
                                                 
693 John of the Cross, The Completed Works, 48–49; my emphases. 
694 Gandhi, The Collected Works of M. K. Gandhi, vol. 13, ch. 153, 241. 
695 Boff and Boff, Introducing Liberation Theology, 3. 
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entailed living with the poor and struggling alongside them. This is what Boff and 
Boff term “com-passion, ‘suffering with.’”696 The notions of “com-passion” and 
solidarity are borne out of recognition of the massive socio-economic inequalities in 
the world and the dire realities of global poverty. 
Attitudes of compassion and solidarity resonate in the Brazilian 
consciousness. Brazilians, as my interviewees explained, are excellent at coming 
together in a crisis: “When you have great tragedies like flooding, landslides, etc. 
Then you have lots of people losing their houses and dying; then people exist in 
solidarity.”697 Community action in times of difficulty is a uniting force in Brazilian 
culture. It is most often seen in times of human tragedy, but there are also instances of 
solidarity with animals. The largest animal shelter in Rio de Janeiro recently sent out 
a large appeal, and “people donated tons of cat food, dog food, medicine, and 
everything.”698 Actions of solidarity are borne out of an attitude of compassion. As 
Naconecy explained, compassion fits more easily within the Brazilian outlook: “We 
look to the weak in a different way, with a special inclination, so we say ‘poor man’ 
or ‘poor animal.’”699 This is not to say these attitudes are applicable only to the 
Brazilian context; rather, I add this discussion here to demonstrate that given the 
suffusion of liberation theology in Brazil, it may be a good place to start in terms of 
moral concern for creation. 
 What, then, would solidarity with animals look like? It would spring from the 
theology of sight, or from recognising the suffering of billions of animals worldwide. 
However, it would not necessarily require humans to go and live with those oppressed 
animals (although it might be possible to alleviate some animal suffering by sharing 
our homes with uncared-for companion animals). Rather, solidarity begins first with 
the commitment to live less violently and without cruelty, to embody more gentleness 
in our relations with all other beings. Living without violence and cruelty may then be 
seen as an anticipation of and participation in the peaceable kingdom of God. 
  There are steps all of us can take to move towards greater solidarity with 
animals. Linzey has termed this “a program of progressive disengagement from injury 
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697 See Appendix 10. 
698 See Appendix 10. 
699 See Appendix 9. Naconecy argues that “the concepts of compassion and solidarity are more familiar 
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to animals.”700 This programme begins with acknowledgement that the world is in a 
mess: that we are all, wittingly or otherwise, engaged in systems that institutionalise 
the use and abuse of animals. Solidarity begins with committing to taking steps to 
disengage from animal cruelty in our lives. Animals need to be liberated from human 
control, manipulation, aggression, and confinement—indeed, from all practices in 
which animals are used as a means to human ends. If we can take steps to disengage 
from these abusive practices, we can move towards recognising the value of animals 
to the Triune God. 
 If we can embrace gentleness towards and solidarity with animals, then we 
may enter into a genuine fraternity with other members of creation—a fraternity 
based not on exploitation or domination but on gentleness and compassion. If we can 
allow Fraternity to guide us into these new relationships, then we may be able to 
move into closer communion with the Triune God, as we come to see the wonder of 
creation as she does. 
 
7.3. Why animal theology matters in Brazil 
I end where I began, by returning to the context for animals in Brazil. The image of 
the emaciated horse and child on the rubbish heap returns to my mind. Human 
suffering, animal suffering, and environmental degradation are three parts of the same 
problem: a failure to love and care for God’s creation. Poverty and animal suffering 
are not separate issues; rather, they are both examples of the need for moral 
solicitude—for greater gentleness, solidarity, and compassion in the world. 
One might ask, how is any of this relevant to the lives of animals (and people) 
in Brazil? One answer involves acknowledging again the power of Thomistic thought 
as regards animals. In the interviews I conducted, all of the interviewees indicated that 
religious views hold great sway in Brazil in terms of the treatment of animals. I hope 
this has become clear during the contextual discussions in this work. Importantly, 
then, thinkers such as Boff and encyclicals such as Laudato Si’ have the potential to 
make an enormous impact for animals.  
During my trip, I was frequently asked, “Why continue to research religion if 
it is so bad for animals? Why not just forget it?” The answer to that is twofold. First, 
religious attitudes towards animals underpin general ideas about animals. 
                                                 
700 Linzey, Animal Gospel, 86. 
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Instrumentalist and anthropocentric thinking about animals cannot be overcome 
without confronting the underlying Thomistic theology that grounds that thinking. 
Second, as I hope to have shown, Thomism is only one theological interpretation of 
animals. It can, and should, be replaced with a Trinitarian model for understanding 
our relationship with animals: a model based on a Triune God who loves and delights 
in creation, in other sentient beings especially, and who wills to be in communion 
with her creation. Of course, humans cannot do this alone; it is a change that has to be 
willed and enabled by the Triune God. But enabled Fraternity, we may be able to 
grow in greater communion with God’s creation and with God as well. 
 
7.4. An unfinished journey 
I have attempted to sketch the progression of both Boff and the Roman Catholic 
Church in their attitudes to creation. It is remarkable to see the shift that has occurred 
in such a relatively short period of time. However, both journeys are unfinished. 
Though he has acted as a catalyst for greater concern for creation, Boff has yet to 
fully embrace moral solicitude towards animals. Despite the animal agriculture 
industry’s power in Brazil, its contribution to deforestation, and the appalling human 
rights abuses in the industry, Boff has yet to make any sustained theological reflection 
on the moral issue of eating animals. Indeed, he has yet to offer any deep theological 
reflection on the issue of animals, despite the fact that world hunger could be 
dramatically reduced if the world embraced vegetarianism. 
 Arguably, the Catholic Church has gone further than Boff. In Laudato Si’ 
animals are proclaimed to have “intrinsic value,” to give “glory to God,” and to have 
a right to existence. However, Francis has yet to demonstrate any sustained 
theological reflection on the moral status of animals. The Church could make greater 
progress by resolving the tensions that remain in Laudato Si’—namely, the tensions 
between the intrinsic value of animals and the human use of them as resources. In 
addition, a thorough consideration of the moral problem posed by animal suffering 
would advance theological thought in this area. To aid this theological thinking, still 
more inspiration can be taken from the model of Saint Francis to help restore our 
relationship with creation and animals.  
Of course, change is slow, and moral change is the slowest of all. What is 
important is that we are hopefully on the path to change, and Boff has helped us make 
it here. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusions 
 
This thesis has sought to develop animal theology through an engagement with Boff’s 
liberation and ecological theology. I hope to have found new insights in Boff’s work 
that help to build a fully satisfying theology of sentient creation, building on the 
foundational insights of animal theology explored in chapter one. I posed three 
methodological questions throughout the thesis: 
1. What, if any, consideration does Boff give to animals as a theological 
concern?   
2. What aspects, if any, of his theology could help the development of animal 
theology? 
3. Has his theology been a catalyst for greater concern for animals in the 
Roman Catholic Church? 
The chapters of the thesis have explored the following in answer to the above 
questions. In chapter one, I outlined the foundational insights of animal theology and 
provided a methodology and overview of the thesis. In chapter two, I explored Boff’s 
context, the place of animals in Catholic thought and Brazil. Chapter three focused on 
the place of animals in his liberation theology and considered ways in which it could 
become more animal-friendly. Chapter four considered his work Francis, especially 
his neglect of concern for animals in the example of Saint Francis. It suggested ways 
in which Saint Francis’ care for creation, and especially animals, could be 
incorporated into Boff’s thought.  
The fifth chapter explored Boff’s turn towards ecological theology. It argued 
that Boff is overly dependent on the concept of ecology and resulting holism, such 
that the importance of individual animals is ignored. It concluded that Boff does not 
include concern for animals within his moral vision, perhaps because ecology itself is 
not concerned for the suffering and death of individual animals.  
Chapter six considered the teachings of the Catholic Church on animals since 
Vatican II. It demonstrated how far the Church has moved in including concern for 
animals within its teachings. It argues that Boff has been a catalyst for greater concern 
for the poor and the environment. These ideas, however unacknowledged, now 
occupy a central place in Catholic moral theology through Francis’ Laudato Si’. The 
central conclusion of this thesis is that Boff’s ecological theology has formed part of 
an intellectual milieu that has helped move the Catholic Church towards greater 
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concern for the poor, the environment, and even animals. Although Boff’s own 
theology remains insufficiently attentive to the animal issue, perhaps paradoxically, 
he has been a catalyst for more creation-friendly, and even animal-friendly, thought 
within the Church. 
In chapter seven, I offered some original theology, inspired by my engagement 
with Boff. It suggested reconceiving of the Trinity in terms of Gentleness, Solidarity 
and Fraternity. Then I developed three of his ideas – communion as being “for” 
creation, entering the Triune sight, and a Trinitarian model for our relationships with 
animals – to suggest a more creation-friendly and animal-friendly reconstruction of 
his work. 
 
8.1. An Agenda for the Future 
Further avenues for research in this area could address four areas. First, an exploration 
into the place of animals in Brazil’s other religious traditions could be undertaken. 
Although Catholicism is still the largest religion in Brazil, there is a great deal of 
cultural exchange between the other smaller Christian denominations and other 
religions, for instance, Protestants, Mormons, and Spiritualists. For example, during 
my research trip, I was asked about the practice of animal sacrifice that still continues 
in Brazil.701 Research into the theologies that support the use of animals in sacrifice 
could help illuminate the reasons behind its enduring practice.  
 Second, further research could be undertaken to explore the ways in which 
Laudato Si’ is being received in Brazil. Although it is clear that the encyclical is 
having an impact in the academic community, it would be interesting to explore what 
impact it might be having within congregations. One way to explore this would be to 
conduct some fieldwork in Brazil within different religious communities and to assess 
what meaningful impact the encyclical is having. 
 Third, in terms of the animal movement, Brazil is undergoing a shift in its 
understanding of animals, evidenced by the rise of vegetarian and vegan businesses 
and changing laws on animal related practices. Because of this, Brazil would make an 
interesting case study to explore shifting cultural norms in relation to animals. For 
instance, Brazil has a complex situation regarding companion animals. They are kept 
not only in domestic arrangements, but also they exist in liminal spaces, such as 
                                                 
701 For a discussion of this in relation to cats, see appendix 10. 
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parks, and are cared for by groups dedicated to their welfare (such as Felinos du 
Campos at PUC).702 Further interviews could be conducted with people within 
Brazil’s animal movement to understand the changing perception of animals, the 
obstacles still remaining, and the further opportunities for deepening moral concern 
for animals. As regards the Church in Brazil, animals are currently a non-issue, but it 
is not inconceivable that Laudato Si’ might at least help put animals on the 
theological agenda alongside concern for the human poor, and the environment. 
 Fourth, there is still a great deal more to be done in developing animal 
theology. Specifically in depth work in the areas of Christology, redemption and 
soteriology should be undertaken to consider ways in which the Christian faith can 
become less anthropocentric, and more inclusive of all of God’s creation, especially 
animals. 
  
                                                 
702 For a discussion of issues surrounding companion animals, see Appendix 8.  
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Appendix 1. Questions to Professor Leonardo Boff  
 
Questions in English and below in Portuguese as they were sent to Professor Boff. 
 
1. As you know, Vatican II said virtually nothing about care for creation, and yet now 
we have a major papal encyclical on our responsibility for creation. Are you gratified 
by this change of direction in the Catholic Church? 
 
1. Como o senhor sabe, o Vaticano II não disse praticamente nada a respeito do 
cuidado pela criação e, no entanto, agora nós temos uma importante encíclica papal 
sobre nossa a responsabilidade pela criação. O senhor está satisfeito com essa 
mudança de direção na Igreja Católica? 
 
2. Not all liberation theologians have turned their attention to eco-theology, what 
specifically made you move in this direction? 
 
2. Nem todos os teólogos da libertação voltaram sua atenção para a ecoteologia. O 
que especificamente fez o senhor virar para essa direção? 
 
3. Is there anything specific about the Brazilian context that should necessitate care 
for creation? 
 
3. Há algo específico ao contexto brasileiro que deveria demandar o cuidado pela 
criação? 
 
4. Your work is rightly critical of the way humans use and abuse the earth, does that 
extend to humanity’s use of animals? 
 
4. Seu trabalho, com toda razão, critica o modo pelo qual os humanos usam e 
abusam da Terra. Isso se estende ao uso dos animais por parte da humanidade? 
 
5. You are one of the very few liberation theologians who write about the rights of 
animals. What sort of rights do you think animals have? 
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5. O senhor é um dos poucos teólogos da libertação que escrevem sobre os direitos 
dos animais. Que tipos de direitos o senhor acha que os animais têm? 
 
6. You write about the need for humanity to address climate change.  Given that 
animal agriculture is one of the main causes of climate change, do you think humanity 
needs to change what it eats? 
 
6. O senhor escreve sobre a necessidade da humanidade em tratar das mudanças 
climáticas. Dado que a pecuária é uma das principais causas das mudanças 
climáticas, o senhor acha que a humanidade precisa mudar o que ela come? 
 
7. Your writing often distances itself from the scholastic tradition, in favour of a more 
Latin American approach, yet you seem to implicitly accept a Thomistic version of 
rational hierarchy within your work, why? 
 
7. Frequentemente, seus escritos se distanciam da tradição escolástica em favor de 
uma abordagem mais latino-americana, no entanto, em sua obra, o senhor parece 
aceitar implicitamente uma versão tomista da hierarquia racional. Por quê? 
 
8. How do you see the relationship, if any, between eco / liberation theology and 
animal theology? 
 
8. Como o senhor vê a relação, se é que há alguma, entre a ecoteologia / teologia da 
libertação e a teologia animal? 
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Appendix 2. Sample Interview Questions 
 
Below is a list of sample questions used as a starting point for the interviews. Not all 
questions were asked to all interviewees, rather they were selected based on their 
expertise. 
 
1. What do you think liberation theology has to say on the subject of animals? 
 
2. Why is liberation theology important in the animal context in Brazil? 
 
3. Why do you think liberation theology in general has been slow to embrace 
animals? 
 
4. Is liberation theology still important for Brazil today? 
 
5. What influence, if any, has Leonardo Boff had on your work [in relation to 
liberation theology, the environment, or animals respectively]? 
 
6. What are the main challenges for the animal movement in Brazil at the moment? 
 
7. What successes has the animal movement achieved in Brazil so far? 
 
8. Brazil is the largest Catholic country in the world. How has Catholicism affected 
the animal movement in Brazil? 
 
9. There is a strong environmental movement in Brazil, has this helped the animal 
movement? 
 
10. How do you see the future of the animal movement in Brazil? 
 
11. How do you see the relationship between the poor and the environment in Brazil? 
 
12. How is Laudato Si’ being received in Brazil? 
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Appendix 3. Excerpts from Professor Luiz Carlos Susin Interview 
 
September 12, 2016 
Porto Alegre, Brazil 
 
Q: Please can you explain your intellectual movement from liberation theology, to 
ecological theology, to animal theology.  
 
We have gradually, softly moved our position and conviction to pass anthropocentric 
ideas to ecological thinking, and now to see that animals are the relationship in the 
centre of this. It was for us a slow movement this way. It began with the challenge 
from vegetarian and vegan students. On a research trip to the United States in 2011, I 
began to read [Andrew] Linzey and to look at the animal issue.   
 
In the Catholic Church, it is very strange for a theologian in the tradition of liberation 
to invest some thought on the issue of animals. So I read Linzey to help explain this 
path of conversion. 
 
Q: Why is it strange for liberation theologians to consider animals? 
 
Because liberation theology began also with an anthropocentric vision. Now it has 
moved not just to consider social questions, but also gender and ecology. But it is 
slow to embrace animal theology. 
 
Q: Do you think Francis’ pontificate is a turning point for animals in the Catholic 
Church? 
 
In the document Laudato Si’ he wrote some things about animals, but it is not 
sufficient. Our critique is in the same direction as Linzey because there is a 
contradiction. This contradiction remains in the official Catechism because, on the 
one hand, animals are creatures of God who have inherent value, not just value for 
human use. But on the other hand, there is also the tradition of animals being there for 
our use, for clothes, shoes, food. This is a contradiction that is not deeply reflected 
upon. Pope Francis speaks about the preoccupation with the possibility of extinction. 
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Here the animal is considered as a species, not in terms of its own individual life. This 
is an important distinction; all individual life is important. This is an important lesson 
from your father to me. I use the rights language of Linzey to bring liberation 
theology something more in this direction. 
 
Q: In terms of the Brazilian context, what are the challenges for animals here? Or 
what are the challenges in Brazil for people having a better relationship with animals 
here? 
 
Concrete challenges in Brazil. We have a big crisis here, because the exportation of 
meat is the most important export in our economy. Meat is very important 
economically, and it is the centre of our international commerce. The production of 
meat is linked to the problem of environment. We need food for animals, and so there 
is a lot of deforestation. There is a culture of meat. For example, here in the south of 
Brazil we have the culture of the gaucho. Gaucho is a traditional figure here and in 
the north of Argentina—the gaucho’s clothes are typical in these regions. There is 
also churrasco—cowboy culture. Meat is fundamental for feasts and celebrations—
without meat it seems we cannot celebrate. It is a culture of meat. It is a very wide 
problem. 
 
Q: You were first an ecological theologian. Many people see a tension between 
ecological theology and animal theology, do you see the tension? Ecology focuses on 
the whole, the ecosystem, but not the individual species. Did ecological theology help 
you embrace animal theology or not? 
 
It is a problem because, for example, when we approach ecology with holistic 
categories, it is not easy to arrive at the individual, to the fragile individual life. It is 
possible, but it is easier to remain in the bigger categories of the whole. And Leonardo 
[Boff] began with the holistic. As a Franciscan, he knows well the tradition of respect 
for individual life, but it is not sufficiently clear. 
 
Q: How do you see Boff’s work relating to your work? 
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I was a student of Leonardo’s, he was a young professor, and after we worked 
together. And now, we meet two or three times a year, we meet as a group of 
theologians in Rio de Janeiro. Then we speak about the situation, about the churches. 
I know well his work and I presented to him our book last year. We have 
collaboration. 
 
Q: What does Boff think of your book? Is he receptive? 
 
Yes, yes.  
  
Q: Do you think Boff is open to the idea of animals? 
 
He is open. I think he can go in this direction. In his theology he is a creator of 
sensibility, he has the possibility to feel more towards animal life. 
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Appendix 4. Excerpts from Professor Jung Mo Sung Interview 
 
September 15, 2016 
São Paulo, Brazil 
 
Q: Do you think Boff’s theology has room to embrace animals? 
 
A: The one problem I have with Leonardo Boff [is that] he has a notion of totality that 
has no internal distinction. Every part of the holistic world has the same rights and 
there is no priority. Priority depends only on what is the most important at that time. 
Since there is no priority you cannot create political action, because you cannot do 
everything at the same time … There is a direct tension between what is possible and 
what is desirable.   
 
I don’t think that Leonardo Boff can help you because he does not distinguish 
between cosmos, galaxies, and concrete persons. He is influenced by Teilhard de 
Chardin’s mystic view of the world. This is good for a romantic vision because we are 
all part of the universe and the energy of the universe and the experience of the 
universe. According to this view, God leads us into the Christification of the cosmos. 
In that case, why do I need to worry about this? Everything is set. God has planned 
everything. At same time, Boff says “if you don’t do anything, don’t change, the 
world will go into chaos situation.” Is God in control or not of the evolution of the 
world?  Boff is always moving between these two contradictory ideas. We need to go 
further. We need a new vision of totality that includes everything but has internal 
distinction in relationship. You have to understand what is the most important 
relationship and what is the least. Leonardo would say, “we are all connected.” Yes, 
but what happens now in a star that is ten million light years from us? I don’t care 
because this doesn’t affect us and I will be dead ten million years from now. The 
whole human species will not be here anymore. We need to make distinctions within 
the universe.   
 
Maybe there is something that can be helpful in Laudato Si’. I think in terms of 
ecology it is nothing new, but it is new for the Christian Church. There is something 
new, a new ontology: Everything is in relationship. This is a new ontology that there 
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is no individual substance that can stand by itself, that everything is in relationship. 
This is a good idea as an alliance is created in the notion of life. Within life there are 
distinctions of levels, for instance, distinctions between vegetable life and human life. 
Leonardo used to say that, I am not sure if he still does, that all life is sacred. But if it 
is right, I cannot struggle against bacteria that can kill someone. Life is important but 
we have to establish distinction. You have to use biology and other sciences. 
 
Q: Boff and the pope are clear about the relationship between climate change and 
poverty, that it has an adverse effect on the poor. What are your thoughts on this? 
 
A: It is important to distinguish between Boff and Pope Francis. Leonardo Boff, and 
others focused on ecology, say that poor people will be the most affected by climate 
change. But the pope says that climate change and poverty are created by the same 
process. It is not only about the consequences. So we cannot solve the climate change 
problem without solving the problem of poverty because the source is the same. So 
the problem with Al Gore’s solution to the ecological problem is that it would 
potentially solve the climate change problem without solving the problem of poverty 
and social exclusion. Because for them, that is not their problem. Their problem is the 
sustainability of their life, their style of life, their group. Not other groups. That kind 
of change is not possible because climate change is produced by capitalist society, 
which at the same time produces poverty and exclusion. This is something that 
Leonardo Boff does not see, the economics behind the climate change, he does not 
analyse this. 
 
Chapter five of Boff’s Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor is on liberation theology and 
equality. If you take this chapter out, the whole book is based in first world theology 
and theories on ecology. The logic is human beings against nature. It is a critique of 
anthropocentrism. When he tries to discuss ecology and liberation theology he 
focuses on capitalism, in chapter five. He criticizes capitalism, using Latin-American 
liberation theology, as a system that kills millions of people in the name of the 
accumulation of capital. Then it is not anthropocentric, it is capital-centric or market-
centric. Chapter five speaks of how capitalist society kills poor people and because of 
that you have to listen to the cry of the earth and the cry of the poor people. But he 
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cannot see that he is using not only different, but opposite theories, in relation to 
ecology. So he has two books in one. 
 
Q: I heard that Pope Francis has read Leonardo Boff’s ecological work. 
 
A: Yes, but I don’t see Leonardo Boff’s theology in Pope Francis’ work. The basic, 
God is in favour of the poor, yes. But money as idolatry is not present in Leonardo 
Boff. It is not Leonardo Boff’s theology. 
 
Q: Yes, I agree Pope Francis’ encyclical goes beyond Leonardo Boff’s work. 
 
A: Not only beyond it, it is different. The idea is that poverty and ecology are created 
by capitalism. He talks about the spirit of economics. This is liberation theology. This 
is theological critique of economics.  
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Appendix 5. Excerpts from Professor Claudio de Oliveira Ribeiro Interview 
 
September 15, 2016 
São Paulo, Brazil 
 
General discussion and introduction 
 
Claudio: I organised a book with Protestant views on leadership in Brazil about 
Laudato Si’. I published an article by Olav Fykse Tveit, who is the general secretary 
of the World Congress of Churches (WCC), with other people from Brazil—
Methodists, Lutherans, Pentecostals and Baptists. Everybody is talking about the 
encyclical, from the ecumenical perspective and on the ecological issues. 
 
Q: How do you think Laudato Si’ is being received generally in Brazil? 
 
A: The good reception is linked to the good view among Protestant groups about Pope 
Francis. Since the beginning of his papacy, many church leaders here are excited to 
see what is going to happen in the Catholic Church with his ecumenical openness. 
Because of this some groups are trying to follow their lead. So in the case of Laudato 
Si’ this is important. In Pope Francis’s first encyclical there is a special section on 
economy and theology. It is very similar to liberation theology. It is the same with 
Ladauto Si’, there are many overlapping concerns, of course the encyclical is not a 
part of liberation theology, but there are many aspects that we can see are linked. 
 
Q: How do you see liberation theology in Brazil now? 
 
A: Many people do not know what liberation theology means, they may have heard 
about it, but if you ask them they either don’t know anything or they only know a few 
things about liberation theology. … many people are [now] asking about liberation 
theology. They know for example Leonardo Boff because he has a public presence in 
television and the internet, but maybe only Boff. Young people do not know for 
example that there are thousands of people who in the last five decades are working 
very hard in liberation theology—working hard, publishing books, trying to reflect.  
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Appendix 6. Excerpts from Dr Carlos Frederico Ramos de Jesus Interview 
 
September 18, 2016 
São Paulo, Brazil 
 
Q: How do you see the animal movement as it stands in Brazil? 
 
A: Brazil has a very meat-centred culture, our culture has many events concerning 
meat, so the rodeo, the churrasco—the barbeque—which is very popular, so it is not 
exactly an ideal place for animal rights because meat is very entrenched in society. 
But lately there has been an increase in people wanting to know about vegetarianism 
and veganism, and the animal rights issue has begun to gather momentum in the 
media, and in the judicial system. For example, the rodeo, the kind of rodeo we call 
vaquejada (we have the regular rodeo as well). This ability rodeo called vaquejada is 
under consideration by the Supreme Court because many states have brought in laws 
to consider whether it can be considered a cultural heritage. These laws have been 
questioned in the Supreme Court and we are awaiting the judgement, the court is 
currently tied four to four. So the court is considering whether those laws are 
unconstitutional—whether it violates the Brazilian constitution, specifically the clause 
that prohibits cruelty to animals. If they decide it is unconstitutional, then it will 
become illegal, as we can’t have a cultural heritage that condones cruelty to animals. 
It could be considered against the spirit and the letter of the Brazilian constitution, and 
if it is it would be a good victory for the animal rights movement.  
 
Q: What stage of the process is the Supreme Court in with the vaquejada decision?  
When can we expect a final decision? 
 
A: It is already in the final decision stage, and it is tied four to four and three Justices 
are still to vote. One of the Justices has suspended the process to consider the issue 
further, and probably in this semester they will un-suspend the process and the three 
remaining Justices will vote. It is really unclear how these three judges will vote. One 
of them will probably be against vaquejada, but the other two it is still unclear. So it 
is very suspenseful. Previously the Supreme Court had prohibited state laws about 
cock fighting, and they also prohibited state laws on another animal issue. I think the 
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pro-animal Brazilians expected this rodeo ruling to be easier because there are these 
precedents in the Supreme Court regarding cock fighting, and it is essentially very 
similar. But it is said that in the rodeo, vaquejada, there is not as much cruelty as cock 
fighting, which is arguable, because the oxen usually do not die after vaquejada, but 
they might, because they are pulled by their tail to make them fall. It usually does hurt 
them, but it might not kill them, like it does with the cocks in cock fighting. But it 
certainly hurts, and our constitution forbids cruelty to animals. It should be the same 
grounds, but it seems like things may not be as easy in this case. 
 
Update [added by interviewee]: Supreme Court has deemed vaquejada 
unconstitutional, by 6-5. Congress has enacted a constitutional amendment, trying to 
protect vaquejada. The amendment protects social practices with animals which, 
among other requirements, are considered a cultural heritage. This amendment is 
under scrutiny in the Supreme Court. 
 
Q: Are there any precedents for winning this kind of case on the basis of cultural 
heritage? 
 
A: No. That is quite new. The argument that cock fighting was considered a cultural 
heritage was not even considered by the court as it was considered too cruel. This 
rodeo is a bit less cruel, so people think that perhaps it can be considered a cultural 
heritage. We know that this is not the case, but the Justices are considering it. 
 
Q: Animal law in Brazil seems to be a growing movement, when did animal law begin 
here and how do you understand its growth?  
 
A: I would say it has been a topic for discussion in the last ten to five years. Before 
this there were some researchers who cared about animal law, but there weren’t as 
many people studying animal law as there are now. Our first important animal law 
dates back to 1934. It was a really progressive law in the context of the time in which 
it was created because it gave animals standing in justice. Up until then animals did 
not have standing in justice, but this law gave them that. There is a great debate about 
this law and whether it was in keeping with our constitution. But the real concern in 
society and in the university about animal law, with researchers writing pieces on the 
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issue, this has only happened in the last ten or five years. There was a habeas corpus 
case in 2005, when a prosecutor from Bahia, Heron de Santana Gordilho (an animal 
rights professor and researcher) sued for habeas corpus in favour of a chimp. The 
habeas was accepted but not judged because the chimp died in the middle of the 
process. I believe that was really the first time an animal issue had become a matter of 
such large national interest. It was in every newspaper. Some people said this was 
ridiculous, habeas corpus for a chimp, and some thought he has a point because the 
chimp is really suffering in that cage. So in recent times, it was the first time. Even 
though there are many other researchers before Professor de Santana, Sonia Felipe 
from Santa Catarina, for example, started researching this issue of habeas corpus in 
the 1980’s and 1990’s. But the question has grown in importance in the last ten or five 
years. There are many people writing about this now, which is really exciting. 
 
Q: Is the link between eating meat and climate change being made in Brazil and if not 
why do you think not? 
 
A: Not at all. People see the agro-business as a source of revenue, even though there 
might be cruelty to animals in the agro-business. There was recent footage in farms 
that sells meat to the two main agro-business companies in Brazil, which are JBS and 
Friboi. This footage showed cruelty to animals and that the agricultural ministry 
recommendations are not followed on their farms. These recommendations do not 
deliver high animal welfare standards. But even when it is clear the standards are not 
being met, people mostly see that this is an important economic activity, which should 
be helped, especially in a time of crisis. You can’t get rid of agro-business. This was 
really strong even in Dilma Rousseff’s government, and Rousseff is undoubtedly 
centre leftist. But she had as her agricultural minister, one of the biggest agro-business 
women in Brazil, Katia Abreu. She was the president of the agro-business association 
in Brazil before she became a minister. Ironically she was one of the most loyal allies 
of Rousseff, she was with her until the last vote, when Rousseff was impeached 
(Katia Abreu is also a senator). So it is really bad, that not even the left sees the agro-
business, and the scale of it, as something dangerous for the survival of the planet and 
the environment. One of the ministers of India, I don’t remember her name, but she 
was very active in environmental law. I saw her speak at an animal rights congress, 
and she said, “when we talk about animals, we are not talking about love for animals 
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necessarily, but we are talking about us. If we treat animals badly, if we continue to 
breed animals for agro-business without necessity because we don’t need to eat them 
to survive, the world will be a much worse place in a very short period of time.” Of 
course, I think when we are thinking about animals we are thinking about them as 
well, but politically that discourse makes sense. But few people think this way in 
Brazil. Only some more leftist parties have a point of not accepting donations from 
agro-business people. But even the environmental party—Marina Silva, even her, she 
is very closely connected to the agro-business. She is not as connected as the other 
two parties, the labour party and the social democrat party, but she is also connected. 
In the last elections, even her government proposal did not have much about animals. 
The three main candidates did not say a word about animals. It is very sad. 
 
Q: Please can you say a little more about the power of the agro-business in Brazil. 
 
A: The agro-business is very strong. The last point demonstrates their power. In a 
centre-leftist government the agricultural minister and senator, used to be president of 
the agro-business association. So already their power is clear. In the last campaign, 
they were one of the largest donors for the two main candidates for president, 
Rousseff and Neves (from the social democrat party, Cardoso´s party). So they retain 
their power no matter who wins, because they give money to everyone. Now 
hopefully, it should be modified because firms have now been prohibited from 
donating to candidates, only individual persons can do this. We are seeing now in the 
mayoral election that people who own firms are giving large donations. So it has 
improved a little bit, but they still have financial influence on candidates.  
 
The agro-business has started a massive media campaign claiming that meat is 
necessary, meat is good, that everyone should eat meat. They have hired many 
popular actors, actresses, singers—some of them were even vegetarian before—and 
they have paid them to taste meat and say how delicious it is. I don’t remember 
having such advertising for meat on television before. The three and a half leftist 
governments we have had, they have spent public money from our development 
public bank (BNDES) to increase their activities to be “national champions” to export 
meat all over the world. So Brazil can become a standard for meat in the export 
industry. Public money is being directed (because money from the public 
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development bank is public) and given to these industries at a very low interest rate, 
for them to create great exports for Brazil. But they are consuming something that we 
cannot necessarily refuel—water, trees, and the suffering of animals and workers 
involved in the production. There is a recent documentary about the poor labour 
conditions in these industries. It is bad for humans, bad for animals, bad for everyone. 
Nonetheless they are very powerful. Every government thinks that they should give 
these industries a central role in our economy. I don’t think that any of them are 
thinking about animal rights, or even environmental rights. It is really a distant 
thought. Civil society has many good movements on these issues, but it has not 
entered the hard core of politics, except for some sparse laws. 
 
Q: Brazil is the largest Catholic country in the world. What relationship does 
Catholicism have to animals here? And do you think that has a general influence on 
ideas about animals? 
 
A: People here usually do not relate Catholicism and the protection of animals. People 
do not see it that way, even though they should. It is really divorced. The dominant 
idea is of man having dominion, and “might means right” dominion, not a purely 
functional dominion. So the lessons of love of Catholic writings and the Bible do not 
have a decisive influence in terms of encouraging people to treat animals better. I 
believe that they are against direct cruelty, but eating meat is fine. In my LGBT 
Catholic group, I know only one who is vegetarian. So even those who think I should 
study animal rights, who see that it is important, they still eat meat. It is not surprising 
because it is so entrenched in the culture. I have heard all the arguments for eating 
animals as a Catholic-based permission. One friend of mine told me, “but Jesus ate 
fish, and even multiplied the fish, and that is why we can eat animals.” I replied: “but 
the context is so different. The fish were already dead, and there were five thousand 
people to be fed. What they had was fish and bread, which are symbols of food.” So it 
is not really a permission. The other parts of the Bible are much more emphatic in 
favour of respecting animals. For me it is very simple, if we do not need them, we 
should not use them. If we need it okay, and if we happen to live in a forest in a very 
exceptional situation, we should do it. But if we don’t need to, which is really the 
common situation, we should not cause damage to them. But this connection is really 
not present. In the last papal encyclical there were some good parts on the 
 198 
environment and on animals. Some friends in my LGBT group, they read and they 
told me: “there is something interesting here for you.” The pope is also worried about 
animals and the environment, so that is good. So perhaps if Pope Francis, or if the 
next pope continues his line of thought, maybe there will be greater Catholic concern 
for this. But even people in the Catholic Church who are worried about the 
environment and environmental law—and there are many; it is very present in the 
Brazilian Catholic Church—they are concerned with animals as part of the 
environment, not the animals in themselves. 
 
Q: How much influence does Leonardo Boff, as a public figure, have in terms of ideas 
on the environment and animals? 
 
A: I have seen many people talking about Leonardo Boff, and some interviews with 
him in papers. I have never really read Boff, but I know that he is a big influence. But 
I sense, at least amongst my Catholic friends, they see Boff as a political religious 
leader: a religious man who has inspired a political approach to religion. A religion-
based approach to the political. In that sense he is seen as different from the 
traditional positions. Boff is seen as advancing a duty to fight inequality, to fight 
dictatorships, to fight every kind of oppression, as a Catholic or Christian duty. My 
friends see Boff in this way. As one who regained the original sense of Christianity as 
not only a spiritual religion, but a spiritual religion with a political message, so the 
political cannot be separated from the religious. But on the environment and on 
animals, I have not heard them talk about his views. That is why your research is 
important, as it will make this connection, which is needed and perhaps Boff will see 
it as a continuation of his thought. It is a logical continuation of liberation theology as 
animal rights are a logical continuation of human rights. 
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Appendix 7. Excerpts from Dr Bruno Garrote Interview 
 
January 18, 2017 
By email 
 
Q: What are the main challenges for the animal movement in Brazil at the moment? 
 
A: The agribusiness is one of the great resources of the wealthy in Brazil. It has an 
enormous power, not only with the media, but actually in our legislative and 
executive powers. Most people elected have connections with agribusiness. They are 
owners of some company, or large portions of land, or indirectly were financed by 
agribusiness—it is scary. So a lot of laws are made to protect them, to provide legal 
protection and subsidies, and tax facilitations (e.g. paying less for water 
consumption). In Brazil there is a BBB happening nowadays in the legislative branch 
of government specifically. These are the 3Bs: Boi, Bala and Bíblia (cattle/bull, bullet 
and Bible, respectively). These people and their influences usually come together here 
in Brazil.  
 
So, another challenge is to get people elected that are more concerned with animal 
movement issues. There are already a few, but the financial investment to become a 
politician in Brazil is high. 
 
Q: Brazil is the largest Catholic country in the world, how has Catholicism affected 
the animal movement in Brazil? 
 
A: As I said, in our legislative power, usually the politicians linked with cattle, bullet 
and Bible work together. So this is already a big thing. Besides that, I don’t think we 
have had (yet!) a strong speech or position from priests in favour of the animal 
movement. I have already talked to some Catholic people who say that the Bible says 
that animals are inferior to men, and we shall rule and, therefore, may eat them etc. 
Maybe that is in the Brazilian collective subconscious and may impact upon some 
prejudice against vegetarianism as a whole, but that is not usually explicit. But we 
really have a strong idea that eating meat is a sign of health and wealth here in Brazil. 
The poor are happy when they have money to buy meat of better quality or even buy 
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meat at all. And when they say “meat” here in Brazil they mean “red meat”, which is 
more expensive than chicken (not everyone here likes to eat fish, specially when you 
are not from a beach or river region).  
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Appendix 8. Excerpts from Professor Daniel Braga Lourenço Interview 
 
September 21, 2016 
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 
 
Q: How do you see the state of the animal movement in Brazil at the moment? 
 
A: Like the Bryan Adam’s song—we are young, wild, and free. We are really young 
in the sense that we are immature, we have only existed for a short period of time. I 
would say that animal activism really started in the 90’s in Brazil. Of course there 
have always been people concerned about animals. But as a movement, I would say 
that we really started in the 90s. So we are a new thing, and new things generate good 
and bad things. We have energy. Some people have time. But they don’t have the 
resources, and they don’t usually have the information on how to act and react to the 
problems. 
 
For instance, to give you a sense about Brazilian reality in terms of the law, which is 
mainly my field. In the UK the first law concerning animals was the Martin’s Act in 
1822 (something like that). Here in Brazil the first federal law concerning animals, for 
all Brazilian territories, was only passed in 1934. So you see there is a gap of more 
than a hundred years in terms of the difference in the movement. And so that 
reinforces my sense that we are very new to the field, even in the legal sense of 
protecting animals against cruelty. The first animal association here in Brazil was 
formed in 1895, while in the UK it much earlier with the SPCA in 1824. It is called 
UIPA, the International Union for the Protection of Animals. It still exists in São 
Paulo. It is an important organisation. These are just some things to demonstrate how 
we are still young to the issue of animal protection. 
 
For example, the main references on animal ethics, like Andrew Linzey, Tom Regan, 
Steve Sapontzis, we don’t have them all translated into Portuguese. So that is a huge 
problem in terms of information. There is a big gap, and many people who are 
activists don’t think it is important to study the issue. They think it is important to act. 
This is a worldwide problem, but here it is very intense. We need to act, but we also 
need to think strategically, and reflect on how to act to get the best results. People 
 202 
don’t have access to that material. For instance, Peter Singer’s book Animal 
Liberation was published in 1975 [in English]. Here it was published in 2004. It is 
almost forty years late, and so the discussion is late. We are still beginning to read 
those works. So that reflects on how we are immature. We haven’t had the time to 
digest all that information on the complex issues. The fact of that immaturity makes 
the debate on animal welfare and animal rights behind in Brazil. 
 
Q: What are the challenges for the animal movement in Brazil? 
 
We are a big country, as you know, and that is a problem because we are very diverse. 
The south of Brazil, is not very far away, but still it has some traditions that are 
different from São Paulo and Rio. As São Paulo and Rio are different from the north 
of Brazil, and the north east of Brazil. So each part of Brazil has its particular 
problems, specific animal problems. For example, the Amazon jungle has specific 
wildlife problems. The north east of Brazil has some animal husbandry traditions that 
are problematic, like the vaquejada, which the Supreme Court is currently deciding if 
it is against our constitution or not. We had a problem in the nineties’s in the south 
part of Brazil, they had the tradition of the farra do boi. It is a cultural tradition 
mainly brought to Brazil by people who emigrated from Portugal that has a religious 
aspect. They call it malhação do Judas (Judas party). Some communities have the 
symbolic tradition of, at particular times of the year, making a doll that represents 
Judas. Then they go with sticks and beat Judas. So in the south part of Brazil, instead 
of a doll they would use a cow. They would place a cow in the streets, and people 
would start chasing the cow, and throwing stones at the cow, cutting the cow until the 
cow dies very painfully. It is similar to Spanish blood fiestas. Our Supreme Court said 
it was against the constitution to do this. It was a big decision in terms of cultural 
heritage. It was a good decision for the animals. But now we are facing the 
vaquejada, which is a little different, but the decision is not made. It is currently tied 
with four judges saying it is okay, and four saying it is not okay. And there are just 
three judges left to give their opinion. 
 
So each part of Brazil has its own problems. Here in São Paulo and Rio we have a lot 
of problems relative to animals inside the cities, stray cats, stray dogs. We have a lot 
of places with feral cats and feral dogs. The forest of Tijuca has a problem with feral 
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dogs. We have a lot of problems relative to using horses for work and carrying. In 
some parts of the city they still use horses. The favelas use a lot of horses, including 
the drug dealers. 
 
Q: Can you say more about how you see those problems with the stray cats and dogs? 
 
A: There’s a big cultural problem relative to slavery—this is connected to that. 
Slavery was abolished in Brazil in 1888. It’s historically yesterday. In that sense, (of 
course this is a very broad statement) the Brazilian people are used to violence in 
slavery. We had slaves only very recently, so in that sense, violence to animals is 
more acceptable perhaps in comparison to other societies that have abandoned slavery 
a long time ago. It’s not the only justification of course, but that is an interesting 
issue. For example, in Brazil there are a lot of people who work inside the house, who 
are domestic employees. We still have a system here, that is not slavery as they work 
and receive salaries, but there is a culture of service and we are used to that. So when 
we use an animal to transport things, it is more natural to us. We see an abandoned 
animal and nobody worries about them, it is normal. It’s a way of seeing things. 
 
Another problem is poverty. We are a poor country and of course we don’t have the 
resources and political agenda to do good things for animals or to deal with the 
problem. For instance, we don’t have public shelters, so whenever anyone tries to deal 
with the problem they have to bring the animal to their home. If it is one cat or one 
dog, yes we can handle that, but with a big problem it is more difficult. Where are the 
animals going to go? And here in Rio we have a private association called SUIPA. It 
is similar to the São Paulo organisation (UIPA). It is a very old important animal 
protection association and it is the biggest here in Rio. It is very sad as it has become 
a deposit of animals and the association doesn’t really have the money to take good 
care of the animals. So the animals fight, eat themselves, have diseases that spread 
and so on. I went there five times and then I decided not to go again as it is really 
depressing. Perhaps, sometimes I think it would be better for the animals to stay on 
the streets. It is really incredible that we don’t have a serious public policy to deal 
with the problem. The animal issue from the political parties it is a minor question. 
Nowadays politicians are starting to see that many people worry about the problem, 
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and there are some politicians that use that to capitalise on votes. But they are not 
really worried about the problem. 
 
Q: Are the animal shelters here kill shelters? 
 
A: No. There is a clear statement from SUIPA that they don’t kill the animals. They 
only kill for euthanasia if an animal is very sick. But if they are not adopted for one 
month, one year, two years, they are still there. They just live in bad conditions. 
 
Q: Could you tell me a little bit about the relationship between animal ethics and 
environmental ethics?  
 
A: There is a debate about whether animal ethics is a branch of environmental ethics 
or if it is completely separate. I think it is separate. Here in Brazil many people think 
that animal ethics is a branch of environmental ethics. The main reason I think this is 
not the case is because the fundamental question of environmental ethics is relative to 
the stability, to the integrity, as Aldo Leopoldo said, to the beauty of the system, of 
the whole. That really strikes me as something completely different from the worry 
about the individual’s preference and interests. So there are conflicts and tensions 
between these thoughts. For instance, we can see this in the problem that we are 
facing about the over-population of some species, and how to deal with this kind of 
situation. The problem of the wild boar, the javali. It is a European animal that some 
people from the south of Brazil imported. They brought in a number of wild boars to 
raise, probably for meat and leather, and some escaped from the farms and reproduced 
in the wild. So there are very large numbers of wild boars. It is argued that they need 
to kill them to reduce the numbers. In Brazil, we have a law called the Law of 
Environmental Crimes, which deals with which acts are crimes to the environment. In 
this law cruelty to animals is a crime in Brazil. But it is argued that it is not a crime 
when the environmental authority gives permission to do controlled hunting—to 
eliminate a number of animals that are considered to be over-populated. So there is a 
big discussion here about whether this should be the case with wild boars. Should we 
hunt and kill them as environmental ethicists might perhaps assert as they worry about 
the stability of the ecosystem. Or perhaps as an animal ethicist, we cannot do that, 
let’s try to do other things, such as move some of the animals to another place or 
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sterilise the females if that is the only option that we have. That is just one example 
about the tension between those lines of thoughts.  
 
Some time ago, I was talking about that issue with a student, and he said “Well, I 
think that you should wear leather shoes because leather is more biodegradable than 
plastic.” Because I was wearing a fake leather shoe, a plastic shoe, we entered into 
this discussion. Fake leather shoes are bad for the environment as whenever you stop 
using the shoes, the plastic will decompose very slowly. Our concerns are very 
different. He is worried about not damaging the environment with plastic, and I am 
worried about not damaging the individual animal that was killed for the shoe. 
 
In Brazil, we use animals a lot for transport to collect cans or trash. There is also an 
island here in Rio, Ilha de Paquetá, which is a traditional touristic spot that people go 
to on the weekends to ride horses on the beaches. The horses are in a very bad 
condition. I was telling the students that we should think about substituting the horses 
for electric cars, so that people can ride but they don’t pollute the environment or hurt 
the horses. But a student objected, “We shouldn’t do that, it’s tradition, it is better that 
we should abandon cars and ride horses because it is better for the environment.” The 
argument goes that we should go back to using more horsepower instead of cars, 
because cars are bad for the environment, and horses are better for the environment. It 
is more ecological in that sense. These are some examples of this tension between 
environmental and animal ethics.  
 
Q: What is your perception of the influence of Leonardo Boff in Brazil in terms of 
ecological and animal thought? 
 
A: I don’t know him personally. My impression of him is that he has importance in 
Brazil, in South America. People respect him a lot. He is politically more to the left, 
of course. For instance we are now facing the elections for mayor, and he is 
supporting a candidate from a very left wing political party, which is coherent with 
his position. From the point of view about the worries about nature and animals, I 
have read some of his books—and he has a lot of books! He has three or four directly 
thinking about nature, or more than that perhaps. I did not like his books. Thinking 
about the ecological point of view they are very superficial from my perspective. But 
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I think he is obviously attached to the environmental ethics side, Aldo Leopold, Arne 
Ness. More Leopold, I would say. He is concerned about the stability of the planet 
and that is good. But I doubt that his environmental ethics or earth ethics is a step to 
get to thinking about animals. I very much doubt that Leonardo will reach this point. 
 
Q: Please explain why you don’t think it is a step. 
 
A: I read a lot about Aldo Leopold when I was writing my PhD thesis and I read his 
biography, it is very clear. For instance, one turning point for Aldo Leopold was when 
he killed a mother wolf with kittens. He said he was transformed from that point. He 
said that from that point on he turned his mind to the mountains. But the main issue 
was not the problem of killing the wolf. The problem is that killing the wolf was 
eliminating the wolf from the country, and would bring bad consequences with it. He 
used to hunt with bows because he thought bows were more primitive than guns. His 
whole life he hunted and he didn’t see a problem with hunting. I think it is very 
difficult to move from ecological thinking to animal ethics. He was attached to that 
idea that hunting leads you to a more natural, more primitive man, and that this is 
good. That it is good to enter that kind of relationship with prey. It is really 
entrenched in Leopold’s work. I don’t know if Leonardo is so attached to those same 
ideas. But broadly speaking, this kind of line of thought really does not necessarily 
lead to concern for individual animals. I think that is a different story. Environmental 
law is more attached to the ecological side of it than to animals. That is an interesting 
point too, as I also teach environmental law. The place to study animals in Brazilian 
law is inside environmental law. I strongly disagree with this because animals are 
seen as a natural resource inside environmental law. It is really attached to ideas of 
species conservation. Whereas I think animal ethics and animal rights is nearer to the 
human rights discourse. That the place to study animals in Brazil is inside 
environmental law—I think that is a problem. It is in the wrong place, because in 
environmental law, you always think about the collective point of view. 
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Appendix 9. Excerpts from Dr Carlos Naconecy Interview 
 
September 22, 2016 
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 
 
Q: How do you see the animal movement in relation to Brazilian culture?  
 
A: As I see it, the Brazilian people are more emotive and spirtualised than people 
from Anglo Saxon countries like Britain and the US, and that makes it different. The 
concepts of compassion and solidarity are more familiar to us than respect and rights. 
Respect and rights are not part of our moral vocabulary in the strong sense. Of course 
we talk about respect and animal rights, but not so strongly as I can see in other 
countries. The reason, I think, is the strong Catholic influence and politically speaking 
the tradition of left wing governments. So we have other moral vocabulary to deal 
with moral problems. 
 
Q: So how do you understand the concepts of solidarity and compassion? What work 
do they do in moral terms?  
 
A: We look at the weak in a different way, with a special inclination, so we say “poor 
man” or “poor animal.” In contrast to an analytical, pragmatic, and logical approach 
that you can see in Anglo Saxon countries, we see them as weak. It happens in other 
countries in South America, not just Brazil. This explains why we don’t have a lot of 
direct action tactics or strategies, because we don’t have the same ideas of rights, 
respect, and justice. “Oh poor rabbits, let’s help them,” is different from “they have 
rights, let’s go and get justice for them.” 
 
Q: What do you see as the major challenge in terms of changing the way we use 
animals for food in the Brazilian context? 
 
A: The meat industry here is very powerful. The number one financial contributors to 
the presidential elections here were the meat industry. We have seen some kind of 
reaction against vegetarianism here in the media. This is good. Some years ago they 
did not care about vegetarianism or what was happening in the animal movement. 
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Now they are starting to react. They buy advertising space in magazines, with adverts 
that say: “Doctors say eating meat is good for you.” They are starting to recognise the 
vegetarian movement here, and this is only very recently in the last two or three years. 
 
Q: How do you see the challenges for animals in Brazil?  
 
A: We have the biggest commercial cattle industry in the world (India is the biggest, 
but it is not commercial). Most of this farming is not intensive farming, but extensive. 
If you speak about animal suffering, people would say they are not in factories they 
are in fields, in contrast to countries in Europe and the US. This is one of the 
problems for animal activism, because if you import materials, reflections, campaign 
strategies, they are not so effective as it is a different context here. This is a good 
thing that the animals are in extensive rather than an intensive regime, but the bad part 
is that it is destroying natural resources, because you need room to keep cattle. 
Natural resources are being devastated because of this. So it is good for the animal 
welfare aspect but bad for the environmental aspect. 
 
Brazil has strong social inequalities. The problem with this is that we are exposed to 
vulnerabilities much more than other countries. The problem with this is the lack of 
moral visual sensitivity; you are used to seeing violence, inequality and vulnerability, 
much more than in other countries. This is bad for animals. This is a huge cultural 
difference. 
 
Q: When we were talking the other day, you likened this issue to slavery. Can you say 
a little more about that? 
 
A: Yes, this country was built upon slavery. You can see the presence of the logic of 
the slavery everywhere. Slavery was abolished just about one century ago, which is 
like yesterday in terms of historical perspective. We have people who put gasoline in 
your car, who are probably black, and who serve you in your house. This is a hang 
over from slavery times. The whole idea that a creature serves another creature is not 
such a strange idea here. It has a huge impact on the animal issue. In the UK, the anti-
vivisection movement began in the nineteenth century. In the nineteenth century here, 
we had human slaves. 
 209 
 
Q: I know Brazil has a strong eco-movement, how do you see the tensions or the 
differences between the two movements?  
 
A: We have huge environmental problems and they compete with animal problems. 
We have huge natural resources. We have so much to damage, compared to other 
countries. We have seemingly more urgent environmental problems to deal with. 
Animals are part of the environmental issues, but they are not the focus. It is a huge 
task and the challenge of the animal movement here is to try and link and show that 
both issues are connected.  But it is not intuitive. You have to show people this 
connection. 
 
Q: What do you see positively in the Brazilian culture that could help the future of 
animal here?  
 
A: The positive is that it is a new movement, so we have room to grow. That is why 
international animal organisations are coming. Everything has to be done here. We 
have a huge animal agriculture here. We have a huge amount of victims. We have a 
mission here.  This is the beginning of our animal ethics history. 
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Appendix 10. Excerpts from Felinos du Campus, PUC Group Interview 
 
Interview with members of Felinos du Campus at the Pontifical Catholic University 
of Rio de Janeiro (PUC) 
- Patricia Österreicher, faculty member at PUC 
- Thaissa da Silva Mocoes Puppin, student at PUC 
- Maria Teresa Barcellos, volunteer with Felinos du Campus 
 
September 25, 2016 
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 
 
Q: Why is it so problematic rehoming black cats? 
 
Thaissa: In general, people do not like black cats I think because they are considered 
unlucky. It is a superstitious thing. They are not good luck. 
 
Patricia: They are used for black magic. So when it is close to Friday 13th or 
Halloween, people who work to have animals adopted do not give up for adoption any 
black animals around those dates. We had a few volunteers that knew about the 
African religious practices, I don’t. What people say is that those are the religions that 
use black animals for rituals, but that is not true. In Europe it happens too and there 
are people who practice European black magic and white magic. So here we have 
problems with the adopting of black animals as we have to be very, very careful. 
People go on Facebook and they ask for black animals. Generally they ask for kittens 
because when they are neutered they cannot be used for magic. So that is why we 
promote continually that all the cats on campus are neutered because they are not 
good for black magic. Cats who are completely white are used also. 
 
Q: Is this related to animal sacrifice? 
 
Patricia: Yes. It is precisely that. It is awful. But every time I see it in the news, I 
always post it on Facebook for the people who do not believe it happens. It happens. 
Black hens, black roosters, black goats, but cats and dogs are easier to find.  
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Thaissa: Goats in general. These ideas are present in the imagination of the general 
public. So when they see a black cat, even if they themselves do not practice the 
rituals, they see in them a sign of bad luck.  
 
Q: So you have pedigree animals, then you have rescued animals, and then you seem 
to have liminal space animals, who are around but are not completely feral because 
some people care for them. 
 
Patricia: You have plenty of places in Rio where cat colonies have started. You have 
the trees and the vegetation, and so people abandon the cat because they think they 
will be okay there. He can find food, he can hunt, or there are people who will take 
care of him. The groups were established taking care of these specific places where 
the colonies have formed. 
 
Q: How many groups are there in Rio de Janeiro taking care of the cat colonies? 
 
Patricia: For each place there is a group, or two groups. Thank God. For each area you 
have a different group.  
 
Q: How are animals viewed in Brazil? 
 
Thaissa: Animals are not cared for, they are not seen as beings that need neutering 
and caring for. They are still things, objects. It is thought that they will just take care 
of themselves. There is this idea, with cats specifically because they reproduce so fast, 
and there are plenty of them. They are not controlled. They are not neutered. They are 
not considered to be as good as plants. They are not seen as deserving beings who 
need care.  
 
Patricia: They are not seen as living, sentient beings who have a right to life and 
dignity. Just like objects. Even less than objects as an object belongs to you and you 
can sell it. An animal it is just seen as a nuisance.  
 
Thaissa: They are just good for barbeque. We have here in this country kitten 
barbeque. 
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Q: People eat cats here? 
 
Patricia: Not officially. But they do. 
 
Q: Does the fact that your University is Catholic have an impact on your work? 
 
Thaissa: We have a lot of different views here. I can talk about the students’ view. 
How they view us, how they view the group. In general, we are very well seen. The 
issue is really important and the group is important. In general the students think it is 
cool, it is good, because it is politically correct. We have to respect all forms of life. 
But when you ask them about animals rights or if you see them as living beings, they 
say no, they are not as important as humans. They are just animals. That is one of the 
issues I am addressing in my final project—what is so important about humans and 
how do we define that. Why humans are important? Why animals are not? We have 
logic, we are rational, we think. God created man and God created animals to serve 
man.  
 
Q: What language do you use in your work to talk about animals? 
 
Thaissa: Compassion. I used language that appeals to religious or spiritual people. 
They have souls. They need to be cared for. They suffer just like us. Because when 
you talk in terms of rights, it is something completely strange for people here. It is 
difficult to talk about humans having rights here. We are not used to that. 
 
Maria: Some people have rights and some people do not. 
 
Thaissa: Yes, we still have that here. This in-between situation. So when you talk 
about rights in terms of animals it is completely alien. Brazilians do not understand 
themselves as having rights. We are just taking baby steps. Imagine thinking about 
that with animals.  
 
Patricia: There are some people in the judicial area that are starting to consider this. 
This is very good because people still believe in laws, more than in religion. Simple 
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compassion. You see someone suffering and you do something for that being. Like 
rescuing birds. I have rescued birds, and they recuperate on my terrace and then they 
fly away when they are better. Every time that I carry a bird home, people stop me 
and ask what I am doing? 
 
Thaissa: When I rescued a hamster, people said, “what are you doing? This is a 
sewage animal, it is not supposed to be in a home.” But this is not a sewage animal. 
People do not think any form of life beyond humans deserve to have rights. 
 
Q: Can you say something about the different ways that animals are viewed in the 
country as opposed to in the city? 
 
Thaissa: Some of my mother’s family lives in the country on a small farm. They view 
animals as a product. We are going to feed them and use them. They provide 
something that will be used. 
 
Patricia: They are resources. Dogs are for shepherding; cats are for keeping mice 
away from grain, and horses. 
 
Q: Why don’t you like to talk about being a vegetarian or vegan? 
 
Patricia: You are called a radical, or an extremist. People suddenly want to talk to you 
about B12, iron, protein. I have been a vegetarian my whole life, and I have been a 
vegan for many years. But when you go out with people you don’t know, they 
immediately notice that you are not having meat. So they always try to trick you into 
arguing about it. So I think that is why, not only here in Brazil, but generally people 
can be reluctant to talk about it. 
 
Thaissa: Especially in Brazil because people are so willing to argue with you. 
 
Patricia: They make fun of you. They are very quick to make fun of everything and 
they turn your views into a joke. It is very hard because they are aggressive, and they 
make fun of you.  
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Thaissa: It is a form of humiliation. It is not directly, but they will make fun of you. 
You become a sport. 
 
Q: Are there Brazilian qualities that you think might enable the animal movement? 
 
Maria: Solidarity. I think it is a good characteristic. 
 
Patricia: Yes, that is true. When you have great tragedies like flooding, landslides, etc. 
Then you have lots of people losing their houses and dying; then people exist in 
solidarity. Lately, in the last ten years, you have a lot of people organising groups to 
save the animals. At the beginning it was not very well seen, “why are you saving the 
dogs or the cats or the horses, when you have children dying?” 
 
Thaissa: Every time here when you want to make a point about animal rights, they 
bring up children. Think about the kids. 
 
Patricia: Recently, the biggest animal shelter in Rio, SUIPA was in a terrible 
situation. The president of SUIPA died, and the little money they had was blocked, 
and their bank accounts were suspended. So there was an appeal for people to help 
SUIPA and people donated tons of cat food, dog food, medicine, and everything. So 
when I see that, I think why don’t people do that all the time? Why only when there is 
a tragedy? 
 
Thaissa: I think in Brazil there is a very strong characteristic. You don’t prevent the 
situation. You solve it once it has happened. 
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